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Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades, the rise of government expenditure on 
pharmaceutical across many countries and in Australia has led governments and 
policy makers in these countries to implement cost containment measures. In 
Australia, cost containment reforms such as the requirement of economic 
evaluation (1993), re-supply limits (1994), a brand substitution policy (1994), co-
payment increases (1997 and 2005), a therapeutic group premium policy (1998), 
the safety net 20 days rule (2006), the creation of F1 and F2 formularies (2007), 
premium-free dispensing (2008) and price cuts (2008 onwards) have been 
implemented between 1992 and 2011.  
The objective of this study was to investigate the impact of cost 
containment reforms to the PBS on prescribing volumes and expenditure. 
Monthly government expenditure (benefit) and prescription volume (service) 
data was retrieved from Medicare Australia’s PBS Statistics database and 
segmented linear regression models were used to analyse the time series data 
starting from 1 January 1992 to 31 March 2012. In each segment, two 
parameters, the level and trend were used to estimate the impact of the 
intervention. The level parameter estimates the differences in absolute value 
between pre-intervention and post-intervention immediately following the 
intervention while the trend parameter estimates the differences in growth rate 
or slope over the segment. The data were classified into three categories, 
Category 1 (all ATC main drug groups), Category 2 (all HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups) and Category 3 (all Atorvastatin drug groups). The 
Category 1 analysis provided a general perspective of the PBS cost containment 
reforms while the statins group was selected for analysis in Category 2 because 
this group is most widely dispensed and incurs the highest total expenditure in 
the PBS. In the Category 3 analysis, Atorvastatin was selected for further analysis 
because Atorvastatin was the most prescribed drugs and incurred the highest 
xviii 
 
expenditure in PBS for the year ending June 2012. Seven cost containment 
policies mainly the requirement of economic evaluation, re-supply limits, co-
payment increases, the therapeutic group premium policy, the safety net 20 
days rule and price cuts were investigated. In addition to these policies, four new 
listing dates of statins (Pravastatin, Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin, and Rosuvastatin) 
in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme were included as breakpoints, applicable 
only to Category 2 and 3 analyses. Nine dependent variables, Total Service 
(General + Concessional), Total Benefits (General + Concessional), Total Service 
(General), Total Benefit (General), Total Service (Concessional), Total Benefits 
(Concessional), Total Service per thousand of the population (Total 
Service/1000), Total Benefits per thousand of the population (Total 
Benefits/1000) and the Defined Daily Doses (DDDs) per thousand of the 
population per day (DDDs/1000/day) were included in the analysis. The 
concessional beneficiary category consists of low-income earners and 
unemployed people who are on social security payments while the general 
beneficiary category includes all Australian insured by Medicare excluding those 
in the concessional beneficiary category. 
In the Category 1 analysis, seven cost containment policies were analysed 
and all except the re-supply limits policy were found to have significant impact 
on at least one of the outcome variables. For the category 2 analysis, six cost 
containment policies (re-supply limits, two co-payment increases, the 
therapeutic group premium policy, the safety net 20 days rule and price cuts) 
and four new listing dates of statins were analysed and were found to have 
significant impact on at least one of the outcome variables except the listing of 
Pravastatin. For the category 3 analysis, three cost containment policies (co-
payment increase, the safety net 20 days rule and price cuts) and the new listing 
date of Rosuvastatin were analysed and all interventions were found to have 
significant impact on at least one of the outcome variables. The two increases in 
patient’s co-payment implemented in January 1997 and January 2005 resulted in 
xix 
 
an immediate drop in the level of services and benefits but the interventions 
effects were reversed in the following months post intervention where the trend 
continued to increase. The safety net 20 days rule was the only measure that 
displayed outcomes that matched with the expected impact, where reductions 
in both the level and trend for all beneficiaries were observed. For the 
therapeutic group premium policy, the category 1 analysis showed a deceasing 
direction for both level and trend of services and benefits after the policy 
implementation while in the category 2 analysis, no significant changes were 
observed in the trend in benefits. The implementation of the price cuts resulted 
in an increase in the levels of services and benefits across all categories. 
However, in the following months the trends of services and benefits returned to 
the pre-intervention trend. 
Generally, the study found that not all cost containment measures were 
effective in containing costs. Among those measures, the safety net 20 days rule 
was found to be the most effective in reducing drugs utilisation and expenditure 
with the overall trend in services and benefits reduced after its implementation 
in addition to initial decrease in level. The therapeutic group premium policy was 
effective in containing utilisation and cost but its effectiveness may be limited to 
only a short time of period.  
The main limitation of the study was the PBS data not capturing PBS 
prescriptions priced below the general co-payment level prior to April 2012, so 
results relating to number of services may not reflect the actual effect of the 
interventions. This limitation does not extend to analyses of the level and trend 
of PBS benefits paid as the focus of the study was the impact of cost 
containment measures on government spending on pharmaceuticals.  
This study has considered the impact of cost containment policies on 
prescription volumes and expenditure. Future research should examine the 
xx 
 
impact of these policies on other areas such as adherence with medications, 
health outcomes and health-related quality. 
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Chapter 1.0 Introduction 
 
Globally, the rise of government expenditure on pharmaceuticals in most 
developed countries over the last two decades poses a major public health 
problem (Almarsdóttir et al., 2005). Rising pharmaceutical expenditure places a 
financial burden on the healthcare system and if left unchecked may result in a 
healthcare funding crisis. Due to high healthcare costs, patients’ accessibility to 
and affordability of medical care may be restricted and threaten coverage for 
healthcare. In Australia, similar trends are developing in the healthcare system in 
relation to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) with health and 
pharmaceutical expenditures having more than doubled over the ten year period 
from 2001/02 (Department of Health and Ageing, 2012).  
The issue of rising pharmaceutical expenditure has received considerable 
critical attention by governments and policy makers. Various cost containment 
measures have been implemented to contain expenditure by influencing the 
demand and supply for pharmaceuticals (Busse et al., 2005). To date there has 
been little agreement on the impact and effectiveness of these cost containment 
measures. Due to the variety of cost containment measures, and coupled with 
cross-country differences in healthcare systems and populations, a conclusive 
assessment of the impact of individual measures has not been made. Most 
studies of the impact of cost containment policies have only focussed on a single 
type of measure and have been limited to measures such as the introduction of a 
reference pricing system and patient cost sharing. In addition, systematic 
reviews of cost containment measures have been restricted to a narrow range of 
measures, usually a single type of measure (Weir et al., 2012). No previous 
systematic reviews have reviewed different cost containment measures in the 
same study, thus making comparison between measures problematic. For 
Australia, the number of studies is even more limited despite numerous cost 
2 
 
containment measures having been introduced by the Australian 
Commonwealth government. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of cost 
containment reforms to the PBS on prescribing volumes and expenditure. Data 
for this study was retrieved from Medicare Australia’s PBS Statistics database 
that provides monthly government expenditure (benefit) and prescription 
volume (service) data. Analysis of the time series data in this study is by the 
application of segmented linear regression models. Two parameters, the level 
and trend were used to estimate the impact of the intervention in each segment. 
This dissertation comprises six chapters, including this introductory 
chapter. Chapter Two provides an overview of the global pharmaceutical 
industry and the types of healthcare system as well as the different categories of 
cost containment measures.  
The third chapter focuses on the Australian healthcare system and the 
PBS. An overview of past healthcare and PBS expenditure trends and the key 
drivers to the growth in PBS expenditure are discussed. Cost containment 
reforms and measures implemented by the Australian Commonwealth 
government between 1992 and 2011 are also discussed. 
The fourth chapter comprises a systematic review of the pharmaceutical 
cost containment measures implemented in different jurisdictions. Chapter Five 
then presents the methods and results of the analysis examining the impact of 
cost containment reforms to the PBS. The analysis was undertaken for three 
categories: category 1 (all ATC main drug groups), category 2 (all HMG-CoA 
reductase inhibitor drug groups) and category 3 (all Atorvastatin drug groups). 
Seven cost containment measures were investigated for the category 1 analysis 
while the category 2 analysis evaluated six cost containment measures and four 
new statins listings and the category 3 analysis evaluated three cost containment 
measures and one new statins listing.  
3 
 
The final chapter concludes the dissertation by interpreting the overall 
research findings, including from the systematic review and the statistical 
analysis. These findings and their significance are discussed in the wider context 
of similar research findings about the impact of cost containment policies both in 
Australia and internationally.  
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Chapter 2.0 Pharmaceutical Industry and Its Stakeholders: A 
Global Perspective 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the pharmaceutical industry and 
its stakeholders from a global perspective. Globally, the pharmaceutical industry 
is a sizeable industry and is regarded by many countries as a vital industry in 
their economy. Types of pharmaceutical products are described in the following 
section. As the majority of the pharmaceutical expenditure is borne by the 
government, this chapter will then examine the level of government’s 
pharmaceutical expenditure in several OECD countries. Next, types of healthcare 
systems are described, and the scope of cost containment measures discussed in 
the following section was restricted to those implemented in national or tax-
based health care systems and social health insurance systems. Only cost 
containment measures implemented to control the increase in public healthcare 
spending were included. Cost containment measures were categorised into 
measures that influence the demand for pharmaceuticals and those that 
influence the supply for pharmaceuticals. 
 
2.2  Overview of the Global Pharmaceutical Industry 
The global pharmaceutical market is a multibillion dollar industry and 
ranked as one of the most profitable industries in the United States (Gottlieb, 
2002). In 2011, global pharmaceutical spending was at US$956 billion, an 
increase of nearly US$351 billion from the US$605 billion recorded in 2005 (IMS 
Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2011a). This figure is expected to escalate to 
nearly US$1.2 trillion by 2016 with an annual global growth of US$30 billion in 
2012 and likely up to US$70 billion in 2016. Geographically, in 2011 the 
traditional markets of North America, Europe and Japan dominated the global 
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share of pharmaceutical spending with 36%, 24% and 12% respectively. These 
markets are expected to shrink in their market share of pharmaceutical spending 
with an annual growth of 1 to 4% through 2016. On the other hand, the future 
growth in the pharmaceutical industry will depend much on the emerging 
markets such as China, Brazil, India and Russia where domestic healthcare 
consumption is growing rapidly. China and Russia are expected to register a 
strong growth in pharmaceutical spending, doubling the amount spent on 
pharmaceutical by 2016. According to IMS Health, the China market alone is 
expected to reach US$161 billion, Brazil US$47 billion and Russia US$27 billion by 
2016 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012a). 
There are more than 2000 pharmaceutical and biotech companies 
worldwide with the majority of these companies based in the United States. In 
2011, the top 20 pharmaceutical companies by sales earned approximately 
US$520 billion, representing 60% of global pharmaceutical sales (IMS Institute 
for Healthcare Informatics, 2011b). These companies generally hold numerous 
blockbuster drugs that generate big profits. At the top of the list is Pfizer’s Lipitor 
(atorvastatin calcium) used treating dyslipidemia and for cardiovascular disease 
prevention, which recorded sales of US$12.5 billion in 2011, followed by Bristol-
Myers Squibb and Sanofi-Aventis’s Plavix (clopidogrel), an antiplatelet agent with 
sales of US$9.3 billion, and GlaxoSmithKline’s Seretide (fluticasone/salmeterol) 
used in the management of asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) with US$8.7 billion of sales (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 
2012b).  
Both the developed and developing countries view the pharmaceutical 
industry as a vital component to their economic sustainability and growth. The 
pharmaceutical industry contributes significantly to employment, trade and 
research and development (R&D). In 2010, around 650,000 people in the United 
States and 663,500 people in Europe were involved directly in the 
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pharmaceutical industry while in China 1,604,800 people were employed in the 
pharmaceutical industry (International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers and Associations, 2012). In pharmaceutical trade, Europe remains 
the world’s top exporter of pharmaceuticals. Europe exported nearly US$360 
billion worth of pharmaceuticals in 2010 while the United States exported 
US$39.4 billion (International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations, 2011). The revenues from pharmaceutical sales are reinvested into 
pharmaceutical R&D activities. In 2007, the United States lead in R&D 
investments reaching US$47 billion, followed by US$10.4 billion in Japan and 
US$3.9 billion in France. The continuous investment in R&D results in major 
breakthrough in the fight against disease and provides a steady stream of new 
drugs. In 2012 alone, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved 35 new drugs, with the majority of the drugs to be used for cancer 
treatments (U.S. Food And Drug Administration, 2012b). Although the new 
cutting edge drugs are better in treating diseases, these newer drugs are usually 
more expensive than their predecessor with some even double or triple in prices. 
 
2.3 Generic versus Brand Name Pharmaceutical Products 
Pharmaceuticals can be divided into two broad categories: generic drugs 
and brand name drugs. The United States FDA defines a generic drug as “a drug 
product that is comparable to brand/reference listed drug product in dosage 
form, strength, route of administration, quality and performance characteristics, 
and intended use” (U.S. Food And Drug Administration, 2012a). Generic drug are 
generally drugs that are marketed after the patent and exclusive protection of a 
brand name drug ends and typically cost 30 to 80 percent less than the brand 
name drug (IMAP, 2001). A brand name drug is a drug marketed under a 
proprietary, trademark-protected name. The company that holds the patent for 
the drug has the exclusive right to produce and sell the drug (U.S. Food And Drug 
Administration, 2012a).  
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The global generic drugs market was worth US$242.0 billion in 2009, 
representing a market share of 25% of total pharmaceutical spending and is 
projected to reach US$400.0 to US$430.0 billion by 2014 with a larger market 
share of 35% of total pharmaceutical spending (IMS Institute for Healthcare 
Informatics, 2012a). The growth in the generic market was due to the large 
numbers of drugs that went off patent since the beginning of 2010. This 
phenomenon of large patent expirations is referred to as the “patent cliff.” In 
2011, two blockbuster drugs Plavix’s Lipitor (atorvastatin calcium) and Eli Lilly’s 
Zyprexa (olanzapine) went off patent protection (IMS Institute for Healthcare 
Informatics, 2011a). Jointly, these two drugs eroded US$18.2 billion from the 
companies’ annual sales. In 2012, more blockbuster drugs were taken off their 
patent protection such as Bristol-Myers Squibb and Sanofi-Aventis’s Plavix 
(clopidogrel), AstraZeneca’s Seroquel (quetiapine), and Merck’s Singulair 
(montelukast) with combined annual sales of US$23 billion. Between 2012 and 
2016, at least nine blockbuster drugs are scheduled to lose their patent 
protection, costing pharmaceutical companies US$62.6 billion in annual sales 
(IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012b).  
 
2.4 Pharmaceutical Expenditure in Public Healthcare 
Pharmaceuticals are regarded as one of the main focus points in 
delivering excellent healthcare, with public pharmaceutical expenditures 
constituting a significant and increasing share of national Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). In 2011, OECD countries spent between 0.1 and 1.9% of the 
national GDP subsidising pharmaceuticals (Figure 2.1) (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). Pharmaceuticals include 
prescription medicines and over-the-counter medicines (OTC medicines) while in 
some countries, other medical non-durables such as bandages, elasticized 
stockings, incontinence articles, condoms and other mechanical contraceptive 
devices were included. Ten countries consisting of Greece, Slovak Republic, 
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Japan, Hungary, France, Ireland, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Portugal recorded 
pharmaceutical expenditure of more than 1% of their national GDP. Public 
pharmaceutical spending in Greece was the highest among OECD countries at 
1.92% of its national GDP (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.1 Public expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in selected OECD countries, 2011 
 
Over the last decade, government expenditure on pharmaceuticals in 
OECD counties increased by an average of 76.2% (Table 2.1). The most notable 
increase was in Ireland where pharmaceutical expenditure increased by 211.9% 
from US$741 million to US$2,313 million in 2011; followed by the United States 
where government pharmaceutical expenditure increased by 200% from 
US$33,008 million in 2001 to US$98,994 million in 2011. Others European Union 
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(EU) countries such as Greece and Netherlands recorded an increase of 150.6% 
and 126.1% respectively. In the Asian region, Korea has the highest increase in 
pharmaceutical spending with a 151.7% increase from US$5,352 million in 2001 
to US$13,472 million in 2011 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013).  
The continuous increase in public pharmaceutical expenditures places 
financial constraints on overall public healthcare expenditure. A larger portion of 
the public healthcare budget must be allocated for pharmaceutical purchases, 
therefore reducing the budget allocation for other essential public healthcare 
services. In 2011, pharmaceutical expenditure accounted for between 2.88% and 
32.3% of healthcare budgets (Figure 2.2). Greece has the highest percentage of 
pharmaceutical expenditure among the 30 OECD countries with 32.3% followed 
by the Slovak Republic (27.0%), Hungary (26.1%), Korea (22.8%), and Ireland 
(21.0%) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). 
10 
 
Table 2.1 Public expenditure on pharmaceutical, 2001 and 2011 
Country 
Amount (Million US$) 
Growth rate (%) 
2001 2011 
Ireland 741 2,312 211.9 
United States 33,008 98,994 199.9 
Korea 5,352 13,472 151.7 
Greece 2,239 5,611 150.6 
Netherlands 2,778 6,282 126.1 
Canada 4,979 9,809 97.0 
Slovak Republic 1,006 1,968 95.6 
Estonia 93 182 95.4 
Poland 2,787 4,955 77.8 
Finland 759 1,345 77.1 
Japan 33,916 59001¹ 74.0 
Switzerland 1,666 2,893 73.7 
Australia 3,806 6476¹ 70.1 
Spain 10,382 17,049 64.2 
Germany 24,179 38,908 60.9 
Hungary 1,726 2,761 59.9 
Austria 1,948 3,033 55.7 
France 19,144 28,391 48.3 
Luxembourg 146 211 45.2 
Sweden 1,946 2,612 34.2 
Norway 786 1,042 32.6 
Portugal 2,097 2,727 30.0 
Czech Republic 2,003 2,587 29.1 
Denmark 654 823 25.7 
Iceland 65 68 4.6 
Italy 15,362 13,785 -10.3 
Belgium N/A 4,483 N/A 
Chile N/A 337 N/A 
New Zealand N/A 861 N/A 
Slovenia N/A 540 N/A 
    Average growth 
rate 
  
76.2 
        
¹ 2010 data  
 
Source: OECD StatExtracts 2013   
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Figure 2.2 Public expenditure on pharmaceutical as a percentage of health 
expenditure in selected OECD countries, 2011 
 
2.5 The Healthcare System 
Since 1963, there has been much research done on the classification of 
healthcare systems (Freeman et al., 2010). However, the most commonly 
accepted classification of a healthcare system is by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (1987) where three main models were 
proposed; the national health service, a social health insurance system, and a 
private health insurance system. The national health service, also known as the 
Beveridge model, provides universal coverage and derives its funding mainly 
from taxation (direct and indirect). Examples of countries with a national health 
service are the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Canada and Australia. The 
social health insurance system or Bismarck model is a quasi-universal coverage 
system with compulsory health insurance usually financed jointly by employers 
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and employees and funding channelled through non-profit insurance funds. 
Countries such as France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Japan have social 
health insurance systems (Böhm et al., 2013; Wallace, 2013).  
The third model, the private health insurance system is solely funded by 
the private sectors (Lameire et al., 1999). This system is widely use in the United 
States where the majority of the population is covered by private health 
insurance with other insurance coverage provided by the government. 
Government health insurance including Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the Veteran’s Administration (VA) is 
limited to special groups of the population such as those aged 65 years old and 
over (Medicare), the low-income and disabled (Medicaid), children without 
insurance (CHIP) and the military’s veterans (VA) (Stone, 2000). Private health 
insurance is purchased either by the employer or by individuals from a private 
company. The main disadvantage of the private health insurance system is in its 
failure to provide universal healthcare coverage to its population (Garson, 2000). 
In 2011, it is estimated that 15.7% of the population were without any insurance 
coverage (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2012). In examining the impact of cost 
containment measures on pharmaceutical expenditures and prescribing 
volumes, the scope of this study will be limited to countries that have a national 
health service and a social health insurance system. The rationale for limiting the 
scope to these types of health systems is to focus on cost containment measures 
implemented by governments aiming to curb public expenditures. Therefore, 
cost containment measures introduced by health insurance organisations 
operating in a private health insurance system will be excluded. 
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2.6  Cost Containment Measures 
The global economic uncertainties and the European financial crisis in 
recent years have made pharmaceutical expenditures a central part of policy to 
control the increase in public healthcare spending. Governments around the 
world, particularly in Europe, have introduced austerity measures to contain 
pharmaceutical expenditures. Pharmaceutical expenditures are often singled out 
as a target of cost containment in healthcare by policy makers due to the relative 
ease of measuring pharmaceutical costs compared to measuring other 
healthcare costs (Towse, 2003).  
For the past two decades, numerous cost containment measures have 
been introduced with only a few of these policies succeeding in containing 
pharmaceutical expenditures in the long run. Most of the policies introduced 
were not supported by evidence in regards to their effectiveness in containing 
cost (Maynard et al., 2003). However, more recently, an increase in experimental 
and quasi-experimental research on pharmaceutical cost containments policies 
has provided a better evidence-base to help policy makers make decisions.  
Implementation of pharmaceutical policy is extremely difficult due to the 
fact that the sector involves multiple stakeholders: insurers (in most cases 
governments and their agencies), pharmaceutical manufacturers, prescribers 
and pharmacies, and residents with a role as patients and taxpayers (Ess et al., 
2003). Each of the stakeholder groups may have some common objectives such 
as having safe, effective and quality pharmaceuticals. However, in the area of 
policies to contain pharmaceutical costs, each stakeholder has different 
objectives. Insurers act to contain pharmaceutical expenditures by, for example, 
reducing the price and putting constraints on the demand for pharmaceuticals. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers view this as a threat to their profit margin while 
patients see this as restricting their access to pharmaceuticals especially new 
pharmaceuticals that are more expensive. 
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Cost containment policies are put in place to either influence the supply 
or the demand of pharmaceuticals. Atella (2000) concluded that cost 
containment policies can only be sustainable in the long term by manipulating 
both the supply and demand side of the market. Failure to influence both will 
result in short term success and escalating cost in the long run. A cost 
containment model, adapted from Busse et al (2005), categorises cost 
containment policies into three different regulatory measures according to their 
point of intervention: price control, volume control and spending control (Figure 
2.3). Price control works by limiting the amount reimbursed or requires patients 
to pay a portion of the cost of pharmaceuticals. Volume control either limits the 
range of selections available for reimbursement or the quantities of 
pharmaceuticals dispensed at one time, while spending control works by capping 
the total pharmaceutical expenditure. 
 
2.6.1 Influencing the demand for pharmaceuticals  
 
In contrast to many others products, the demand for pharmaceuticals is 
unique being influenced by prescribers, pharmacists and insurers in addition to 
the patients themselves. Demand can either be initiated by the patients or the 
prescribers. The patient’s demand for pharmaceuticals is derived directly from 
the demand for health, seeking for the relief from or prevention of illness. 
Patients are usually not involved in the drug selection process but bear the 
financial commitments with payment ranging from full, partial, to zero payment 
of the price of the drug. The insurer makes the payment for the balance of the 
price. The prescriber, on the other hand, acts as an agent for the patient in 
choosing the best drugs for the patient’s medical conditions. Prescribers are the 
decision makers in the drug selection process but are not involved in financial 
consequences of their decisions (Kanavos, 2003). 
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In principle, cost containment measures influence the demand for 
pharmaceuticals at the point of utilisation. Measures implemented in various 
countries are as follows. 
 
  
 
1
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Types of cost containment measures 
Supply 
Demand 
Price Control Volume Control Spending Control 
  
 Positive and negative list 
 Prescription controls and 
duration limits 
 Patient Cost-Sharing  
o Fixed co-payment 
o Proportional co-payment 
o Caps 
o Ceilings 
o Tier co-payment 
o Combination of the above 
 Budget System 
 Generic substitution 
 Therapeutic substitution 
 Price cuts 
 Maximum pricing 
 Reference pricing 
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2.6.1.1 Patient cost-sharing 
Patient cost-sharing is by far the most popular demand-related measure 
implemented by policy makers. It reduces the insurer’s pharmaceutical expenditure 
by shifting the financial burden from the insurer to the patients and making 
patients more cost-conscious by shifting to cheaper drugs (Gross et al., 1994). It 
also prevents unnecessary demand by creating financial disincentives for patients to 
use pharmaceuticals (Doran et al., 2011). Studies show that patients with higher 
cost-sharing tend to use less drugs and cheaper drugs compare to those with lower 
cost-sharing (Joyce et al., 2002). Patient cost-sharing measures are described in 
different terms and definitions with regards to the numbers and types of drugs 
covered, types of patient groups covered and the size of the patient’s financial 
share. The different types of cost-sharing implemented by policy makers are fixed 
co-payments, proportional co-payment/coinsurance, caps, ceilings and tier co-
payments (Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008).  
2.6.1.1.1 Fixed Co-payment 
A fixed co-payment is defined as a fixed amount of payment paid by the 
patient per drug or prescription. The purpose of a fixed co-payment is to 
reduce drugs utilisation and overall drug expenditures. Co-payments for 
every prescription are the same amount regardless of whether a brand or 
generic drug. Thus, patients have no incentives to choose less expensive 
drugs (Gross et al., 1994). A fixed co-payment policy is practised in countries 
such as United Kingdom and Australia. In the United Kingdom, a fixed co-
payment is applied in all National Health System (NHS) prescription items. 
This payment of £7.85 (from April 2013) per prescription was required 
regardless of the underlying cost of the drugs supplied (Government Digital 
Service, 2013). In Australia, a maximum co-payment of A$36.10 (from 
January 2013) per prescription was required to be paid by patients in the 
general category for most Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) medicines 
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while patients in the concessional category paid A$5.90 per prescription. In 
the event of medicines costing below the co-payment amount, patients will 
only be charged for the medicines cost (Department of Health and Ageing, 
2013). 
2.6.1.1.2 Proportional co-payment/coinsurance 
Proportional co-payment also known as coinsurance is defined as an amount 
paid by the patient based on the percentage of the drug or prescription cost. 
In contrast to fixed co-payment, proportional co-payment gives patients 
incentives to choose less expensive drugs and reduce drugs utilisation and 
overall drug expenditures. For example, since January 2004, patients in 
Germany paid 10% of the prescription cost but this was limited to a 
maximum payment of €10.0 (Herr et al., 2011). 
2.6.1.1.3 Caps 
A cap imposes a limit on either the volume or the amount of prescriptions 
purchased by the patient at no cost or minimal payment. If the cap is 
reached, the patient is required to pay all additional pharmacy costs out of 
pocket. The purpose of caps is to encourage patients and prescribers to use 
fewer medications and prioritise their drugs usage (Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 
2008). In the United States, with the Medicare Part D benefit, patients were 
required to pay a deductible of US$325.0 (for the year 2013) and an 
additional 25% of the drugs cost up to an Initial Coverage Limit of US$2,970 
(for the year 2013). Once the Initial Coverage Limit was reached, patients 
were required to pay full payment of the cost of drugs (Q1Group LLC, 2013). 
2.6.1.1.4 Ceilings 
A ceiling, also known as a deductible or safety net, is defined as a co-
payment or contribution by patients to the cost of the drugs up to a certain 
threshold or ceiling in a defined period of time. Once the ceiling is reached, 
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the safety net applies and patient’s co-payments are reduced or exempted. 
The ceiling policy benefits high users of medicines such as patients with 
chronic disease or those using multiple drugs (Brown et al., 2006). For the 
year 2011, patients in Sweden were entitled to full reimbursement for any 
expenditure above an annual ceiling of DKK2,200 (€244) while chronically ill 
patients in Denmark were given full reimbursement for drug purchases 
above the annual ceiling of DKK3,555 (€477) (Anell et al., 2012; Olejaz et al., 
2012). In Australia, the safety net thresholds beginning January 2013 were at 
A$354.00 and A$1,390.60 for the concessional beneficiary category and the 
general beneficiary category respectively. Once the safety net was reached, 
the general category patient paid A$5.90 per prescription while the 
concessional category patient got the medicine for free (Department of 
Health and Ageing, 2013).  
2.6.1.1.5 Tier co-payment 
A tier co-payment is a co-payment structure where patients pay a different 
co-payment for drugs, depending on the tier of the drugs. Generic drugs 
usually comprise the lowest tier, with the lowest co-payment required while 
brand drugs are usually in the second tier where it a higher patient’s co-
payment is required. In the case of a multi-tier structure, the second tier is 
usually for preferred brands, the third tier for branded drugs and the fourth 
tier is typically for drugs that require prescription by a specialist. The higher 
the drugs in the tier hierarchy, the higher the patient’s co-payment 
required. The purpose of tier co-payments is to encourage patients to use 
generic or cheaper drugs by choosing a lower tiered drug. Tier co-payment 
policy also gives insurers the bargaining power to negotiate with 
manufacturers for a price rebate in exchange for a preferred tier by the 
manufacturers (Goldman, 2007). 
 
 20 
 
 
2.6.1.2 Positive and negative list 
A positive and negative list is basically a formulary that defines the drugs 
eligible for reimbursement. A positive list formulary includes drugs that are eligible 
for reimbursement while a negative formulary list includes drugs that are not 
reimbursed with the full cost of the drug has to be borne by patients (Ess et al., 
2003). The lists are revised regularly to include new drugs and to exclude drugs with 
low therapeutic value. The aims of the listing are to reduce overall pharmaceutical 
expenditures and drugs overutilization. However, the need to individualise a 
patient’s treatment may lead to the selection of second best alternative drugs due 
to the limited choice available to the patient (Dewa et al., 2003). This creates a 
“balloon effect”, whereby restraining expenditures in one part of the health sector 
(in this case, pharmaceutical expenditure) will inflate expenditures in another part 
(for example, hospitalisation cost) and lead to increases in the overall healthcare 
expenditures (Julio López et al., 2000). For example, in 1998, Greece introduced a 
positive list to curb the growth of pharmaceutical expenditures but it was found to 
be ineffective in controlling pharmaceutical expenditure growth (Yfantopoulos, 
2008). In Spain, the introduction of a negative list in September 1998 not only failed 
to reduce the total pharmaceutical expenditure but resulted in higher 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Patients shifted from using medicines in the negative 
list to medicines in the positive list which contained more expensive drugs (Darbà, 
2003). 
2.6.1.3 Prescription controls and duration limits 
Prescription controls policy imposes certain conditions that must be fulfilled 
prior to the reimbursement of a drug. The conditions attached are usually to a 
specific drug or a group of drugs that are likely to be misused or a drug that is costly 
(Rietveld et al., 2003). In the province of British Columbia, Canada, physicians are 
required to obtain prior authorisation from the health insurer before prescribing 
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cyclooxenase-2 inhibitor drugs while in Ontario, Canada, physicians are required to 
justify the prescribing of cyclooxenase-2 inhibitor drugs by filing in a special 
prescription form (Marshall et al., 2007). For the duration limits measures, the 
quantity of drugs allowed to be reimbursed over a period are restricted by the 
insurer. It can be imposed during the prescribing or the dispensing of the drug 
where the maximum total quantity allowed is limited. Besides restricting the 
quantities, it can also be applied to a minimum resupply period that allows a repeat 
prescription to be resupplied. Usually called resupply limits, the policy will not 
reimburse prescriptions that are resupplied before the imposed period and will 
attract a full payment from patients who will not be reimbursed by insurers. The 
aims of resupply limit are to reduce drugs stockpiling by patients and allow drugs to 
be distributed evenly throughout the year (Donnelly et al., 2000). In Australia, a 
resupply limit policy was introduced in November 1994 to increase the minimum 
resupply period for drugs that had five or more repeats from three days to twenty 
days. 
2.6.1.4 Generic Substitution  
Generic substitution refers to switching between a branded drug and its 
therapeutically equivalent generic version (Committee on Drugs, 1987). Pharmacists 
are allowed to substitute with equivalent generics of the prescribed product as long 
as certain criteria are met such as having the same active ingredient, dosage form, 
dose, and route of administration (Holmes et al., 2011). The aim of generic 
substitution is to lower the overall pharmaceutical expenditure by increasing the 
dispensing of less expensive generic medicines. Generic substitution also increases 
the price competition between pharmaceutical manufacturers, thus reducing the 
price in the long term (Timonen et al., 2009). In 1994, Australia introduced a generic 
substitution policy, which made it possible for pharmacists to substitute for the 
prescribed drug brand at the time of dispensing (Chong et al., 2011). Pharmacists 
are usually given financial incentives to encourage patients to switch to generics. In 
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France, a fixed sum of €0.53 per prescription has been paid to pharmacists when a 
generic substitution takes place (Catherine et al., 2010). 
2.6.1.5 Therapeutic substitution 
Therapeutic substitution also known as therapeutic interchange is a policy 
where pharmacists are permitted to switch the prescribed drug with a chemically 
different drug but within the same therapeutic category (Holmes et al., 2011). An 
example is the substitution of the anti-depressant drug Escitalopram with 
Citalopram, both belonging to the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) class 
but chemically different drugs. 
2.6.1.6 Budget System 
A budget system for pharmaceutical expenditures allocates a certain 
amount of budget to prescribers for a certain time period, usually a year. Only 
certain countries have implemented this system including, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Taiwan. In United Kingdom, the budget system was known as General 
Practitioner (GP) fundholding. The GP fundholding was introduced in 1991 and 
abolished in 1999. Annually, GP fundholders were given a certain budget to cover 
the cost of prescriptions for patients on their list. The amount of the budget was 
based on spending in the previous year but negotiable with health authority in 
order to obtain a higher budget (Delnoij et al., 2000; Harris et al., 1996). 
2.6.2 Influencing the supply for pharmaceuticals  
2.6.2.1 Price Cut 
With price cut measures, policy makers cut the manufacturer’s selling price 
of pharmaceuticals either across the therapeutic group or individually. Price cuts 
are usually applied to products that are off-patent and its generic equivalent is 
submitted for listing. The purpose of price cuts is to reduce the total pharmaceutical 
expenditure but it does not necessarily reduce the volume of prescriptions. In 
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recent years, France and Ireland have imposed price cuts on pharmaceuticals. In 
2006, France imposed a 15% price cut on nearly 238 products and made an annual 
saving of €70 to 100 million (Catherine et al., 2010). Ireland carried out a series of 
price cuts in phases between 2007 and 2010. In phase 1, a 20% price cut was 
introduced in March 2007 while phase 2 saw a further 15% price cut in January 
2009. The third phase was introduced in February 2010 where the prices of off-
patent products were cut by 40% (Usher et al., 2012). In Australia, a price cut for 
pharmaceuticals was implemented as part of the creation of two separate 
formularies. Formulary 1 (F1) and Formulary 2 (F2) were created in August 2007 
with all medicines listed on F2 subjected to either a drop of 2% per year for three 
years or a one-off price reduction of 25% on 1 August 2008 (Centre for Strategic 
Economic Studies, 2009). 
2.6.2.2 Maximum pricing 
A maximum pricing mechanism works by setting a maximum price for 
pharmaceuticals whether universally for all pharmaceuticals covered by the insurer 
or for a specific group of pharmaceuticals. The setting of a maximum price by policy 
makers varies between countries, taking into consideration several factors such as 
prescribing and utilisation patterns, budget size, and the role and importance of 
pharmaceutical industries in the economy (Mossialos et al., 2004).  
2.6.2.3 Reference pricing 
Reference pricing was first introduced in Germany in 1989, and refers to 
where drugs that have certain equivalence criteria are grouped together and a 
reference price is set for the group based on the lowest price quoted by 
manufacturers. The reference price is the price that insurers agree to reimburse for 
the drug and patients will pay the difference if the drug cost is higher than the 
reference price. If patients buy a drug that is lower or equal to the reference price, 
then the drug is reimbursed up to the reference price. The criteria for grouping the 
drugs depend on the level of equivalence, either chemically, pharmacologically or 
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therapeutically (Galizzi et al., 2011). Chemically equivalent grouping is where 
identical products with the same active ingredients are grouped together and are 
considered therapeutically interchangeable. This is used in some countries, for 
example, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Pharmacologically equivalent grouping 
consists of drugs that are chemically slightly different but pharmacologically related 
drugs. This approach is used in British Columbia and Australia. In therapeutic 
equivalence grouping, drugs that are used to treat a particular condition (e.g. 
hypercholesterolemia) are clustered together. Germany, the Netherlands and New 
Zealand use this method of classification (López-Casasnovas et al., 2000). Over the 
years, the reference pricing term had expanded to include term such as reference 
drug pricing, reference based pricing, maximum allowable costs, best available 
prices and minimum pricing (Aaserud et al., 2006). Reference pricing acts to 
encourage patients to switch to cheaper drugs, thus reducing the demand for 
expensive drugs. The reduction in demand leads to a reduction of price by 
manufacturers to gain market share, creating an efficient mechanism for reducing 
drug prices (Galizzi et al., 2011). 
2.7 Conclusion 
As discussed above, there are a variety of cost containment measures 
available for policy makers to select from in order to contain pharmaceutical 
volumes and expenditures. However, each country implementing those cost 
containment policies has a unique and different set of characteristics in term of its 
demographic, social, and political features, the structure of its health care system 
and its economic position, therefore producing uncertainty in the effectiveness of 
implementing any of these cost containment measures. It is essential for policy 
makers in each country to select and customise cost containment measures that 
suit the need of their country in order to achieve its objective in containing the 
pharmaceutical expenditure. This choice should be made after consideration of the 
evidence base of effective studies conducted in that country or similar countries, 
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and relative to the specific characteristics of that country which might impact on 
effectiveness of local implementation of measures.  
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Chapter 3.0 Australia’s Healthcare System and the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a brief global perspective of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the different types of healthcare system and different cost 
containment measures that countries can implement. This chapter focuses more 
narrowly on the Australian context. First, Australia’s healthcare system and the PBS 
are discussed. Australia’s healthcare system is based on a national health service 
model, similar to the United Kingdom, with public funding covering primary health 
care, ambulatory services and inpatient care in public hospitals, and PBS subsidised 
medicines. The next two sections in this chapter examine the trend in volume of 
scripts and expenditure for the PBS from 1991 to 2011 and key drivers to the 
growth of spending on the PBS respectively. Following this, reforms to the PBS 
including cost containment measures implemented by the Australian 
Commonwealth government between 1991 and 2011 are outlined. The final two 
sections discuss the prevalence of hypercholesterolemia and hyperlipidaemia in 
Australia and the usage of HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors in the PBS. The 
examination of HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors, also known as statins, is important 
as statins were the most widely dispensed PBS medicine and incurred the highest 
total expenditure. Furthermore, pharmaceutical expenditure for cardiovascular 
disease has been projected to increase from A$2.8 billion in 2003 to A$5.2 billion in 
2033, exceeding projected increases in other diseases expenditure such as 
respiratory disease and endocrine, nutritional and metabolic disorders (Goss, 2008). 
This discussion provides background to the statistical analysis in Chapter 5.0, in 
which statins are the class of drugs selected for the category 2 analysis. 
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3.2  Healthcare System 
The Australian healthcare system is modelled on the United Kingdom’s 
national health service model with the goal of providing universal healthcare 
coverage to all Australian citizens. Initially, Medibank, a national health insurance 
scheme was introduced in July 1975 by the Labour government under Prime 
Minister Whitlam to provide universal healthcare coverage. Medibank was 
administered by the Health Insurance Commission and funded entirely from 
taxation. Medibank reimbursed 85% of the schedule fee paid by patients for 
medical services and also provided universal and free access to hospital care 
through state run public hospitals. However, when the Liberal-National Coalition 
under Prime Minister Fraser (1975 – 1982) came into power, significant changes 
were made to the Medibank’s universal coverage features. On October 1976, 
individuals were allowed to opt out of Medibank and purchase private health 
insurance. Those who chose to remain in Medibank were required to pay a levy of 
2.5% of taxable income, which resulted in a large portion of the population being 
uninsured for hospital care (Behan, 2012; Healy et al., 2006; Scotton et al., 1993). 
Medibank Private, a private health insurance arm of Medibank, was created in the 
same year to increase competition in the private health insurance industry 
(Medibank Private Limited, 2014). In April 1981, the Medibank scheme was 
terminated and access to free hospital and medical care was limited to pensioners 
and the poor. When the Labour party returned to power in 1983 under Prime 
Minister Hawke, the original Medibank scheme was reintroduced with a new name, 
Medicare. Since 1984, Medicare has undergone numerous changes and levy 
increases but the main features of providing universal health coverage to all 
Australians remain largely intact (Duckett, 2011). The basic Medicare Levy was 
calculated at 1.5% of taxable income, with low income earners with income below 
the thresholds exempted from paying the Medicare levy. However, starting from 1 
July 2014, the Medicare levy rate was increased to 2.0% of taxable income to help 
fund the National Disability Insurance Scheme ("Medicare Levy Amendment 
(DisabilityCare Australia) Bill," 2013). An additional levy of between 1.0% and 1.5% 
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is applied to individuals with high annual incomes (above A$88,000 for singles and 
A$176,000 for families, 2013-14) who do not have adequate levels of private 
hospital health insurance cover (Australian Taxation Office, 2014). The levies and a 
subsidy from the Commonwealth government provide the basic funding for 
Medicare. Medicare rebates up to 100% of the scheduled fee incurred for any 
consultation with a general practitioner or 85% of the fee for an out-of-hospital 
specialist visit. Patients are required to pay the 15% balance for specialist visits as 
co-payment plus any additional charges. To protect individuals and families that 
require frequent medical attentions, a Medicare Safety Net arrangement was 
created. Once the Medicare Safety Net threshold (A$430.90 for 2014) is reached, 
Medicare fully reimburses the schedule fee for out-of-hospital services (Biggs, 2003; 
Department of Human Services, 2013a). Besides providing direct payments to 
primary health care services, Medicare also provides funding to public hospitals 
where patients receive free access to hospital care (Boxall et al., 2013; Palmer et al., 
2000; Willis et al., 2012).  
Along with Medicare, private health insurance scheme plays an important 
role in the Australian healthcare system. One of the largest private health insurance 
funds is the government-owned Medibank. Private health insurance is available to 
cover private hospital costs, ambulance costs and the cost of ancillary health 
services such as dental, chiropractic, podiatry and physiotherapy. Total expenditure 
on healthcare (health goods and services incurred by governments, private health 
insurers and individuals) is on the rise. In 2010/11, total expenditure on healthcare 
was A$130,266 million, up from A$28,738 million in 1991/92. Health expenditure in 
the 10-year period from 2001/02 to 2010/11 grew at a rate of 8.4% per year, above 
the rate of growth of 7.3% in the previous 10-year period from 1991/92 to 2000/01 
(Table 3.1) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). 
  
 29 
 
Table 3.1  Total health expenditure (current prices^) and annual growth rates, 
1990/91 to 2010/11 
Year 
Health expenditure 
 (A$ million) 
Annual growth rate 
(%) 
1991/92 30,505 6.1 
1992/93 32,450 6.4 
1993/94 34,323 5.8 
1994/95 36,473 6.3 
1995/96 39,047 7.1 
1996/97 42,116 7.9 
1997/98 44,802 6.4 
1998/99 48,428 8.1 
1999/00 52,570 8.6 
2000/01 58,269 10.8 
2001/02 63,099 8.3 
2002/03 68,798 9.0 
2003/04 73,509 6.8 
2004/05 81,061 10.3 
2005/06 86,685 6.9 
2006/07 94,938 9.5 
2007/08 103,563 9.1 
2008/09 113,445 9.5 
2009/10 121,355 7.0 
2010/11 130,266 7.3 
   Average annual growth rates 
 1991/92 to 2000/01 7.3 
2001/02 to 2010/11 8.4 
1991/92 to 2010/11 7.9 
   Source: Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 
    
                                                          
^ Current prices are the prices for each year in the value of the currency for that particular 
year 
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The ratio of total health expenditure to gross domestic product has grown 
steadily from 7.2% in 1991/92 to 9.7% in 2009/10 and remained constant in 
2010/11 (Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2 Total health expenditure (current prices) and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and annual health expenditure to GDP ratios, 1991/92 to 2010/11 
Year 
Health expenditure 
(A$ million) 
GDP (A$ million) 
Ratio of health 
expenditure to GDP 
(%) 
1991/92 30,505 420,969 7.2 
1992/93 32,450 436,448 7.4 
1993/94 34,323 458,863 7.5 
1994/95 36,473 486,411 7.5 
1995/96 39,047 514,902 7.6 
1996/97 42,116 546,198 7.7 
1997/98 44,802 575,549 7.8 
1998/99 48,428 607,153 8.0 
1999/00 52,570 640,694 8.2 
2000/01 58,269 688,573 8.5 
2001/02 63,099 732,647 8.6 
2002/03 68,798 783,616 8.8 
2003/04 73,509 832,895 8.8 
2004/05 81,061 894,496 9.1 
2005/06 86,685 965,113 9.0 
2006/07 94,938 1,041,294 9.1 
2007/08 103,563 1,137,253 9.1 
2008/09 113,445 1,240,595 9.1 
2009/10 121,355 1,249,307 9.7 
2010/11 130,266 1,345,692 9.7 
    Average ratios 
 1991/92 to 2000/01 
 
7.7 
2001/02 to 2010/11 
 
9.1 
1991/92 to 2010/11 
 
8.4 
      
 Source: 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
and International Monetary Fund 
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A large share of the healthcare expenditure is spent on in the public hospital 
sector (33%) with the next biggest shares of expenditure for medical services (18%) 
and pharmaceuticals (15%), including those reimbursed by the PBS or paid out-of-
pocket by patients (Figure 3.1) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). 
Figure 3.1 Proportion of total recurrent expenditure by area of 
expenditure, 2010/11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
hospitals 
33% 
Private 
hospitals 
9% 
Medical 
services 
18% 
Dental 
services 
6% 
Other health 
practitioners 
3% 
Medications 
15% 
Other health 
17% 
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
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The majority of the health expenditure in Australia was funded by the 
government, the Commonwealth and the states and territories combined. Over the 
period of 10 years, from 2001/02 to 2010/11, government funding for healthcare 
has been relatively stable, averaging 70% of total healthcare expenditure (Biggs, 
2013). Out-of-pocket payment, private health insurance and other non–
government funding sources accounted for the balance of 30% of total healthcare 
expenditure (Table 3.3). As healthcare expenditure continues to rise, the level of 
government funding has also increased from approximately A$42 million in 2001/05 
to A$90 million in 2010/11 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). 
Table 3.3 Total funding for health expenditure by source of funds (current 
prices) and proportion of total funding, 2001/02 to 2010/11 
Year 
Government 
(including State and 
territory governments) 
Non-government 
  
Health 
expenditure 
 (A$ million) 
Proportion  
(%) 
Health 
expenditure 
 (A$ million) 
Proportion  
(%) 
Total 
2001/02 42,413 67.2 20,686 32.8 63,099 
2002/03 46,785 68.0 22,013 32.0 68,798 
2003/04 49,382 67.2 24,127 32.8 73,509 
2004/05 54,918 67.7 26,143 32.3 81,061 
2005/06 58,981 68.0 27,704 32.0 86,685 
2006/07 64,358 67.8 30,581 32.2 94,938 
2007/08 71,152 68.7 32,411 31.3 103,563 
2008/09 78,563 69.3 34,882 30.7 113,445 
2009/10 84,789 69.9 36,566 30.1 121,355 
2010/11 90,064 69.1 40,202 30.9 130,266 
Average 
 
68.3 
 
31.7 
 
      Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare  
 
In the 2012/13 Australian Commonwealth government budget, healthcare 
expenditure accounted for 16% of total spending at A$61 billion. Healthcare 
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spending was the third largest spending item after the social security and welfare 
component (34%) and the other purposes component (mainly general revenue 
assistance to the States and Territories) (19%) (Figure 3.2) (Parliamentary Budget 
Office, 2013).  
Figure 3.2 Composition of government spending by functions, 2012/13 
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3.3 Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
The PBS, a key component of Australia's health system, was created under 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Act in 1949 and commenced on 4 September 1950 
with 139 medications (Sloan, 1995). It is part of the National Medicines Policy 
(NMP), with the role of the PBS to provide timely, reliable and affordable access to 
necessary medicines for Australians. In addition to the objective of dealing with 
equity of access to medicines, other objectives of the NMP are to ensure medicines 
meet appropriate standards of quality, safety and efficacy, to promote the quality 
use of medicines, and to maintain a responsible and viable medicines industry 
(Department of Health, 2016).  
At the present time, the PBS is managed by the Department of Health and 
Ageing and administered by Medicare Australia. Initially, all drugs were provided 
free of charge to all residents. In order to provide some control on PBS volumes and 
expenditure, in 1960, two beneficiary categories were created with patients either 
in the Pensioner beneficiary category or in the General beneficiary category. A 
patient co-payment of A$0.50 was introduced for General beneficiary category 
patients. In 1983, a Concessional beneficiary category was created. The 
concessional beneficiary category consists of low-income earners and unemployed 
people who are on social security payments. A co-payment for concessionary 
beneficiary patients was introduced in 1990 (Biggs, 2002). Three beneficiary 
categories existed until December 1991 when the pensioner beneficiary category 
was removed. The co-payment for both concessional beneficiary category patients 
and general beneficiary patients is increased each year in line with the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) and currently stands at A$6.00 (2014) for concessional beneficiary 
category patients and A$36.90 (2014) for general beneficiary category patients 
(Department of Health, 2013a).  
In order to lessen the financial burden for those patients and their families 
who require a lot of PBS-listed drugs, a protective mechanism known as the safety 
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net arrangements was created. Once the annual total cost of drugs exceeds the 
threshold specified as the Safety Net level, the patient’s co-payment is reduced or 
no payment is required. As of January 2014, the safety net thresholds were 
A$360.00 and A$1,421.20 for concessional beneficiary category and general 
beneficiary category respectively (Department of Health and Ageing, 2013). Once 
the threshold is exceeded, general beneficiary category patients pay for their drugs 
at the concessional beneficiary category rate while concessional beneficiary 
category patients get prescriptions free for the rest of the calendar year.  
 
3.3.1 The listing of medicines and medicinal preparations 
The listing of medicines and medicinal preparations on the PBS are under 
the purview of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC). The PBAC 
recommends medicines and its preparations to the Minister for Health for funding 
under the PBS if the new medicine is more effective or less toxic than the existing 
medicines, is needed to treat or prevent important diseases or conditions not 
covered by existing medicines or is as effective and safe as existing medicines listed 
for the same indications (Department of Health, 2014b). The PBS list is regularly 
reviewed by the PBAC and medicines may be removed from the list if a more 
effective and less toxic medicine is available; or if the medicine is no longer cost-
effective, is found to be toxic, or the potential for it to be abused outweighs its 
therapeutic value.  
On the other hand, the prices for medicines listed on the PBS are governed 
by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority (PBPA). The PBPA reviews the 
prices of medicines listed on the PBS and recommends prices for new items that are 
to be listed (Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority, 2010). 
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3.4 Trends in PBS Volume and Expenditure 
 Since its inception, PBS expenditure has been rising steadily in line with the 
ageing and growth of the population, expansion of the number of drugs listed 
particularly new and relatively expensive medicines, and increases in the incidence 
of chronic diseases (National Commission of Audit, 2014). About 80 per cent of 
prescriptions dispensed in Australia are subsidised under the PBS (Medicare 
Australia, 2010). In 1991-1992, the Australian Commonwealth Government paid a 
total of A$1.22 billion for PBS-subsidised medicines. This expenditure increased to 
A$8.73 billion in 2010-2011, a growth of approximately seven times in a period of 
20 years (Figure 3.3) (Department of Health and Ageing, 2012)  
 
 
Since 1991, PBS expenditure has grown at an average rate of 10% annually. 
Although the growth rate in recent years had slowed compared with the early 
1990s, average PBS expenditure continued to grow at a rate of 7.7% from 2001/02 
Figure 3.3  Total PBS expenditure by Australian government, current 
prices, and annual growth rates, 1991/92 to 2010/11  
 37 
 
to 2010/11. This remains above the corresponding growth rate of GDP, which grew 
at an annual rate of 6.5% over the period (International Monetary Fund, 2013).  
On average, between 1991/92 and 2010/11, the ratio of PBS expenditure to health 
health expenditure was 9.5% (  
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Table 3.4). Its share of health expenditure grew steadily from 6.0% in 
1991/92 to 11.3% in 2003/04 before declining and stabilising at 9.7% in the past 
few years.  
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Table 3.4 Total PBS and health expenditure by Australian 
government (current prices) and annual pharmaceutical expenditure to 
health expenditure ratios, 1991/92 to 2010/11 
  
Government expenditure 
(including State and territory governments) 
Year 
PBS  
(incl. Section 100) 
(A$ million) 
Health  
(A$ million) 
Ratio of  
PBS to health (%) 
1991/92 1,220 20,210 6.0 
1992/93 1,505 21,327 7.1 
1993/94 1,801 22,506 8.0 
1994/95 1,991 23,911 8.3 
1995/96 2,327 25,884 9.0 
1996/97 2,538 27,711 9.2 
1997/98 2,785 30,184 9.2 
1998/99 3,070 32,460 9.5 
1999/00 3,488 36,380 9.6 
2000/01 4,158 39,465 10.5 
2001/02 4,584 42,413 10.8 
2002/03 5,043 46,785 10.8 
2003/04 5,562 49,382 11.3 
2004/05 5,964 54,918 10.9 
2005/06 6,148 58,981 10.4 
2006/07 6,352 64,358 9.9 
2007/08 6,888 71,152 9.7 
2008/09 7,645 78,563 9.7 
2009/10 8,252 84,847 9.7 
2010/11 8,727 90,064 9.7 
    Average ratios 
  1991/92 to 2000/01 
 
8.6 
2001/02 to 2010/11 
 
10.3 
1991/92 to 2010/11 
 
9.5 
       
 
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare  
and Department of Health and Ageing 
 40 
 
In terms of prescriptions, both the prescriptions count and average 
prescriptions per person has increased over the period. Although the increase in 
prescriptions count has not matched the growth in PBS expenditure, the number of 
prescriptions recorded by PBS doubled between 1991/92 and 2010/11 (Table 3.5). 
In 2010/11, PBS recorded an average of 8.4 prescriptions per person, up from an 
average of 5.4 prescriptions per person in 1991/92.  
Table 3.5  Total PBS prescriptions count and average prescriptions per 
person, 1991/92 to 2010/11 
Year 
PBS prescriptions  
count 
Average prescriptions  
per person  
1991/92 94,120,154 5.4 
1992/93 106,181,617 6.0 
1993/94 115,042,043 6.4 
1994/95 118,720,677 6.6 
1995/96 124,888,282 6.8 
1996/97 124,099,563 6.7 
1997/98 125,111,809 6.7 
1998/99 128,921,219 6.8 
1999/00 138,081,923 7.2 
2000/01 148,050,778 7.6 
2001/02 154,978,239 7.9 
2002/03 158,956,686 8.0 
2003/04 165,862,101 8.2 
2004/05 170,279,502 8.3 
2005/06 168,322,615 8.1 
2006/07 168,535,519 8.0 
2007/08 171,296,023 8.0 
2008/09 181,836,127 8.3 
2009/10 183,911,537 8.3 
2010/11 188,142,255 8.4 
   Average prescriptions per person  
1991/92 to 2000/01 6.6  
2001/02 to 2010/11 8.2  
1991/92 to 2010/11 7.4  
       
 Source: Department of Health and Ageing  
and Australian Bureau of Statistics  
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On a per capita basis, the average PBS expenditure per person has been 
increasing over the 20-year study period. In 2010/11, the average PBS expenditure 
per person was at A$390.9, an increase of A$321.2 from 1991/92 (Figure 3.4). 
 
 
In comparison to other countries, growth in spending on pharmaceuticals by 
the Australian Government increased by 51.5% from 2003 to 2009. This put 
Australia slightly above the average of the 26 countries reporting to the OECD. In 
that time period, countries with larger GDPs than Australia such as Japan, Germany, 
Spain and Italy recorded smaller percentage growth in pharmaceutical spending 
(Figure 3.5) (International Monetary Fund, 2013).  
Figure 3.4  Average PBS expenditure per person, current prices, 1991/92 
to 2010/11 
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3.5 Key Driver to PBS growth 
The growth in PBS volume and expenditure in the last two decades has been 
of concern to the Australian government. Several reports on the PBS have been 
presented to Parliament for debate and key drivers of PBS growth have been 
identified (Biggs, 2002; Rickard, 2002). Factors contributing to the growth include 
ageing population, increases in concessional cardholders, new listing of drugs, and 
disease prevalence. 
Figure 3.5 Percentage of growth in government’s pharmaceutical 
expenditure in selected OECD countries, 2003 to 2009 
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3.5.1 Ageing population  
Higher living standards and better healthcare provided in Australia has 
resulted in an increase in life expectancies, thus increasing the proportion of the 
aged population. Over the past two decades, the proportion of the Australian 
population aged 50 years and over increased by 9%, representing 33% of the total 
population (Figure 3.6) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Aged people are 
more susceptible to chronic disease and utilize more drugs for treatment. Although 
they accounted for nearly a third of the population, patients in the age category of 
55 and above were responsible for nearly 70% of total PBS expenditure 
(Department of Health and Ageing et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6  Australian population by age groups - 1992, 2002, 2012 
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3.5.2 Increases in concessional cardholders 
Concessional cardholders are entitled to purchase drugs listed on the PBS at 
a discounted rate. Concessional patients pay a minimal amount of A$6.00 (in 2014) 
and no payment is required if the safety net threshold is reached. Therefore, the 
Australian government bears a big percentage of the cost of drugs purchased by 
concessional patients. There are four types of concessional cards issued by the 
Australian government: Health Care Cards, (Low Income) Health Care Cards, 
Pensioner Concession Cards and Commonwealth Seniors Health Cards. The Health 
Care Card is for people receiving social security allowances while the (Low Income) 
Health Care Card is for people with an income below a certain level. The largest 
group of the four, the Pensioner Concession Card, is available to pensioners and 
certain elderly receiving income-support payments, while the Commonwealth 
Seniors Health Card is available to people who have reached the qualifying age of 
pension age and are not receiving an income support payment (The Department of 
Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2012). Figure 3.7 
shows the number of concessional card holders and the annual growth of 
concessional card holders in the time period from 2000/01 to 2011/12. The 
numbers of concessional card holders were relatively constant, approximately five 
million card holders between 2000/01 and 2007/08. However, in 2008/09, there 
was a 6% increase in the number of card holders and the number of concessional 
card holder has continued to grow. One of the main reasons for this increase was 
the global financial crisis in mid-2008 that resulted in higher unemployment 
allowance recipients (Department of Human Services, 2010; The Department of 
Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009). 
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3.5.3 New listing of drugs on the PBS 
The listing of newer and effective but often more expensive drugs on the 
PBS has also contributed to the growth of PBS expenditure. From 1991 to 2012, a 
total of 535 new drugs were listed on the PBS, bringing the overall number of drugs 
listed from 536 in 1991 to 781 in 2012 (Figure 3.8) (Sweeny, 2013). Each new drug 
approved to be listed contributes to PBS expenditure an average of A$9.9 million 
annually (Sweeny, 2007b). For example, Atorvastatin, an HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor was the most prescribed and highest total expenditure drug in PBS for the 
year 2012. From its listing in February 1998 till December 2012, Atorvastatin has 
added A$6.43 billion to the PBS expenditure. On average, Atorvastatin cost the 
Australian government A$ 429 million per year (Medicare Australia, 2013). 
Figure 3.7  Total number of concessional card holders and annual 
growth rates, 2000/01 to 2011/12 
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3.5.4 Disease prevalence 
The 2007-2008 the National Health Survey (2009) showed a high prevalence 
of chronic diseases among Australians. The prevalence of diseases such as cancer 
was 2%, up from 1.6% in 2001 while diabetes prevalence increased to 4% from 2.9% 
in 2001. The prevalence of long-term mental or behavioural conditions increased to 
11% from below 10% in 2001 and the prevalence of arthritis increased by 1% to 
15% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). In a recent health report by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014), nearly 3.3 million persons or 14.8% of the 
population in Australia suffered from arthritis. The second highest condition 
reported was mental and behavioural conditions, with 3.0 million persons or 13.6% 
of the population followed by asthma with 2.4 million persons or 10.2% of the 
population. Other long-term conditions suffered by Australians include heart 
disease, diabetes, osteoporosis, cancer and kidney disease (Table 3.6). 
Figure 3.8  Total number of new drugs listed and the overall number 
of drugs in the PBS, 1991/92 to 2011/12 
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 The increase in the number of persons with chronic diseases such as 
neoplasms, diabetes mellitus, hypertensive disease, asthma and 
hypercholesterolemia is likely to increase the government’s pharmaceuticals 
expenditure due to its subsidising drugs to those patients on a long term basis. In 
2004–05, a total of A$21.1 billion representing 40% of health expenditure was 
spent on treating five disease groups: cardiovascular diseases (A$5.9 billion), mental 
disorders (A$4.1 billion), musculoskeletal diseases (A$4.0 billion), neoplasms (A$3.8 
billion) and respiratory diseases (A$3.3 billion) (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2010). 
 
Table 3.6 Proportion and number of persons with long-term 
conditions, 2011/12 
  
Long-term conditions 
Proportion of 
persons 
(%) 
Number of 
persons 
(n, million) 
Arthritis 14.8 3.3 
Mental and behavioural conditions 13.6 3.0 
Asthma 10.2 2.3 
Heart disease 5.0* 1.1 
Diabetes 4.6 1.0 
Osteoporosis 3.3 0.7 
Cancer 1.5 0.3 
Kidney disease 0.9* 0.2 
  
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
                                                          
 population aged 2 years and over 
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3.6 PBS Reforms and Cost Containment Measures 
The continuous increase in pharmaceutical expenditure has the potential to 
jeopardise the sustainability of the PBS and the relevance of the National Medicines 
Policy. One of the four objectives of the National Medicines Policy is to provide 
timely access to medicines that Australians need, at a cost individuals and the 
community can afford (Department of Health and Ageing, 2000). High prices of 
medicines have been found to keep patients away from filling their prescriptions at 
pharmacies. One survey found that 20% of patients did not completely fill their 
prescription while 10% of patients reduced the dose of prescribed medicines, citing 
high medicines cost as the reason (Doran et al., 2004). In a more recent study, the 
Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision in 2014 
reported that 8.5 per cent of respondents delayed or did not purchase prescribed 
medicines due to cost in the 12 month period between 2012 and 2013 (Steering 
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2014). Failing to 
adhere to medication increases medical costs in term of the hospitalisation rate and 
also contributes to loss of quality of life years (Sokol et al 2005; Harvey 2005). 
In the last two decades, the escalation of PBS spending has forced the 
Commonwealth Government to implement several cost containment measures 
(Figure 3.9) (Rickard, 2002). These include:- 
  
 
4
9
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9  Cost containment measures in Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 1991 to 2012 
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3.6.1 Brand Premium Policy 
On 1 December 1990, the Brand Premium Policy was introduced to increase 
price competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and promote the 
development of the generic pharmaceutical industry. Under this policy, where there 
is more than one brand of a particular drug available, the Australian Government 
subsidises a drug to the level of the lowest priced brand. If a patient is prescribed a 
brand drug that is priced above the price charged by the lowest priced brand, a 
brand premium, which is the price difference between the lowest price brand and 
the brand prescribed, has to be paid by the patient. This extra amount does not 
count towards their PBS safety net threshold (Department of Health, 2013b; 
Sweeny, 2007a). 
 
3.6.2 Economic Evaluation requirement  
Since January 1993, economic evaluation has been required by the 
Commonwealth Government in support of applications for listing of new medicines 
under the PBS. The Economics Sub Committee (ESC) secretariat evaluates the 
economic evaluation submission and ensures new drugs or new indications are 
cost-effective so as to encourage efficient use of resources. The types of economic 
evaluation needed depend on whether the proposed drug is therapeutically 
superior or non-inferior (equivalent) to the main comparator. If the proposed drug 
is non-inferior (equivalent) to the main comparator, cost-minimisation analysis is 
sufficiently adequate for submission. However, if the proposed drug is 
therapeutically superior to the main comparator, four types of economic evaluation 
may be required depending on the outcome of the clinical evidence: cost-utility 
analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, cost-benefit analysis or cost-consequences 
analysis (Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority, 2009). 
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3.6.3 Re-Supply Limits and Safety Net 20 day rule 
In November 1994, a minimum re-supply period for a range of 
pharmaceuticals was increased from three to twenty days. Once a medicine has 
been supplied to a patient, it may not be supplied to that patient again on the same 
day or within the next 20 days. This was introduced to prevent patients from taking 
advantage of the safety net to get multiple prescriptions towards the end of the 
year (Donnelly et al., 2000). However, in January 2006, the Safety Net 20 day rule 
was introduced to improve the effectiveness of the re-supply limit policy. For 
certain PBS medicines, if repeated within 20 days, the patient co-payment amount 
does not count towards the calculation of the safety net threshold. If the patient 
has exceeded the threshold of the safety net level, the patient’s co-payment will be 
charged at the standard amount and not the reduced safety net co-payments 
(Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). Besides preventing patients from abusing 
the safety net benefits, this measure was introduced to encourage good practice for 
safe use of drugs. Savings from this measure to the government were estimated at 
around A$70 million over four years from 2006 to 2009 ("National Health 
Amendment," 2005). 
 
3.6.4 Brand Substitution Policy 
Introduced in 1994, brand substitution enabled pharmacists to substitute 
the prescribed drug brand with a generic at the time of dispensing, unless 
otherwise indicated on the prescription (McManus et al., 2001). Prescribers were 
concerned that this policy might potentially cause confusion to patients as different 
products are dispended each time their prescriptions are filled by pharmacists. 
However, Kalisch et al. (2007a, 2007b) found that the majority of patients were 
supplied the same product on each dispensing and pharmacists rarely supplied 
different products on repeats of the same prescription. In a later study, Ortiz et al. 
(2010) concluded that the potential for patient confusion due to brand substitution 
is relatively small. 
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3.6.5 Co-payment increase and safety net threshold increase 
In the span of 20 years, from 1991 to 2011, patient co-payments have 
increased on two occasions, January 1997 and January 2005, over and above the 
annual increment adjustment to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In January 1997, 
patient co-payments were increased by 15.0% for the general beneficiary category 
and 18.5% for the concessional beneficiary category. General beneficiary category 
patients had to pay A$20.0 instead of A$17.40 before the increase and concessional 
beneficiary category patients had to pay A$3.20 instead of A$2.70. In January 2005, 
patient co-payments were increased by 24.0% across the two beneficiary categories 
with general beneficiary patients having to pay A$28.60 while concessional 
beneficiary patients paying A$4.60. Along with the increase in co-payments, the 
safety net threshold was also increased on both occasions. In January 1997, the 
safety net threshold for the general beneficiary category was A$612.60 while the 
safety net threshold for the concessional beneficiary patients was A$166.40. In 
January 2005, the safety net thresholds for the general beneficiary and the 
concessional beneficiary category were A$874.90 and A$239.20 respectively 
(Sweeny, 2007a). Effective from January 2015, the the safety net threshold for the 
general beneficiary category was increased from A$1,421.20 to A$1,453.90 while 
the safety net threshold for the concessional beneficiary patients was increased 
from $360.00 to $366.00 (Department of Health, 2015). 
 
3.6.6 Therapeutic Group Premium Policy 
On 1 February 1998, the Therapeutic Group Premium Policy was introduced 
to promote greater competition between manufacturers of drugs. Medicines are 
grouped together under the same sub-groups if they are similar in terms of safety, 
efficacy and health outcomes. The Australian Government subsidises drugs within a 
defined therapeutic sub-group to the level of the lowest priced drug in the 
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subgroup. The difference between the lowest price drug and the drug prescribed is 
paid by the patient (Senate Community Affairs References Committee, 2010). Four 
therapeutic groups were formed when this policy was introduced. These groups 
were the ACE inhibitors, the calcium channel blockers, the HMG CoA Reductase 
inhibitors and the H2RAs (Sayer et al., 2000). However, as of May 2014, there are 
only three drugs (telmisartan, olmesartan medoxomil and eprosartan) in the PBS 
that attract a therapeutic group premium ranging from A$2.50 to A$3.50 
(Department of Health, 2014c). 
 
3.6.7 Creation of F1 and F2 formularies 
In 2007, the PBS formulary was split into two separate formularies, 
Formulary 1 (F1) and Formulary 2 (F2), with different pricing strategies for each (de 
Boer, 2009). Formulary 1 comprises single brand medicines which are not 
changeable at the patient level with multiple brand medicines. Formulary 2 
comprises multiple brand medicines and any single brand medicines which are 
interchangeable with multiple brand medicines at the patient level. The reform was 
implemented to take advantage of the fact that patents on a number of PBS 
medicines would expire in the next few years. Medicines listed on F1 will be moved 
to F2 when new competition brands that are bioequivalent to an existing brand of 
an F1 drug are listed on the PBS and subject to statutory price reductions. 
Medicines listed on F2 were temporarily split into two sub-formularies, F2T and 
F2A. Formulary F2T comprises medicines that were significantly discounted by some 
manufacturers or suppliers to pharmacists and were subject to a 25% mandatory 
price reduction on 1 August 2008. Medicines listed on F2A were believed not to be 
subject to significant price discounts by manufacturers or suppliers to pharmacists 
and were subject to staged price reductions of 2% per year for three years 
commencing on 1 August 2008. On January 2011, F2T and F2A were merged into a 
single formulary – F2. Medicines listed on F2 have moved to a system of price 
disclosure where suppliers listing a new brand on or after 1 January 2011 must 
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disclose the actual market price paid by the pharmacist as a condition of listing. 
Price disclosure ensures that the price that the Government pays reflects more 
closely the actual price at which the medicine is being sold (Department of Health 
and Ageing, 2007; Searles et al., 2007) (IMS Health Service Centre, 2009). 
 
3.6.8 Premium-free dispensing incentive 
A premium-free dispensing incentive was introduced in August 2008 as part 
of a pharmacy compensation package to encourage pharmacies to dispense 
premium free PBS listed medicine that costs the patient no more than the standard 
patient co-payment. Under-co-payment medicines and private scripts are not 
entitled to this incentive. In the first year of implementation, a payment of A$1.50 
was paid for each substitutable medicine dispensed. This incentive is indexed 
annually and as at July 2013, the payment is at A$1.65. This incentive was 
introduced to encourage greater use of generic medicine and increase awareness of 
the safety, health and economic benefits of generic medicines (Department of 
Human Services, 2013c). In the first 12 months after its implementation, from 1 
August 2008 to 31 July 2009, over 75 million prescriptions were eligible for the 
incentive (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010). 
 
3.6.9 Formulary 2 – 12.5%, 2% and 25% price reductions 
In accordance with the creation of two formularies, all medicines listed on 
F2 were subject to 12.5%, 2% or 25% price reductions. As discussed earlier, 
medicines on F2T were subject to a mandatory 25% cut in the price to pharmacist 
while medicines on F2A were subject to a staged price reductions of 2% per year for 
three years starting on 1 August 2008. However, when a patent for an original 
medicine expires and a bioequivalent brand of medicine is listed, that medicine will 
be subject to a mandatory 12.5% price reduction. The 12.5% price reduction is 
different from the 2% and 25% price reduction where the former is due to the 
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listing of bioequivalent brand while latter is the results of formulary allocation 
(Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, 2009). 
 
3.7 Hypercholesterolemia and Hyperlipidaemia Prevalence in 
Australia 
High blood cholesterol is one of the major cardiovascular disease risk factors 
along with others risk factor such as smoking, obesity, hypertension and diabetes 
(National Heart Foundation of Australia, 2013). A total cholesterol level of more 
than 5.5mmol/L in blood sample is considered as high risk in developing 
cardiovascular disease. In the 2007/2008 National Health Survey, it was estimated 
that 5.7% of the Australian population had a high level of blood cholesterol 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009). In 2011/2012, the proportion of population 
with high blood cholesterol increased by 323,000 person, representing 6.8% of the 
population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). In a study done by Harrison et al. 
(2013), the prevalence of hyperlipidaemia in the population was estimated at 12.3% 
where patients suffer high plasma lipid and raised serum cholesterol. High blood 
cholesterol has been identified as the fifth leading causes of disease burden after 
tobacco smoking, high blood pressure, high body mass and physical inactivity 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012). In 2010, high total cholesterol 
was responsible for 145,307 disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) and 9,644 deaths 
per year. Diseases associated with high blood cholesterol such as ischemic heart 
disease, stroke and peripheral vascular disease are the leading causes of death 
among Australians. In 2010, Ischemic heart disease caused the greatest disease 
burden in Australia with 31,364 deaths and 386,435 DALYs followed by stroke with 
14,126 deaths and 152,430 DALYs (Global Burden of Disease Study 2010, 2013). 
High blood cholesterol is a modifiable risk for cardiovascular disease and 
reducing the blood cholesterol concentration by 10% can lower the risk of ischemic 
heart disease by 20 to 50% for men aged between 40 and 80 years old (Law et al., 
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1994). Therefore, lipid modifying drugs play an important role in reducing mortality 
from ischemic heart disease. Several groups of lipid modifying drugs are available in 
the market. They are the HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors, the fibrates, bile-acid 
binding resins, nicotinates, omega-3 triglycerides, and ezetimibe (Martindale: The 
Complete Drug Reference, 2010). The HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors are known as 
statins and are the most commonly used drug in hypercholesterolemia treatment. 
Statins work by inhibiting the enzyme HMG-CoA reductase, a rate-limiting enzyme 
in cholesterol biosynthesis, and therefore stimulate the low-density-lipoprotein 
(LDL) receptors in the liver. This results in an increase of LDL clearance from the 
circulation and decreases the total blood cholesterol level (Brown et al., 1986; 
Goldstein et al., 2009). As of 2013, seven drugs in the statins group are available in 
pharmaceutical form, the Atorvastatin, Fluvastatin, Lovastatin, Pitavastatin, 
Pravastatin, Rosuvastatin, and Simvastatin. 
 
3.8 HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitors in the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme 
Out of the seven statins available globally, only five statins are listed on the 
PBS in Australia. The five statins are Atorvastatin, Fluvastatin, Pravastatin, 
Rosuvastatin, and Simvastatin (Department of Health, 2013c). Simvastatin was 
listed on January 1992, followed by Pravastatin on June 1993, Fluvastatin on 
February 1996, Atorvastatin on February 1998, and lastly Rosuvastatin on 
December 2006. From January 1992 to December 2012, the total prescriptions 
count and the total expenditure for the statins group were 245 million prescriptions 
and A$12.7 billion respectively. Atorvastatin accounted for the highest prescriptions 
count and expenditure with nearly 109 million prescriptions and a total expenditure 
of A$6.1 billion since its inception (Medicare Australia, 2013).  
In the 2012 annual Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme report by the 
Department of Health and Ageing (2012), the lipid modifying agents group recorded 
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the highest total prescriptions count and total expenditure. For the year ending 
June 2012, the lipid modifying agents group was prescribed 25.7 million times 
costing the government around A$1.33 billion. Overall, the lipid modifying agents 
group accounted for 13.2% of the total number of prescriptions and 17.7% of the 
total expenditure of PBS (Table 3.7 and Table 3.8). At the individual drug level, 
Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin were the two most used drugs and incurred the 
highest expenditure. The prescriptions count for Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin 
were 10.5 million and 6.7 million prescriptions respectively while the total cost to 
the government was A$593 million and A$359 million respectively (Table 3.9 and 
Table 3.10). 
 
Table 3.7 Drug groups by highest government cost, year end June 2012 
No. Drug groups 
Government 
expenditure, A$ 
1 Lipid modifying agents 1,330,892,919 
2 Immunosuppressants 468,457,064 
3 Antineoplastic agents 466,321,598 
4 Ophthalmologicals 445,132,860 
5 Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system 441,168,333 
6 Psycholeptics 437,857,081 
7 Drugs for obstructive airway diseases 429,318,387 
8 Drugs used in diabetes 419,103,510 
9 Drugs for acid related disorders 403,813,882 
10 Psychoanaleptics 401,671,311 
 Source: Department of Health and Ageing 
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Table 3.8 Drug groups by highest volume, year end June 2012 
No. Drug groups 
Number of 
prescriptions 
1 Lipid modifying agents 25,656,690 
2 Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system 22,206,196 
3 Drugs for acid related disorders  15,241,461 
4 Psychoanaleptics 14,740,041 
5 Analgesics 14,337,661 
6 Antibacterials for systemic use 12,862,665 
7 Drugs for obstructive airway diseases 10,338,196 
8 Psycholeptics 7,854,957 
9 Drugs used in diabetes 7,469,348 
10 Ophthalmologicals 7,323,596 
 Source: Department of Health and Ageing 
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Table 3.9 Drug by highest government cost, year end June 2012 
No. Drug  
Government 
expenditure, A$ 
1 Atorvastatin1 593,307,859 
2 Rosuvastatin1 359,207,846 
3 Ranibizumab2 307,816,693 
4 Adalimumab3 198,802,937 
5 Fluticasone Propionate + Salmeterol Xinafoate4 169,267,494 
6 Esomeprazole Magnesium Trihydrate5 168,095,363 
7 Olanzapine6 159,545,861 
8 Clopidogrel7 133,172,362 
9 Etanercept3 127,752,968 
10 Tiotropium Bromide Monohydrate4 117,857,405 
1Lipid modifying agents, 2Ophthalmologicals, 3Immunosuppressants, 4Drugs for 
obstructive airway diseases, 5Drugs for acid related disorders, 6Psycholeptics, 
7Antithrombotic agents. 
 Source: Department of Health and Ageing 
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Table 3.10 Drug by highest volume, year end June 2012 
No. Drug  
Number of 
prescriptions 
1 Atorvastatin1 10,507,613 
2 Rosuvastatin1 6,729,477 
3 Esomeprazole Magnesium Trihydrate2 5,677,991 
4 Paracetamol3 4,834,008 
5 Perindopril4 3,690,650 
6 Simvastatin1 3,638,727 
7 Pantoprazole Sodium Sesquihydrate5 3,500,393 
8 Metformin Hydrochloride6 3,298,661 
9 Fluticasone Propionate + Salmeterol Xinafoate7 3,007,412 
10 Irbesartan4 2,884,818 
1Lipid modifying agents, 2Drugs for acid related disorders, 3Analgesics, 4Agents acting on 
the renin-angiotensin system, 5Drugs for acid related disorders, 6Drugs used in diabetes, 
7Drugs for obstructive airway diseases. 
 Source: Department of Health and Ageing 
 
 Under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme’s prescribing guidelines, statins 
should only be given to patients in very high risk categories. Those patients can 
have one of a number of conditions with any cholesterol level (Table 3.11). If the 
patient does not fall into any of the very high risk categories, statins can only be 
commenced when the lipid levels satisfied the certain conditions (Table 3.12) 
(Department of Health, 2013d).  
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Table 3.11 Conditions of patients in the very high risk categories 
Conditions 
 coronary heart disease which has become symptomatic 
 cerebrovascular disease which has become symptomatic 
 peripheral vascular disease which has become symptomatic 
 diabetes mellitus with microalbuminuria (defined as urinary albumin 
excretion rate of >20mcg/min or urinary albumin to creatinine ratio of > 
2.5 for males, > 3.5 for females) 
 diabetes mellitus in Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander patients 
 diabetes mellitus in patients aged 60 years or more 
 family history of coronary heart disease which has become symptomatic 
before the age of 55 years in two or more first degree relatives 
 family history of coronary heart disease which has become symptomatic 
before the age of 45 years in one or more first degree relatives 
Source: Department of Health 
 
  
 
6
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Table 3.12 Lipid levels for patients not in the very high risk categories 
Patient Category Lipid Levels for PBS Subsidy 
 Patients with diabetes mellitus not otherwise included total cholesterol > 5.5 mmol/L 
 Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander patients 
 Patients with hypertension 
total cholesterol > 6.5 mmol/L  
or 
total cholesterol > 5.5 mmol/L and 
HDL cholesterol < 1 mmol/L 
 Patients with HDL cholesterol < 1 mmol/L total cholesterol > 6.5 mmol/L 
 Patients with familial hypercholesterolaemia identified by: 
o DNA mutation; or 
o tendon xanthomas in the patient or their first or second degree 
relative 
 Patients with: 
o family history of coronary heart disease which has become 
symptomatic before the age of 60 years in one or more first 
degree relatives; or  
o family history of coronary heart disease which has become 
If aged 18 years or less at treatment 
initiation: 
 LDL cholesterol > 4 mmol/L 
 
If aged more than 18 years at 
treatment initiation: 
 LDL cholesterol > 5 mmol/L 
  or 
 total cholesterol > 6.5 mmol/L 
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symptomatic before the age of 50 years in one or more second 
degree relatives 
  or 
 total cholesterol > 5.5 mmol/L and 
 HDL cholesterol < 1 mmol/L 
 Patients not eligible under the above: 
o men aged 35 to 75 years 
o post-menopausal women aged up to 75 years 
total cholesterol > 7.5 mmol/L 
or 
triglyceride > 4 mmol/L 
 Patients not otherwise included total cholesterol > 9 mmol/L 
or 
triglyceride > 8 mmol/L 
Source: Department of Health 
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3.9 Conclusion 
Over the period of 20-years, from 1991/1992 to 2010/2011, PBS 
expenditure and prescriptions grew from A$1,220 million to A$8,727 million and 94 
million prescriptions to 188 million prescriptions respectively. A significant 
contributor to this growth was the increase in the proportion of the aged 
population and the number of concessional card holders, both groups utilising more 
drugs and claiming the higher level of subsidies. Other factors that contributed to 
the growth of PBS expenditure and prescriptions count were the new listing of 
drugs and the increase in the total number of persons with chronic diseases. 
Chronic diseases such as neoplasms, diabetes mellitus, hypertensive disease, 
asthma and hypercholesterolemia tend to increase government expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals, particularly as more new drugs are listed on the PBS and patients 
take those medicines on a long term basis. Several cost containment policies have 
been implemented by the Commonwealth government to slow down the growth of 
PBS expenditure and volume of prescriptions. These measures include the brand 
premium policy, the requirement for economic evaluation as a condition for listing 
on the PBS, the re-supply limits and safety net 20 day rule, brand substitution 
policy, co-payment increases, the therapeutic group premium policy, the creation of 
the F1 and F2 formularies, the premium-free dispensing incentive and the 12.5%, 
2% and 25% price reductions for drugs in Formulary 2. 
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Chapter 4.0 Systematic Review of Cost Containment Measures 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Globally, numerous pharmaceutical policy reforms to contain cost have 
been implemented with some countries reportedly succeeded in containing cost 
while others have failed (Carone et al., 2012). Numerous studies have investigated 
the impact of various pharmaceutical policy reforms on prescribing patterns and 
pharmaceutical expenditure. However, these studies have focused on either an 
individual reform or a limited range of reforms rather than evaluating the reforms 
collectively over time. In this chapter, the results of a systematic review of a 
comprehensive range of pharmaceutical cost containment policies are presented. 
As the review addresses a wide range of interventions, it adopts what is termed a 
‘lumping’ perspective. A ‘lumped’ review has the advantage over a ‘split’ review, 
which addresses a narrow range of interventions, of being more useful for policy 
makers in informing decisions about which interventions to implement (Grimshaw 
et al., 2003). Previous reviews of pharmaceutical cost containment policies have 
adopted a ‘split’ perspective, involving only a specific cost containment policy or a 
combination of several policies (Weir et al., 2012). Examples of ‘split’ reviews 
include (1) Austvoll-Dahlgren et al. (2008) and Qingyue et al. (2011) on patient cost-
sharing, (2) Aaserud et al. (2006), Galizzi et al. (2011) and Morgan et al. (2009) on 
reference pricing, (3) Green et al. (2010) and Puig-Junoy et al. (2007) on restrictions 
on reimbursement, (4) Goldman (2007) on a combination of the above, and (5) 
Eddama et al. (2008) on economic evaluation. The findings of the systematic review 
presented in this chapter will contribute to the existing literature by providing 
guidance to policymakers, practitioners and researchers about the effectiveness of 
cost containment policies and alternative policy options available.  
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4.2 Objectives  
 The objectives of this systematic review are (1) to identify the types of 
pharmaceutical cost containment policies that have been implemented, (2) to 
synthesise and compare methodologically the reported impacts of pharmaceutical 
cost containment policies on drug utilisation, drug costs and public pharmaceutical 
expenditure. 
 
4.3 Criteria for Inclusion of Studies 
4.3.1 Types of studies 
The following types of studies were included in the review: randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs), non-randomised controlled trials (CCTs), repeated measures 
(RM) studies, interrupted time series (ITS) analyses, and before-after (BA) studies. 
The inclusion of these types of studies was based on the Cochrane Effective Practice 
and Organisation of Care Group (EPOC) guidelines (Cochrane Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care Group, 2013). For BA studies, the inclusion of studies specified 
in the Cochrane EPOC guidelines are limited to controlled BA studies. However, due 
to the limited number of controlled BA studies, the inclusion criteria were expanded 
to include uncontrolled BA studies. Descriptive, editorial, review studies, and 
studies without statistical analysis were excluded. 
 
4.3.2 Inclusion criteria 
Only studies evaluating the impact of cost containment policies 
implemented in health systems with a tax-based national health service or a social 
health insurance system were included. Studies of the impact of cost containment 
policies implemented by private health insurance schemes were excluded. Included 
studies were also limited to those evaluating policies that were implemented 
regionally and nationally. Studies evaluating policies implemented in local health 
care facilities were excluded. 
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4.3.3 Types of cost containment interventions 
Pharmaceutical cost containment policies that are intended to control either 
the volume or the expenditure of drugs or both were included. These policies have 
been discussed in an earlier chapter and were grouped into two categories, namely 
policies influencing either the supply or the demand of pharmaceuticals. Table 4.1 
summarises policies included in this review, showing how they were grouped. The 
term policy in this review refers to a health related public policy that consists of 
rules or regulations made by legislators that are intended to influence the actions, 
behaviours or decisions of others (Harrington et al., 2008; Longest, 2009). 
 
Table 4.1 Types of pharmaceutical cost containment policies 
1. Policies influencing the supply for pharmaceuticals 
a. Price cuts 
b. Maximum pricing 
c. Reference pricing 
 
2. Policies influencing the demand for pharmaceuticals 
a. Patient cost sharing  
i. Fixed co-payment 
ii. Proportional co-payment 
iii. Caps 
iv. Ceilings 
v. Tiered co-payment 
vi. Combination of the above 
b. Positive and negative lists 
c. Prescription controls and duration limits 
d. Budget System 
e. Generic substitution 
f. Therapeutic substitution 
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4.3.4 Types of outcome measures 
 Studies accepted in this review had to measure the impact of cost 
containment policies on at least one of the following outcomes: 
i. Drug volume including the number of prescribed drugs, the number of 
dispensed drugs or the actual usage of drugs 
ii. Drug expenditure including total drug expenditure, the cost of drugs or 
the price of drugs 
 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Searched databases and websites  
 An electronic search for English-language journal articles was conducted in 
three major databases MEDLINE (Ovid), EMBASE (Ovid) and EconLit. Additional 
search was also conducted in the internet through Google Scholar. Articles were 
restricted to publication date from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2012. 
Additionally, hand-searches of core journals and reference tracking of reviewed 
articles were carried out.  
 
4.4.2 Search strategy  
 The search was based on a combination of keywords covering four themes: 
Pharmaceuticals and Insurances, Cost Containment Measures, Health Care Policies, 
and Outcome Measures. Search terms used in the Pharmaceuticals and Insurances 
theme included terms such as ‘Pharmaceutical’ or ‘Insurance, Pharmaceutical 
Services’ or ‘Insurance, Health, Reimbursement’ while search terms in the Health 
Care Policies theme included ‘Public Policy’ or ‘Health Policy’ or ‘Policy’. In the Cost 
Containment Measures theme, search terms included ‘Cost Control’ or ‘Cost 
Savings’ or ‘Cost Sharing’ or ‘Prescription Fees’ or ‘Fees, Pharmaceutical’ or 
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‘Formularies’ or ‘Reference Pricing’ or ‘Copayment’ or ‘Drug Substitution’. The 
fourth primary theme of Outcome Measures included terms such as ‘Drug Costs’ or 
‘Health Expenditures’ or ‘Prescriptions’ or ‘Drug Utilization’.  
 
4.4.3 Review method 
 Every relevant study identified from the search was independently appraised 
by two reviewers (KS Lee and D Hendrie). The reviewers assessed the search results 
and the abstracts and reference lists of reviewed articles before the full text of 
shortlisted articles were retrieved.  
4.4.4 Data extraction 
 Relevant data from each study was independently extracted by two reviewers 
(KS Lee and D Hendrie) using a modified version of the data abstraction form 
developed by the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines (SIGN) (Scottish Intercollegiate 
Guidelines Network, 2008) (Table A1). Qualitative and quantitative data that were 
extracted included study design, study population, geographic setting, data source, 
types of drugs, types of interventions, study period, outcome measures, size of the 
intervention effect, study funding, study limitation and quality criteria.  
4.4.5 Evidence grading of included studies 
 The evidence level of each article was graded according to the SIGN grading 
system (Table 4.2) (Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network, 2008). However, 
due to the nature of pharmaceutical cost containment policies, the design of 
studies evaluating their effectiveness were rarely randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs) or non-randomised controlled trials (CCTs). Most of the study designs were 
repeated measures (RM) studies, interrupted time series (ITS) analyses and before-
after (BA) studies. These study designs constitute an evidence level 3 for non-
analytic studies.  
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Table 4.2 Levels of evidence 
 
 
1++  High quality meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a 
very low risk of bias 
1+  Well conducted meta-analyses, systematic reviews, or RCTs with a low risk 
of bias 
1 -  Meta-analyses, systematic reviews, or RCTs with a high risk of bias 
2++  High quality systematic reviews of case control or cohort studies 
 High quality case control or cohort studies with a very low risk of 
confounding or bias and a high probability that the relationship is causal 
2+  Well conducted case control or cohort studies with a low risk of 
confounding or bias and a moderate probability that the relationship is 
causal 
2 -  Case control or cohort studies with a high risk of confounding or bias and 
a significant risk that the relationship is not causal 
3  Non-analytic studies, e.g. case reports, case series 
4  Expert opinion 
 
Source: Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines (SIGN) 
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4.5 Results 
 The searches in MEDLINE (Ovid) generated 283 articles and in EMBASE (Ovid) 
generated 1,576 articles. The search in the third database, EconLit produced 41 
articles. The search results were combined and duplicates were removed, yielding a 
total of 1,705 articles. The titles and abstracts of articles were identified and 
screened, and 286 articles were selected for full article review. From these articles, 
265 articles were excluded with 111 articles being descriptive, editorials or reviews, 
103 articles not evaluating a pharmaceutical cost containment measure, 21 articles 
evaluating policies implemented in the context of a private health insurance 
system, five articles evaluating policies conducted in a local or institutional setting, 
the evaluation in nine articles having no relevant outcomes, 15 articles were 
excluded due to study design and one article could not be found. An additional 18 
articles were identified through reference list searches, bringing the total number 
of articles included in the final review to 39 (Figure 4.1). Studies that were excluded 
from this review are listed in Appendix (Table A2)  
4.5.1 Characteristics of the included studies 
4.5.1.1 Study design 
Of the 39 articles included in the review, the design of 32 of the studies 
were interrupted time series analyses while seven were before-after studies. 
4.5.1.2 Study site 
Studies included in the review were carried out in 15 different countries. 
The majority of studies investigated cost containment policies in Canada 
(19) where studies were carried out in the provinces of British Columbia (9), 
Quebec (4), Nova Scotia (3), Ontario (1), Manitoba (1) and one study across 
British Columbia, Quebec and Ontario. Other studies were conducted in 
Australia (4), Austria (1), Belgium (1), Denmark (1), Finland (1), France (1), 
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Iceland (1), Ireland (1), South Korea (1), Spain (1), Sweden (2) and Taiwan (5) 
(Table 4.3). 
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Figure 4.1 Flow chart of study selection process 
Full copies retrieved 
and assessed for 
eligibility  
n = 286 
Articles excluded, n= 265 
n=111 Descriptive or editorial or review 
study 
n=103 No pharmaceutical cost 
containment measures 
n=21 Research done in the private 
health insurance system  
n=5 Research conducted in a local or 
institutional setting 
n=9 No relevant outcomes 
n=15 Excluded study design 
n=1 Article not found 
 
Titles and abstracts 
identified and 
screened with 
duplicates removed 
n = 1,705 
Articles excluded following title and 
abstract review 
n = 1,419 
n = 1419 
Articles 
identified by 
reference lists 
search 
n = 18 
 
Articles meeting 
inclusion criteria and 
included in review 
n = 39 
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4.5.1.3 Study time 
Of the 39 studies, the majority (37) were carried out over a period of 
two to 10 years (Table 4.3). The longest time period of 12 years was used in 
the studies by Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) in Spain and Huang et al. (2012) 
in Taiwan. Both studies required a longer study period due to the multiple 
interventions investigated. Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) investigated 16 cost 
containment measures while Huang et al. (2012) studied seven price 
adjustments under reference pricing. In contrast, the studies by Liu et al. 
(2003, 2004) were carried out over 20 months and involved only one 
intervention.  
4.5.1.4 Study interventions 
Most of the policies investigated were intended to influence the 
demand for pharmaceuticals. Seventeen of the studies investigated patient 
cost sharing polices, which included fixed co-payments (2), proportional co-
payments (1), ceilings (2) and a combination of cost sharing policies (12). 
Four studies analysed either positive or negative list policies, while 10 
studies investigated prescription controls and duration limits. Budget policy 
and generic substitution were investigated in one study each. Policies 
influencing the supply of pharmaceuticals consisted mainly of a reference 
pricing policy (9) and price cut measures (3). A breakdown of the 
interventions studied is shown in Table 4.4. 
                                                          
 The total studies in this section do not match the total studies included in the review as some of 
the studies investigated more than one policy. 
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Table 4.3 Characteristics of the included studies 
Paper 
Type 
of 
study Population studied 
Duration of 
study Country SIGN 
(Donnelly et al., 2000) ITS NA 9 years 6 months Australia 3 
(Hynd et al., 2008) ITS All Australian residents; both concessional and general 
beneficiaries 
7 years 9 months Australia 3 
(Hynd et al., 2009) ITS All Western Australian residents; both concessional and 
general beneficiaries 
7 years Australia 3 
(McManus et al., 1996) ITS All Australian residents covered by the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme 
 
7 years 9 months Australia 3 
(Winkelmayer et al., 2010) ITS Patients with at least one claim for any medication 
used for treating diabetes: any sulfonylurea, biguanide, 
α-glucosidase inhibitor, thiazolidinedione, repaglinid, or 
insulin 
2 years Austria 3 
(van Driel et al., 2008) ITS NA 9 years Belgium 3 
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(Dormuth et al., 2006) ITS British Columbia residents aged >65 years who used 
inhaled steroids, β-agonists, or anticholinergics 
between 31 December 1996 and 1 July 2004 
7 years 6 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Dormuth et al., 2009) ITS British Columbia residents aged >65 years, not federally 
insured for drug benefits who were dispensed inhaled 
steroids, β-agonists or anticholinergics on or after 
January 1996 
8 years 2 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Grootendorst et al., 2001) ITS Senior citizens >65 years and taking anti-anginal drugs 
(calcium channel blockers (CCBs), nitrates, or beta-
blockers) 
4 years 2 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Hazlet et al., 2002) BA Senior citizens >65 years who received two or more 
separate prescriptions for an antisecretory drug in the 
period before implementation of the policy 
5 years British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Marshall et al., 2002) BA Senior citizens >65 years and taking Histamine-2 
receptor antagonist (H2RAs) or proton pump inhibitors 
(PPIs) 
6 years 5 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Schneeweiss et al., 2002) ITS Senior citizens >65 years and taking at least one ACE 
inhibitor during the period from Oct. 1, 1995, to Mar. 
31, 1996 
3 years 4 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
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(Schneeweiss et al., 2003) ITS Senior citizens >65 years and taking Dihydropyridine 
CCBs between December 1995 and March 1996 
3 years 6 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Schneeweiss et al., 2004) ITS Patients covered by Pharmacare aged >18 years who 
had filled at least one prescription for a nebulised 
respiratory drug in the preceding 12 months (3 March 
1998 to 28 February 1999) 
2 years British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Schneeweiss et al., 2006) ITS Senior citizens >65 years using one of the restricted 
PPIs during a 6-month identification period (Jan 15, 
2003, to July 14, 2003) 
2 years 6 months British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Kozyrskyj et al., 2001) BA 6612 school-aged children with mild to moderate 
asthma and 1420 school-aged children with severe 
asthma aged between 5 and 15 years old 
3 years Manitoba, Canada 3 
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(Campbell et al., 2003) ITS Nova Scotia residents aged >65 years, not federally, 
provincially, or privately insured for drug benefits who 
received at least one drug for any of these products 
(topical corticosteroid, antibiotic, antifungal, or 
combination product) between April 1, 1999, and 
March 31, 2001 
2 years Nova Scotia, Canada 3 
(Kephart et al., 2005) ITS Senior citizens >65 years, not covered by any other 
provincial, federal, or private drug insurance program 
who received at least one prescription for inhaled 
respiratory drugs during the reference year 
3 years 11 months Nova Scotia, Canada 3 
(MacCara et al., 2001) BA Senior beneficiaries >65 years and with at least one 
drug claim for an oral antimicrobial between December 
1, 1994, and December 31, 1997 
3 years 1 month Nova Scotia, Canada 3 
(Marshall et al., 2006) ITS Senior beneficiaries >65 year 3 years 9 months Ontario, Canada 3 
(Blais et al., 2001) ITS Individuals aged > 65 years with at least one 
prescription of one or more of the study medications 
dispensed between 1 August 1992 – 31 August 1997 
6 years 1 month Quebec, Canada 3 
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(Blais et al., 2003) ITS Individuals aged < 64 years and receiving social 
assistance (welfare group) with at least one 
prescription of one or more of the study medications 
dispensed between 1 August 1991 – 30 June 1997 
6 years Quebec, Canada 3 
(Pilote et al., 2002) ITS Quebec residents aged >65 years who were admitted 
to acute care hospitals in Quebec between Jan. 1, 1994, 
and Dec. 31, 1998, with a discharge diagnosis of acute 
myocardial infarction 
5 years Quebec, Canada 3 
(Tamblyn et al., 2001) ITS Quebec residents who were recipients of welfare-
funded medications or elderly persons who filled at 
least 1 prescription for a drug in the year before the 
policy and who were not exempted from the cost-
sharing policy 
4 years 1 month Quebec, Canada 3 
(Marshall et al., 2007) ITS Senior beneficiaries >65 years with high rates of 
analgesic use 
5 years 9 months Québec, Ontario and 
British Columbia, 
Canada 
3 
(Bjerrum et al., 2001) BA Residents of Funen, Denmark 5 years Denmark 3 
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(Martikainen et al., 2007) ITS All permanent residents covered by the National Health 
Insurance Scheme 
5 years Finland 3 
(Pichetti et al., 2011) ITS NA 11 years 6 months France 3 
(Almarsdottir et al., 2000) ITS All patients covered under the Icelandic State Social 
Security Institute 
5 years 8 months Iceland 3 
(Usher et al., 2012) ITS Patients covered under the General Medical Services 
(GMS) Scheme and Drugs Payment (DP) Scheme 
5 years 10 months Ireland 3 
(Lee et al., 2012) ITS Patients covered under the Health Insurance Review 
and Assessment Service (HIRA) 
5 years 6 months South Korea 3 
(Moreno-Torres et al., 
2011) 
ITS Spanish population covered by the National Health 
System (NHS) excluding civil servants 
12 years Spain 3 
(Andersson et al., 2007) ITS NA 5 years Sweden 3 
(Ong et al., 2003) ITS NA 9 years 6 months Sweden 3 
(Hsiao et al., 2010) ITS NA 4 years Taiwan 3 
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(Huang et al., 2012) ITS 147,157 patients who either received angiotension-
converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs) (between January 
1997 - December 2008) or angiotensin receptor 
blockers (ARBs) (between February 1998 - December 
2008 
12 years Taiwan 3 
(Lee et al., 2006) ITS NA 8 years Taiwan 3 
(Liu et al., 2003) BA Patients aged 65 years or older from 21 selected 
hospitals in Taipei 
1 year 8 months Taipei, Taiwan 3 
(Liu et al., 2004) BA Patients aged 65 years or older from 21 selected 
hospitals in Taipei 
1 year 8 months Taipei, Taiwan 3 
      
NA - Not available, ITS - Interrupted time series, BA - Before- after    
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1
 (McManus et al., 1996) 
2
 (Martikainen et al., 2007) 
3
 (Lee et al., 2012) 
4
 (Kozyrskyj et al., 2001) 
5
 (Almarsdottir et al., 2000) 
6
 (Hynd et al., 2008, 2009) 
7
 (Blais et al., 2001; Blais et al., 2003; Dormuth et al., 2006; Dormuth et al., 
2009; Pilote et al., 2002; Tamblyn et al., 2001) 
8
 (Ong et al., 2003) 
 
                                                                                                                                
9
 (Lee et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2003, 2004) 
10
 (Campbell et al., 2003; Schneeweiss et al., 2006) 
11
 (Pichetti et al., 2011) 
12
 (Moreno-Torres et al., 2011) 
13
 (Donnelly et al., 2000) 
14
 (Winkelmayer et al., 2010) 
15
 (van Driel et al., 2008) 
16
 (Kephart et al., 2005; MacCara et al., 2001; Marshall et al., 2006; Marshall et 
al., 2007; Marshall et al., 2002; Schneeweiss et al., 2004) 
17
 (Bjerrum et al., 2001) 
18
 (Lee et al., 2006) 
19
 (Andersson et al., 2007) 
Policy addressed and reference Countries 
Total AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA ISL IRL KOR ESP SWE TPE 
Influencing the demand for pharmaceuticals              
1. Patient Cost-Sharing              
 Fixed co-payment 1
1     12        
 Proportional co-payment          1
3    
 Caps              
 Ceilings    1
4    15      
 Tier co-payment              
 Combination of the above 2
6   67        18 39 
2. Positive and negative list    210   111    112   
3. Prescription controls and duration limits 113 114 115 616 117         
4. Budget System             118 
5. Generic substitution            119  
6. Therapeutic substitution              
Table 4.4 Interventions studied and the countries involved 
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20
 (Usher et al., 2012) 
21
 (Lee et al., 2012) 
22
 (Moreno-Torres et al., 2011) 
23
 (Grootendorst et al., 2001; Hazlet et al., 2002; Marshall et al., 2002; 
Schneeweiss et al., 2002; Schneeweiss et al., 2003) 
24
 (Moreno-Torres et al., 2011) 
25
 (Hsiao et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2006) 
Policy addressed and reference Countries 
Total AUS AUT BEL CAN DEN FIN FRA ISL IRL KOR ESP SWE TPE 
Influencing the supply for pharmaceuticals              
1. Price cuts 
 
        120 121 122   
2. Maximum pricing 
 
             
3. Reference pricing 
 
   523       124  325 
AUS – Australia; AUT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; DEN – Denmark; FIN – Finland; FRA – France; GER – Germany; HUN – 
Hungary; ISL – Iceland; IRL – Ireland; KOR – South Korea; ESP – Spain; SWE – Sweden; TPE - Taiwan 
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4.5.2 Characteristics of outcomes 
 The majority of the studies reviewed evaluated the cost containment 
measures in terms of their impact on drug volumes followed by their impact on 
drug costs and total expenditure. Prescription counts or prescription rates were 
adopted as the outcome measure in 17 studies with one study (Bjerrum et al., 
2001) evaluating prescription counts using annual prevalence, which is defined as 
the proportion of the population who had collected at least one prescription during 
a year. Prescription duration was used as an outcome by Liu et al. in their two 
studies evaluating the impact of coinsurance and ceilings (Liu et al., 2003, 2004). In 
studies that adopted drug cost as an outcome measure, 11 studies adopted the cost 
per patient or cost per prescription as an outcome while only one study (Lee et al., 
2012) adopted the cost per unit as an outcome. The outcome measure used less 
often was the cost per day, with Liu et al. (2004) the only study to have used it. 
Total drug expenditure was used as an outcome measure across all types of cost 
containment measures either independently or in combination with other outcome 
measures.  
 
4.5.3 Effects of interventions 
Detailed results for the included studies are provided in Table 4.5. 
4.5.3.1 Patient cost sharing 
Two studies by McManus et al. (1996) in Australia and Martikainen 
et al. (2007) in Finland investigated the impact of changes in fixed co-
payments. The changes investigated by these studies were contrary to each 
other, with McManus et al. analysing an increase in co-payment for general 
beneficiaries and the introduction of co-payments for repatriation 
beneficiaries while Martikainen et al. investigated the impact of a decrease 
in co-payments. McManus’s study found that an increase in the co-payment 
led to a statistically significant decrease in the level of prescription counts 
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for essential medicines and for discretionary medicines for both general and 
repatriation beneficiaries. However, no changes in trend for either type of 
beneficiary were demonstrated following the policy implementation. On the 
other hand, Martikainen et al. found a decrease in co-payment resulted in a 
statistically significant increase in the level and trend in defined daily doses 
(DDDs) for both antiglaucoma drugs, Dorzolamide and Latanoprost.  
Lee et al. (2012) investigated the conversion of the co-payment 
system in South Korea from a fixed co-payment of 1500 South Korean won 
(KRW) per prescription to a 30% proportional co-payment. They found no 
significant changes to the utilisation level and trend for all prescriptions 
except for a reduction in antihyperlipidemics. In terms of drug cost, no 
significant changes to the cost per unit dispensed and cost per patient were 
demonstrated with the exception of a reduction in the trend reduction per 
month per patient.  
Changes in deductible were investigated by two studies, Kozyrskyj et 
al. (2001) in Manitoba, Canada and Almarsdottir et al. (2000) in Iceland. In 
April 1996, Manitoba's drug benefit program, Pharmacare, changed the 
patient’s annual deductible from a fixed payment of C$237 per family plus a 
40% co-payment on prescription costs over C$237 to an income-based 
deductible of 2% of income for families with annual income of C$15,000 or 
less and 3% of income for families with higher incomes. These changes 
resulted in a reduction in the number of inhaled corticosteroid doses 
dispensed to children aged 5 to 15 years old with asthma, with relatively 
similar reductions found for children with stable or mild to moderate 
asthma and those with stable, severe asthma. In contrast to the Kozyrskyj et 
al. study, Almarsdottir et al. (2000) found no significant changes in total drug 
expenditure following the increase in patient’s deductibles. 
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Twelve studies investigated changes in patient cost sharing which 
used a combination of different types of cost sharing. In Australia, Hynd et 
al. (2008, 2009) examined the impact of an increase in patient fixed co-
payment and safety net and the impacts varied according to the categories 
of medicines considered. The majority of medicine categories such as 
statins, proton-pump inhibitors and a combination of asthma medicines 
showed a reduction in utilisation level or trend but medicine categories such 
as hypnotics, anxiolytics and anti-gout showed no significant changes or 
even increases in the case of atypical antipsychotics. Four of the six studies 
carried out in Canada were based in Quebec province (Blais et al., 2001; 
Blais et al., 2003; Pilote et al., 2002; Tamblyn et al., 2001). Those studies 
investigated the introduction of 25% coinsurance and annual ceilings in 
August 1996 followed by the introduction of an annual deductible with 
coinsurance and an annual ceiling based on income in January 1997. Blais et 
al. (2001) and Pilote et al. (2002) found no significant changes to the drug 
utilisation trend in elderly patients (aged more than 65 years) following the 
changes in patient cost sharing. However, in a later study by Blais et al. 
(2003) with individuals aged less than 65 years and receiving social 
assistance or classified as welfare recipients, a 37% trend reduction in the 
number of inhaled corticosteroid prescriptions dispensed was reported. No 
significant changes were observed in this study for two other drug groups, 
the neuroleptics and the anticonvulsants. In a study using two categories of 
the population as subjects, the elderly and welfare groups, Tamblyn et al. 
(2001) found a significant reduction in both categories but the intervention 
impacted the welfare group more that the elderly group. The overall daily 
drug utilisation trend for elderly persons was reduced by 9.14% while the 
welfare recipients reduced their usage by 15.94%. Higher rate of serious 
adverse events and emergency department visits were reported to be 
associated with the reduction in drug utilisation.  
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In the province of British Columbia, two studies by Dormuth et al. 
(2006; 2009) investigated the introduction in January 2002 of patient fixed 
co-payment of C$10 per-dispensing for those with household incomes 
below $50,000 and C$25 for those with incomes above $50,000. This plan 
was changed to a 25% coinsurance plus family deductible equal to 0%, 1% or 
2% of family income with an out-of-pocket ceiling equal to 1.25%, 2%, or 3% 
of income in May the following year. With DDD/10,000 patients/month as 
an outcome, Dormuth et al. (2006) found a reduction in the utilisation trend 
following both interventions while Dormuth et al. (2009) reported a similar 
finding in total drug expenditure, albeit a different outcome measure. Both 
studies found the combination of coinsurance with deductible and ceiling to 
be more effective in reducing utilisation and expenditure that the fixed co-
payment.  
In Sweden, Ong et al. (2003) investigated two cost sharing changes in 
July 1995 and January 1997. The first change was the increase of fixed co-
payment from 125 Swedish Krona (SEK) to 160 SEK for an initial prescription 
and coinsurance of 60 SEK for additional drugs from 25 SEK previously, while 
the second change was the increase of fixed co-payment to 400 SEK 
followed by a coinsurance up to a ceiling of 1300 SEK. This study found that 
the first cost sharing changes permanently increased the antidepressants 
and sedatives DDDs dispensed to men while the second cost sharing 
changes permanently reduced the antidepressants DDDs dispensed to 
women.  
In two other studies that investigated the impact of introducing 
coinsurance and a ceiling in Taiwan, Liu et al. (2003; 2004) found significant 
reduction in the average prescription duration and the average drug cost per 
prescription. However, Lee et al. (2006) reported no significant changes in 
the total drug expenditure. 
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4.5.3.2 Positive and negative list 
Four studies (Campbell et al., 2003; Moreno-Torres et al., 2011; 
Pichetti et al., 2011; Schneeweiss et al., 2006) were included in the review 
under the positive and negative list measure. Two Canadian studies 
(Campbell et al., 2003; Schneeweiss et al., 2006) investigated the removal of 
reimbursement eligibility of drugs that were previously available for 
reimbursement. Schneeweiss et al. studied the removal of reimbursement 
eligibility of three non-preferred PPIs, namely Omeprazole, Pantoprazole 
and Lansoprazole. Only one preferred PPI, Rabeprazole, was covered by 
PharmaCare, the province-funded drug benefits plan. The rationale of this 
regulation was to increase the negotiating power of PharmaCare and reduce 
the cost of PPIs. Following the implementation of this intervention in July 
2003, the level of daily doses per 10,000 residents of non-preferred PPIs was 
significantly reduced while usage of preferred PPIs increased. However, the 
overall impact of this intervention did not result in any significant changes to 
the level and trend on all PPIs. In Campbell’s study, the removal of 10 topical 
combination corticosteroid products from reimbursement eligibility did not 
result in any changes in the cost per patient of the topical combination 
corticosteroid products but instead increased the overall cost of all topical 
products mainly due to the increase in the cost per patient of potent topical 
corticosteroids. 
In a more recent study by Pichetti et al. (2011) in France, the removal 
of 128 types of mucolytics and expectorants from the list of reimbursable 
drugs decreased the trend of prescription rate for mucolytics and 
expectorants but increased the rate for bronchodilator, antitussive and 
antibacterial prescriptions. The study also found significant saving in drug 
expenditure due to the removal of mucolytics and expectorants. In a similar 
study design by Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) in Spain, the exclusion of 984 
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products from public financing beginning September 1998 reduced the 
number of prescriptions per capita while increasing the price per 
prescription. The saving from the reduction in utilisation was not able to 
adequately compensate for the increase in cost, and therefore resulted in 
no significant saving in total drug expenditure.  
4.5.3.3 Prescription controls and duration limits 
Ten studies (Bjerrum et al., 2001; Donnelly et al., 2000; Kephart et 
al., 2005; MacCara et al., 2001; Marshall et al., 2006; Marshall et al., 2007; 
Marshall et al., 2002; Schneeweiss et al., 2004; van Driel et al., 2008; 
Winkelmayer et al., 2010) were identifies that examined prescription 
controls and duration limit measures.  
The only study (Donnelly et al., 2000) on duration limits was carried 
out in Australia. The minimum prescription re-supply period was increased 
from three days to 20 days. In the first month following the changes in the 
re-supply period, the number of prescriptions dispensed was significantly 
reduced but no significant impact was observed in the second month. 
Therefore the impact of increasing the re-supply period had a temporary 
effect in reducing the drug utilisation but not in the longer period.  
Two studies (van Driel et al., 2008; Winkelmayer et al., 2010) 
reported the impact of relaxing the restrictions of preferred drugs to switch 
patients from the non-preferred drugs in order to reduce drug expenditures. 
In Belgium, van Driel et al. (2008) studied the impact of moving the status of 
preferred (cheaper) H2AH and PPIs drugs from ‘restricted’ to ‘open 
benefits’. In March 2001, Cimetidine and Ranitidine were shifted from 
‘restricted’ to ‘open benefit’ where no authorizations were required while in 
March 2003, Omeprazole (20 mg) and Rabeprazole (small packages) were 
shifted to ‘open benefit’. Liberation of Cimetidine and Ranitidine 
reimbursement in 2001 increased the volume and expenditure of overall 
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H2AH without any significant impact on the volume or expenditure of PPIs. 
However, following the 2003 intervention, the utilisation and expenditure of 
PPIs were increased while the H2AH drug group were reduced. Van Driel et 
al. concluded that lifting of reimbursement restrictions to make preferred 
acid suppressant drugs more favourable to prescribers did not result in 
significant changes in utilization or cost saving. In Austria, Winkelmayer et al. 
(2010) studied the expansion of indications for preferred statins and found 
no significant changes in the level and trend of drug utilisation for overall 
statins. However, their study reported a statistically significant increase in 
the trend of preferred statins while the trend of non-preferred statins 
decreased.  
Six Canadian studies (Kephart et al., 2005; MacCara et al., 2001; 
Marshall et al., 2006; Marshall et al., 2007; Marshall et al., 2002; 
Schneeweiss et al., 2004) provided estimates of the impact of implementing 
reimbursement restrictions. Schneeweiss’s study found significant savings in 
the overall drug cost per patient following the removal of reimbursement 
eligibility of nebulised bronchodilators, steroids and cromoglycates. 
Although the increase in drug cost per patient for inhaler drugs and 
decrease in drug cost per patient for nebuliser drugs were initially not 
statistically significant, the study result was later corrected for non-
compliance in sensitivity analysis and resulted in a significant decrease in 
overall drug cost per patient.  
In a cross-country study by Marshall et al. (2007), three provinces 
with three different reimbursement policies on Cox-2 inhibitors were 
investigated. No restrictions on Cox-2 inhibitors reimbursement was present 
in Québec while the reimbursement policy in Ontario was based on a policy 
of ‘Limited Use’ when certain clinical criteria were met and the most 
restricted policy of all the provinces was in British Columbia where the 
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prescribing physician was required to request for a Special Authority before 
reimbursement was approved. Marshall et al. (2007) found that NSAIDs 
utilisation, measured by DDDs per 100 senior beneficiaries per month, was 
higher in Québec and Ontario, provinces with relax reimbursement 
restrictions; while no significant changes in utilisation were observed in 
British Columbia, where restrictions were more strict. 
Other Canadian studies estimated a reduction in drug utilisation 
(Kephart et al., 2005; MacCara et al., 2001) and total drug expenditure 
(Marshall et al., 2002). Kephart et al. (2005) found significant trend 
reduction in the wet nebulisation therapy utilisation rate after the 
implementation of reimbursement restrictions for wet nebulisation therapy. 
However, the utilisation trend of other respiratory drugs such as oral 
corticosteroids, inhaled short-acting β-agonists and inhaled anticholinergics 
were higher after the implementation. MacCara’s study found a significant 
reduction in the number of prescription for fluoroquinolones as well as in 
the total antimicrobial usage after the implementation of reimbursement 
restrictions for fluoroquinolones in January 1997. The study also found that 
the average cost per patient for fluoroquinolones increased by 8.7% while 
the average cost per patient for overall antimicrobial decreased by 21.9%. In 
Marshall (2002) study, the implementation of reimbursement restrictions 
for PPIs resulted in the reduction of total drug expenditure. However, 
Marshall et al. (2006) found no significant changes in the total number of 
prescriptions and total expenditure after the implementation of 
reimbursement restrictions for ciprofloxacin and ofloxacin. 
In a study (Bjerrum et al., 2001) that examined the relaxation of the 
reimbursement restrictions of lipid lowering drugs in order to improve the 
prevention of cardiovascular heart disease, Bjerrum et al. found a significant 
increase in the annual prevalence of lipid lowering drugs use in the 
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population. The proportion of the population who had collected at least one 
prescription for lipid lowering drugs during a year had increased by 0.4% 
after the intervention. The lipid lowering drugs utilisation of in patients with 
diabetes mellitus and patients with cardiovascular heart disease increased 
by 2.3% and 8.1% respectively. 
4.5.3.4 Budget system 
A single study was reviewed that evaluated the budget system 
measure. Lee et al. (2006) investigated the introduction of a global budget 
for clinics and hospitals as one of the interventions in their study. Global 
budgets for clinics were initiated in July 2001 while budgets for hospitals 
were implemented a year later in July 2002. Lee’s study found no significant 
changes to the monthly pharmaceutical expenditure trend after 
implementation of the July 2001 intervention while the expenditure trend 
after July 2002 resulted in a significant increase in monthly expenditure.  
4.5.3.5 Generic substitution 
As with budget system measures, only a single study was included in 
the review about generic substitution. Andersson et al. (2007) studied the 
introduction of mandatory generic substitution in Sweden on October 2002. 
Pharmacists were obligated to provide patients with the cheapest available 
generic drug in the Medical Products Agency’s list unless substitution was 
restricted. After the implementation of this measure, the total cost per 1000 
inhabitants per working day of all prescribed pharmaceuticals was reduced 
by 51.4% and pharmaceuticals on regular prescriptions was reduced by 
43.0%. 
4.5.3.6 Price cuts 
The search identified three studies on pharmaceutical price cuts. 
Price reduction for off-patent drugs was investigated by Usher et al. (2012) 
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in Ireland and Lee et al. (2012) in South Korea. In Usher’s study, three 
occasion of price cuts over the study period resulted in a significant 
reduction in the level and trend of expenditure for off-patent drugs but no 
significant changes were observed for patent and generic drugs. The study 
by Lee et al. yielded similar results with no significant changes in the level 
and trend of drug utilisation and drug cost. Instead, the monthly per person 
trend of antihyperlipidemics utilisation was significantly increased following 
the price cuts. In a third study, Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) found only one 
measure out of four price reduction measures in Spain was effective in 
reducing the total expenditure per capita. The first price cut measure in 
November 1999 increased the number of prescriptions per capita but 
decreased the price per prescription, reducing the total expenditure per 
capita. Another measure found to reduce the drug cost was the March 2005 
price cut while the others price cuts showed no significant changes. 
4.5.3.7 Reference pricing 
Nine studies (Grootendorst et al., 2001; Hazlet et al., 2002; Hsiao et 
al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2006; Marshall et al., 2002; Moreno-
Torres et al., 2011; Schneeweiss et al., 2002; Schneeweiss et al., 2003) 
provided trend estimates post implementation of reference pricing. Out of 
five Canadian studies (Grootendorst et al., 2001; Hazlet et al., 2002; 
Marshall et al., 2002; Schneeweiss et al., 2002; Schneeweiss et al., 2003), 
two studies (Grootendorst et al., 2001; Marshall et al., 2002) reported a 
significant reduction in drug expenditure while two studies by Schneeweiss 
et al. (2002; 2003) reported significant decreases in drug cost per patient. In 
the 2002 study by Schneeweiss et al., the monthly doses per 10,000 senior 
citizens of ACEIs were found to be unaffected by the implementation of 
ACEIs reference pricing while the 2003 study found reduction in overall 
dihydropyridine CCB utilisation after the implementation of CCB reference 
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pricing. Grootendorst’s study estimated a saving of C$4.2 million annually 
following the implementation of reference based pricing of nitrates while 
Marshall’s study estimated a saving of C$1.8 million per year post 
introduction of reference based pricing of H2AH. Hazlet’s study did not find 
any significant changes to the utilisation trend of antisecretory drugs 
following the introduction of reference based pricing for H2AH. 
Three studies in Taiwan (Hsiao et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Lee et 
al., 2006) investigated a series of reference pricing measures implemented 
between November 1996 and September 2007. Hsiao et al. (2010) found no 
significant trend changes in the cost of NSAIDs per ambulatory visit and 
NSAIDs DDDs per ambulatory visit post introduction of two reference pricing 
measures on April 2001 and March 2003. However, Huang’s study found 
reduction in drug expenditure for reference pricing measures introduced on 
November 2004 while in Lee’s study, the reductions were observed on April 
2001, January 2002 and March 2003. There were no significant differences 
in outcomes following the implementation of other reference pricing 
measures. 
Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) in Spain studied five reference pricing 
measures implemented on December 2000 to December 2003, May 2002, 
May 2003, January 2004 and August 2004. Only the August 2004 reference 
pricing measure was found to decrease the trend of price per prescription 
and the total expenditure per capita. Surprisingly, the May 2003 reference 
pricing was found to increase the trend of prescriptions volume per capita. 
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Table 4.5 Summary of findings 
Intervention Patient Cost-Sharing 
Variables 
Study 
McManus et al 
(1996) 
Martikainen et al. 
(2007) 
Lee et al. 
(2012) 
Kozyrskyj et al. 
(2001) 
Almarsdottir et al. 
(2000) 
Country Australia Finland South Korea Canada Iceland 
Intervention 
studied 
Increase in patient’s fixed 
co-payments (general 
beneficiary) and 
introduction of patient’s 
fixed co-payment 
(repatriation beneficiary) 
Decrease in patient’s co-
payment 
Change from fixed co-
payment to proportional 
co-payment 
Change from fixed annual 
deductible to income 
based deductible 
Increase in deductible 
Characteristics       
 
Population 
studied 
All Australian residents 
covered by the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme 
All permanent residents 
covered by the National 
Health Insurance Scheme 
Patients covered under 
the Health Insurance 
Review and Assessment 
Service (HIRA) 
Children aged 5 to 15 
years old with asthma 
All patients covered 
under the Icelandic State 
Social Security Institute 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
Twelve groups of 
essential medicines and 
nine groups of 
discretionary medicines
1
 
Dorzolamide, latanoprost All prescriptions,  
antihypertensives, 
antihyperlipidemics 
Inhaled corticosteroid 
(beclomethasone, 
budesonide, fluticasone, 
flunisolide, 
triamcinolone) 
All prescriptions 
       
  
                                                          
1
 The essential medicines group includes antiasthmatic inhalants, antiepileptics, antithrombotic agents, antiparkinson drugs, antihypertensives, antiglaucoma 
preparations and miotics, beta-blocking agents, cardiac glycosides, plain corticosteroids for systemic use, diuretics, drugs used in diabetes and thyroid 
preparations. The discretionary medicines group include antacids, antihistamines for systemic use, nonsteroid anti-inflammatory products, antiobesity 
preparations, cough and cold preparations, hypnotics/sedatives, other analgesics and antipyretics, throat preparations, vitamins 
  
 
9
6
 
 
Outcomes      
Drug volume      
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
[-]
2
 
Level 
(essential and 
discretionary medicines) 
 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
(essential and 
discretionary medicines) 
N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and trend 
(All prescriptions, 
Antihypertensives) 
 
[-] 
Level and trend 
(Antihyperlipidemics) 
N.T N.T 
 Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T
3
 
[+]
4
 
Level and trend 
N.T 
[-] 
Year before v. 2nd year 
after intervention (int.) 
N.T 
 Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Drug cost      
 
Cost per unit N.T N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and trend 
(All prescriptions) 
N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level 
(All prescriptions) 
 
[-] 
Trend 
(All prescriptions) 
N.T N.T 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
N.T N.T N.T N.T [Not significant] 
  
                                                          
2
 [-] - Decrease 
3
 N.T - Not tested 
4
 [+] - Increase 
  
 
9
7
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued  
Intervention Patient Cost-Sharing 
Variables 
Study 
Hynd et al. 
(2008) 
Hynd et al. 
(2009) 
Blais et al. 
(2001) 
Blais et al. 
(2003) 
Dormuth et al. 
(2006) 
Dormuth et al. 
(2009) 
Country Australia Australia Canada Canada Canada Canada 
Intervention 
studied 
Increase in patient’s 
fixed co-payments 
and safety net 
(ceiling) 
Increase in 
patient’s fixed co-
payments and 
safety net (ceiling) 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and annual 
ceiling 
 
Introduction of annual 
deductible and 
coinsurance and annual 
ceiling (based on 
income), prorated 
quarterly 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and annual 
ceiling 
 
Introduction of annual 
deductible and 
coinsurance and annual 
ceiling (based on 
income), prorated 
quarterly 
Int. 1: Introduction 
of fixed co-payment 
 
Int. 2: Change to 
coinsurance and 
family deductible 
(based on family 
income) and ceiling 
(based on income) 
Int. 1: Introduction of 
fixed co-payment 
 
Int. 2: Change to 
coinsurance and family 
deductible (based on 
family income) and ceiling 
(based on income) 
Characteristics        
 
Population 
studied 
All Australian 
residents; both 
concessional and 
general 
beneficiaries 
All Western 
Australian 
residents; both 
concessional and 
general 
beneficiaries 
Individuals aged > 65 
years with at least one 
prescription of one or 
more of the study 
medications dispensed 
Individuals aged < 64 
years and receiving 
social assistance 
(welfare group) with at 
least one prescription 
of one or more of the 
study medications 
dispensed 
British Columbia 
residents aged >65 
years who used 
inhaled steroids, β-
agonists, or 
anticholinergics 
British Columbia 
residents aged >65 years, 
not federally insured for 
drug benefits who used 
inhaled steroids, β-
agonists, or 
anticholinergics 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
17 categories of 
medicine
5
 
Atypical 
antipsychotics, 
comb. of asthma 
med., statins, 
proton-pump 
inhibitors 
Nitrates, 
antihypertensive, 
anticoagulants and 
benzodiazepines 
Inhaled corticosteroids, 
neuroleptics and 
anticonvulsants 
Inhaled steroids, 
inhaled β-agonists 
and inhaled 
anticholinergics 
Inhaled steroids, inhaled 
β-agonists and inhaled 
anticholinergics 
        
  
                                                          
5
 Anti-epileptics, anti-gout, anti-Parkinson’s, anxiolytics, atypical antipsychotics, β-blockers, combination (comb.) of asthma medicines (med.), eye-drops, 
glaucoma treatments, hypnotics, insulin, muscle relaxants, non-aspirin antiplatelets, osteoporosis treatments, proton-pump inhibitors (PPIs), statins, thyroxine. 
  
 
9
8
 
 
Outcomes       
Drug volume       
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
[-] 
Level and/or trend 
for 12
6
 out of 17 
categories 
(concessional 
beneficiary) 
[-] 
Level  
(statins, PPIs) 
 
[-] 
Trend  
(comb. of asthma 
med., PPIs) 
 
[+] 
Trend  
(atypical 
antipsychotics) 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
[-] 
Trend  
(Inhaled 
corticosteroids) 
N.T N.T 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T 
[-] 
Level  
(statins, PPIs) 
 
[-] 
Trend  
(atypical 
antipsychotics, 
comb. of asthma 
med., PPIs) 
N.T N.T 
[-] 
Trend 
(Both intervention) 
 
[-] 
Trend 
(Int. 2 v. Int. 1) 
N.T 
 
Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
  
                                                          
6
 Anti-epileptics, anti-Parkinson’s, comb. asthma med., eye-drops, glaucoma treatments, insulin, muscle relaxants, non-aspirin antiplatelets, osteoporosis 
treatments, PPIs, statins, thyroxine. 
  
 
9
9
 
 
Drug cost       
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
[-] 
Trend  
(Int. 1) 
 
[-] 
Trend 
(Int. 2 v. Int. 1) 
        
  
  
 
1
0
0
 
 
Table 4.5 Summary of findings / continued  
                                                          
7
 NA – Not available 
8
 ACEIs - angiotension-converting enzyme inhibitors, ASA - acetylsalicylic acid 
Intervention Patient Cost-Sharing 
Variables 
 Study 
Pilote et al. 
(2002) 
Tamblyn et al. 
(2001) 
Ong et al. 
(2003) 
Lee et al. 
(2006) 
Liu et al. 
(2003) 
Liu et al. 
(2004) 
Country Canada Canada Sweden Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
Intervention 
studied 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and 
annual ceiling 
 
Introduction of 
annual deductible 
and coinsurance 
and annual ceiling 
(based on income), 
prorated quarterly  
 
Change the annual 
ceiling to monthly 
prorated 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and 
fixed annual ceiling 
(for welfare 
recipient) or based 
on income (for 
others) 
 
Int. 1 – Increase in fixed 
co-payment and 
coinsurance 
 
Int. 2 - – Increase fixed 
co-payment and 
introduction of ceiling 
with coinsurance 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and ceiling 
 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and 
ceiling 
 
Introduction of 
coinsurance and ceiling 
 
Characteristics        
 
Population 
studied 
Quebec residents 
aged >65 years who 
were admitted to 
acute care hospitals 
Quebec residents 
who were (i) 
recipients of 
welfare-funded 
medications or (ii) 
elderly person 
NA
7
 NA Patients aged 65 or 
older from 21 
selected hospitals in 
Taipei 
Patients aged 65 or older 
from 21 selected 
hospitals in Taipei 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
β-blockers, ACEIs, 
lipid-lowering 
agents, ASA
8
 
21 essential drugs 
and 4 less essential 
drugs 
Antidepressants,  
anxiolytics and  
sedatives 
All drugs prescribed by 
physicians but excludes 
drugs prescribed by 
dentists and Chinese 
medical doctors 
NA NA 
  
 
1
0
1
 
 
 
Outcomes       
Drug volume       
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
[Not significant] 
Trend
9
 
 
[-] 
Trend  
(elderly persons) 
 
[-] 
Trend 
(welfare persons) 
N.T 
 
N.T N.T N.T 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T N.T 
[+] 
Men  
Step
10
 
(Int.1 - antidepressants, 
sedatives  
 
[-] 
Women 
Step 
(Int.2 - antidepressants) 
N.T N.T N.T 
 Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T [-] [-] 
Drug cost       
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T N.T N.T N.T [-] [-] 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T [Not significant] 
Total drug 
expenditure  
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
        
  
                                                          
9
 Proportion of patients receiving prescriptions for any of these medications within 30 days after discharge 
10
 Step - changes in which the error terms move above or below the 99% (2-tailed test) CI of their expected levels and remain, on average, outside the CI for 
the remainder of the test period 
  
 
1
0
2
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued  
  
                                                          
11
 single-entity topical corticosteroids, topical corticosteroid combination products, other combination products, single-entity topical antibiotics, single-entity 
topical antifungal products 
Intervention Positive and negative list 
Variables 
Study 
Campbell et al. 
(2003) 
Schneeweiss et al. 
(2006) 
Pichetti et al. 
(2011) 
Moreno-Torres et al  
(2011) 
Country Canada Canada France Spain 
Intervention 
studied 
Reduced from 12 to only 2 topical 
combination corticosteroid 
products available for 
reimbursement 
Removed the reimbursement 
eligibility of Omeprazole, 
pantoprazole and lansoprazole 
Removed the reimbursement 
eligibility of 128 mucolytics and 
expectorants 
Removed the reimbursement 
eligibility of 984 products 
Characteristics      
 
Population 
studied 
Nova Scotia residents aged >65 
years 
Senior citizens >65 years using one 
of the restricted PPIs 
NA Spanish population covered by the 
NHS (National Health System) 
excluding civil servants 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
Varieties of topical products
11
 Non-preferred PPIs (omeprazole, 
pantoprazole, lansoprazole) and 
preferred PPIs (rabeprazole) 
Mucolytics and expectorants, 
bronchodilators, antitussives, 
antibacterials 
All prescription pharmaceuticals 
covered under NHS 
      
  
 
1
0
3
 
 
  
Outcomes     
Drug volume     
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
N.T N.T 
[-] 
Trend  
(mucolytics and expectorants) 
 
[+] 
Trend  
(Bronchodilators, antitussives, 
antibacterials) 
[-] 
Trend 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T 
[-] 
Level  
(non-preferred PPIs) 
 
[Not significant] 
Level and trend  
(total PPIs) 
N.T N.T 
 Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Drug cost     
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
[+] 
Trend  
(all topical products, potent 
topical corticosteroids) 
 
[Not significant] 
Trend  
(Topical combination 
corticosteroid products) 
N.T N.T 
[+] 
Trend 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
N.T N.T 
[-] 
(overall saving) 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
  
 
1
0
4
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued 
  
                                                          
12
 Preferred statins - Simvastatin 20 and 40 mg, Lovastatin, Pravastatin, Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin 10mg; Nonpreferred statins - Atorvastatin > 10 mg, All 
strengths of rosuvastatin 
13
 H2AH - H2-antihistamines 
Intervention Prescription controls and duration limits 
Variables 
Study 
Donnelly et al. 
(2000) 
Winkelmayer et al. 
(2010) 
van Driel et al. 
(2008) 
Kephart et al.  
(2005) 
MacCara et al. 
(2001) 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Canada 
Intervention 
studied 
Increase in the minimum 
re-supply period from 
three days to 20 days 
Expansion of the 
indications for preferred 
statin 
Moved preferred (cheaper) 
drugs from ‘restricted’ to 
‘open benefit’:- 
 
Int. 1 – H2AH (cimetidine 
and ranitidine) 
Int. 2 - PPIs (omeprazole, 20 
mg and rabeprazole) 
Implemented 
reimbursement 
restrictions for wet 
nebulization therapy 
Implemented 
reimbursement restrictions 
for Fluoroquinolones 
Characteristics       
 
Population 
studied 
NA Patients with at least one 
claim for any medication 
used for treating diabetes 
NA Senior citizens >65 years, 
not covered by any other 
provincial, federal, or 
private drug insurance 
program who received at 
least one prescription for 
inhaled respiratory drugs 
during the reference year 
Senior beneficiaries >65 
years and with at least one 
drug claim for an oral 
antimicrobial  
 
Drug classes 
studied 
All drugs covered under 
the PBS 
Preferred statins and 
nonpreferred statins
12
 
PPIs, H2AH
13
 Wet nebulization, oral 
corticosteroids, inhaled 
long-acting β-agonists, 
inhaled short-acting β-
agonists, inhaled 
corticosteroids, inhaled 
anticholinergics 
Penicillins, fluoroquinolones, 
cephalosporins, 
sulfonamides and 
trimethoprim, macrolides 
and lincosamides, 
tetracyclines, nitrofurantoin 
  
 
1
0
5
 
 
Outcomes      
Drug volume      
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
[-] 
Level 
(1
st
 month post 
intervention) 
 
[Not significant] 
(2
nd
 month post 
intervention) 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(Overall statins) 
 
[+] 
Trend 
(preferred statins) 
 
[-] 
Trend 
(nonpreferred statins) 
N.T 
[-] 
Trend 
(wet nebulization therapy) 
 
[+] 
Trend 
(oral corticosteroids, 
inhaled short-acting β-
agonists, inhaled 
anticholinergics) 
[-] 
All antimicrobial 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and trend (PPIs - Int. 
1) 
 
[+] 
Level and trend (H2AH - Int. 
1, 
PPIs - Int. 2) 
 
[-] 
Level and trend (H2AH - Int. 
2) 
N.T N.T 
 
Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
  
  
 
1
0
6
 
 
Drug cost      
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T 
[-] 
Level 
N.T N.T 
[-] 
Average cost 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
N.T N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and trend (PPIs - Int. 
1) 
Trend (PPIs – Int. 2) 
 
[+] 
Level and trend (H2AH - Int. 
1) 
Level 
(PPIs - Int. 2) 
 
[-] 
Level and trend (H2AH - Int. 
2) 
N.T N.T 
       
  
  
 
1
0
7
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued  
  
                                                          
14
 LLDs - lipid lowering drugs 
15
 NSAIDs - Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs; nsNSAIDs – Non-selective non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
Intervention Prescription controls and duration limits 
Variables 
Study 
Marshall et al. 
(2006) 
Marshall et al. 
(2007) 
Marshall et al. 
(2002) 
Schneeweiss et al. 
(2004) 
Bjerrum et al. 
(2001) 
Country Canada Canada Canada Canada Denmark 
Intervention 
studied 
Implemented 
reimbursement restrictions 
for ciprofloxacin and 
ofloxacin 
Three different 
reimbursement policies on 
coxib; without restrictions 
(Québec), Limited Use 
(Ontario), prior 
authorization (British 
Columbia) 
Implemented 
reimbursement restrictions 
for PPIs 
Removed the 
reimbursement eligibility 
of nebulised 
bronchodilators, steroids 
and cromoglycate 
Relaxed the 
reimbursement restrictions 
for LLDs
14
 
Characteristics       
 
Population 
studied 
Senior beneficiaries >65 
years 
Senior beneficiaries >65 
years with high rates of 
analgesic use 
Senior citizens >65 years 
and taking Histamine-2 
receptor antagonist 
(H2RAs) or PPIs 
patients aged >18 years Residents of Funen, 
Denmark 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
β-Lactam, macrolide, 
fluroquinolone, 
cephalosporin, 
tetracycline, clindamycin, 
fosfomycin 
NSAIDs (coxibs plus 
nsNSAIDs)
15
 
 
H2AH, PPIs nebulised bronchodilators, 
steroids, cromoglycate 
LLDs 
       
  
 
1
0
8
 
 
Outcomes      
Drug volume      
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
N.T N.T N.T 
[+] 
annual prevalence of LLD 
use
16
 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T 
[+] 
Trend 
(Québec and Ontario) 
 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
(British Columbia) 
N.T N.T N.T 
 Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Drug cost      
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T N.T N.T 
[+] 
inhaler drugs 
 
[-] 
nebuliser drugs, overall 
cost 
N.T 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
[Not significant] 
Trend 
N.T 
[-] 
Trend 
N.T N.T 
       
  
                                                          
16
 annual prevalence - proportion of the population who had collected at least one prescription for LLDs during a year 
  
 
1
0
9
 
 
Table 4.5 Summary of findings / continued  
  
Intervention Budget system Generic substitution 
Variables 
Study Study 
Lee et al. 
(2006) 
Andersson et al. 
(2007) 
Country Taiwan Sweden 
Intervention 
studied 
Global budget for clinics and hospitals Generic substitution 
Characteristics    
 Population 
studied 
NA NA 
 Drug classes 
studied 
All drugs prescribed by physicians but excluded drugs prescribed by 
dentists and Chinese medical doctors 
All prescribed pharmaceuticals and pharmaceuticals on regular 
prescriptions 
    
Outcomes   
Drug volume   
 Prescription 
counts/rates N.T N.T 
 Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T N.T 
 Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T 
Drug cost   
 Cost per unit N.T N.T 
 Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T N.T 
 Cost per day N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
[+] 
Trend 
(hospitals) 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
(clinics) 
[-] 
Trend 
(All prescribed and regular pharmaceuticals) 
  
 
1
1
0
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued   
  
Intervention Price cuts 
Variables 
Study 
Usher et al. 
(2012) 
Lee et al. 
(2012) 
Moreno-Torres et al. 
(2011) 
Country Ireland South Korea Spain 
Intervention 
studied 
Int. 1 – 20% price reduction for off patents 
 
Int. 2 – 15% price reduction for off patents 
 
Int. 3 – 40% price reduction in off patents 
20% price cut after patient expiry Four reduction of ex-factory prices – Nov 1999, 
Jul 2001, Mac 2005, Mac 2006 
Characteristics     
 
Population 
studied 
Patients covered under the General Medical 
Services (GMS) Scheme and Drugs Payment 
(DP) Scheme 
Patients covered under the Health Insurance 
Review and Assessment Service (HIRA) 
Spanish population covered by the NHS 
(National Health System) excluding civil 
servants 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
All prescription pharmaceuticals covered under 
General Medical Services (GMS) Scheme and 
Drugs Payment (DP) Scheme 
All prescriptions, antihypertensives, 
antihyperlipidemics 
All prescription pharmaceuticals covered under 
the NHS 
     
  
 
1
1
1
 
 
Outcomes    
Drug volume    
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(all prescriptions) 
 
[+] 
Trend 
(antihyperlipidemics) 
[+] 
Trend 
(Nov 1999) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
 Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T N.T N.T 
 Prescription 
duration 
 N.T N.T 
Drug cost    
 
Cost per unit N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(all prescriptions) 
N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(all prescriptions) 
[-] 
Trend 
(Nov 1999 and Mac 2005) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
[-] 
Level and Trend 
(off-patent) 
(Int. 1, 2 and 3) 
 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(patent and generic) 
(Int. 1, 2 and 3) 
N.T 
[-] 
Trend 
(Nov 1999) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
  
  
 
1
1
2
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued 
Intervention Reference pricing 
Variables 
Study 
Grootendorst et al. 
(2001) 
Hazlet et al. 
(2002) 
Marshall et al. 
(2002) 
Schneeweiss et al. 
(2002) 
Schneeweiss et al. 
(2003) 
Country Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada 
Intervention 
studied 
Reference-based pricing of 
nitrates 
Reference-based pricing of 
H2AH 
Reference-based pricing of 
H2AH 
Reference-based pricing 
for ACEIs 
Reference-based pricing 
for dihydropyridine 
calcium channel blockers 
Characteristics       
 
Population 
studied 
Senior citizens >65 years 
and taking anti-anginal 
drugs (CCBs, nitrates, or β-
blockers) 
Senior citizens >65 years 
who received two or more 
separate prescriptions for 
an antisecretory drug in 
the period before 
implementation of the 
policy 
Senior citizens >65 years 
and taking Histamine-2 
receptor antagonist 
(H2RAs) or PPIs 
 
Senior citizens >65 years 
and taking at least one ACE 
inhibitor 
Senior citizens >65 years 
and taking Dihydropyridine 
calcium channel blockers 
(CCB) 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
Nitrates, CCBs, β-blockers
17
 H2AH, PPIs, sucralfate, and 
several others 
H2AH, PPIs No-cost ACEIs (Cost 
covered) and cost-shared 
ACEIs (Patients pay the 
balance)
18
 
Dihydropyridine calcium 
channel blockers
19
 
       
  
                                                          
17
 Nitrates - Isosorbide Mononitrate, Isosorbide Dinitrate(ISDN), Nitroglycerin; CCBs - Calcium channel blockers 
18
 No-cost ACEIs – Captopril, Quinapril, Ramipril; Cost-shared ACEIs – Benazepril, Cilazapril, Enalapril, Fosinopril, Lisinopril 
19
 Dihydropyridine calcium channel blockers – Felodipine, Nifedipine, Amlodipine, Nicardipine, Verapamil, Diltiazem 
 
  
 
1
1
3
 
 
Outcomes      
Drug volume      
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
N.T 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
N.T N.T N.T 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T N.T N.T 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
(Overall ACEIs) 
[-] 
Trend 
(Overall dihydropyridine 
calcium channel blockers) 
 
Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Drug cost      
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
N.T N.T N.T 
[-] 
Trend 
[-] 
Trend 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
[-] 
Trend 
N.T 
[-] 
Trend 
N.T N.T 
       
  
  
 
1
1
4
 
 
Table 4.5  Summary of findings / continued 
  
Intervention Reference pricing 
Variables 
Study 
Moreno-Torres et al. 
(2011) 
Hsiao et al. 
(2010) 
Huang et al. 
(2012) 
Lee et al. 
(2006) 
Country Spain Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
Intervention 
studied 
Five reference pricing systems - 
Dec 2000 - Dec 2003, May 2002, 
May 2003, Jan 2004, Aug 2004 
Two reference pricing systems - 
Apr 2001, Mac 2003 
Seven reference pricing systems – 
Apr 2000, Apr 2001, Mac 2003, 
Nov 2004, Sept 2005, Nov 2006, 
Sept 2007 
Six reference pricing systems – 
Nov 1996, Dec 1997, Apr 2000, 
Apr 2001, Jan 2002, Mac 2003 
Characteristics      
 
Population 
studied 
Spain population covered by the 
NHS (National Health System) 
excluding civil servants 
NA Patients who either received ACEIs 
or ARBs 
NA 
 
Drug classes 
studied 
All prescription pharmaceuticals 
covered under NHS 
NSAIDs and cyclooxygennse-2 
(COX-2) inhibitors 
ACEIs and 
ARBs (angiotensin receptor 
blockers) 
All drugs prescribed by physicians 
but excludes drugs prescribed by 
dentists and Chinese medical 
doctors 
      
  
 
1
1
5
 
 
Outcomes     
Drug volume     
 
Prescription 
counts/rates 
[+] 
Trend 
(May 2003) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
N.T N.T N.T 
 
Doses/ 
defined daily 
dose 
N.T 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
[-] 
Level 
(Apr 2000 - overall renin-
angiotensin) 
 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(others - overall renin-angiotensin) 
N.T 
 
Prescription 
duration 
N.T N.T N.T N.T 
  
  
 
1
1
6
 
 
Drug cost     
 Cost per unit N.T N.T N.T N.T 
 
Cost per 
patient/ 
prescription 
[-] 
Trend 
(Jan 2004) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
[Not significant] 
Trend 
N.T N.T 
 Cost per day N.T N.T N.T N.T 
Total drug 
expenditure  
[-] 
Trend 
(Jan 2004) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
N.T 
[-] 
Level 
(Nov 2006 - overall renin-
angiotensin) 
 
[-] 
Trend 
(Nov 2004 - overall renin-
angiotensin) 
 
[Not significant] 
Level and Trend 
(others - overall renin-angiotensin) 
[-] 
Trend 
(Apr 2001, Jan 2002, Mac 2003) 
 
[Not significant] 
(others) 
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4.6 Discussion 
Of the cost containment measures included in this study, three 
measures, namely patient cost sharing, prescription controls and duration 
limits and reference pricing had been evaluated most often. Various types of 
patient cost sharing have been implemented across different countries. 
Seven of thirteen countries had introduced cost sharing or implemented 
changes to cost sharing. Many countries had used a combination of different 
types of cost sharing, for instance proportional co-payment with a ceiling or 
fixed co-payment with a ceiling. For prescription controls and duration 
limits, most of the studies involved implementing reimbursement criteria to 
switch patient usage to preferred cheaper drugs. Only a single study had 
evaluated the impact of imposing duration limits. 
Geographically, nearly half of the studies were carried out in Canada 
and these studies had evaluated measures such as changes in cost sharing, 
removal of certain drugs reimbursement eligibility, implementation of 
reimbursement criteria and reference pricing. Only four studies had been 
conducted in Australia (Donnelly et al., 2000; Hynd et al., 2008, 2009; 
McManus et al., 1996), and these studies investigated the introduction of an 
increase in fixed co-payments as well as the increase in the re-supply period. 
All studies in the review fell into Level 3 (non-analytic studies) of the 
SIGN grading system. Due to the nature of public policy investigations that 
are difficult to carry out in a laboratory mode with a control, interrupted 
time series analyses and before-after studies were the preferred study 
designs in all of the studies. Although studies without controls were 
accepted and included in this review, three before-after studies (Hazlet et 
al., 2002; Kozyrskyj et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2004) and four interrupted time 
series studies (Kephart et al., 2005; Marshall et al., 2007; Schneeweiss et al., 
2004; Schneeweiss et al., 2003) included a control group in their study 
design.  
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Most of the studies covered a sufficient time period. Generally, for 
interrupted time series studies, a minimum of 12 points are required 
between interventions in order to detect any significant changes in trends. 
However, four studies (Huang et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2006; 
Moreno-Torres et al., 2011) suffered serious limitations due to insufficient 
time points between interventions. 
4.6.1 Patient cost sharing 
Generally, the introduction of patient’s cost sharing or increasing 
patient’s share of cost sharing decreased drug cost but did not necessarily 
reduce drug volume. Without an influence on drug utilisation, overall 
savings in total drug expenditure might not have been achieved. A reduction 
in drug cost was found in all studies that used cost as an outcome measure 
but, in studies with drug volume as an outcome measure, several studies 
found no significant changes to drug utilisation or total drug expenditure. 
The intention of implementing cost sharing is to reduce patient demand by 
creating financial disincentives for patients to use pharmaceuticals (Doran et 
al., 2011). However, the results of this review suggest this was not the case. 
The implementation of cost sharing encouraged patients to switch to 
cheaper drugs that required lower payment without changes in their 
utilisation pattern. This behaviour was more noticeable in healthcare 
systems that implemented proportional co-payments. The change from 
fixed to proportional co-payment on August 2007 in South Korea resulted in 
the reduction in drug cost without any significant changes in drug utilisation 
(Lee et al., 2012). For better control of drug volume and cost, the 
combination of proportional or coinsurance with a ceiling appeared to be a 
better option for cost containment. With proportional co-payment, the 
amount the patient pays to fill a prescription is based on the percentage of 
the drug or prescription cost. Therefore, proportional co-payment is a better 
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representation of patient burden of co-payment in cost sharing as compared 
to fixed co-payment. Several studies in Canada (Blais et al., 2003; Dormuth 
et al., 2006; Tamblyn et al., 2001) and Taiwan (Liu et al., 2003, 2004) 
suggested better cost containment with such a combination. However, the 
optimal level of patient share in cost sharing is hard to determine. If the 
level is set too high, patients risk being exposed to adverse effects due to 
their discontinuing their medications or switching to cheaper medicines that 
are not the best choice for treatment.  
Contrary to the three systematic reviews studies available on patient 
cost sharing measures, Austvoll-Dahlgren et al. (2008), Qingyue et al. (2011) 
and Goldman et al. (2007) concluded that the implementation of patient’s 
cost sharing reduced both the drug usage and drug expenditures. These 
studies also found limited evidence of adverse effects on health following 
the implementation of cost sharing.  
4.6.2 Positive and negative lists 
The removal of drugs reimbursement eligibility reduced the volume 
of the delisted drugs but did not result in an overall saving in drug 
expenditure. In most cases, the volume and cost of others drugs in similar 
therapeutic group that were still available for reimbursement increased as a 
result of patients switching to the subsidised drugs in the positive list which 
contained more expensive drugs (Moreno-Torres et al., 2011; Pichetti et al., 
2011; Schneeweiss et al., 2006). Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) concluded that 
the effectiveness of negative lists as a cost containment measure for 
reducing pharmaceutical expenditure was limited. 
4.6.3 Prescription controls and duration limits 
The duration limits imposed in Australia by limiting the re-supply 
period from three days to 20 days was not effective in containing drug 
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utilisation. Reduction in utilisation was observed in the first month post 
implementation but no significant changes were observed in the following 
months. However, due to the limited studies available, comparison of 
results from the Donnelly et al. (2000) study with others cannot be done. 
For the prescription control measure, six studies were carried out in 
Canada. The results from these Canadian studies demonstrated a reduction 
in drug cost but did not necessarily reduce the total drug expenditure. 
Marshall et al. (2002) found a significant reduction in total drug expenditure 
whereas the Marshall et al. (2006) study was unable to demonstrate any 
saving from the prescription controls measure. In term of drug utilisation, 
the utilisation of non-preferred drugs (subjected to stricter reimbursement 
criteria) was decreased while the utilisation of preferred drugs (subjected to 
less reimbursement criteria or not subjected to any reimbursement criteria) 
increased. Other studies (Kephart et al., 2005; Marshall et al., 2007) did not 
include total drug expenditure as one of the outcomes in their studies, thus 
the cost saving impact of prescription control measures on overall drug 
expenditure in these studies was inconclusive. Patients tended to switch 
from non-preferred drugs to preferred drugs and even increased utilisation 
of other drugs, thus eliminating the potential saving from the reduction in 
non-preferred drugs utilisation.  
In studies that investigated the relaxation of the reimbursement 
criteria by either expanding the indication for preferred drugs or placing the 
preferred drugs under ‘open benefits’, no significant changes in trend were 
observed. Despite Bjerrum et al. (2001) reporting a significant increase in 
the annual prevalence use of lipid lowering drugs post intervention, they 
concluded that the increase in prescribing of lipid lowering drugs had been 
observed in the years before the interventions.  
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Therefore, the impact of prescription controls and duration limits 
were limited to a decrease in drug cost without significant changes in drug 
utilisation and total expenditure.  
However, the findings of the study by Bjerrum et al. (2001) do not 
support the results of other systematic review studies. Green et al. (2010) 
concluded that the impact of prescription control measures varies by 
different drug classes. Drug utilisation and expenditure were found to 
decrease in gastric-acid suppressant and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory 
drug classes while no significant impact on drug expenditure was found for 
antipsychotic drugs. In another study, Puig-Junoy et al. (2007) concluded 
that the implementation of prescription control measures resulted in a 
saving in drug expenditure by reducing drug utilisation and drug cost. 
 
4.6.4 Budget system 
With only one study covering the implementation of a budget 
system, no conclusions can be drawn in this cost containment measure. 
Furthermore, the study in Taiwan did not provide encouraging results with 
total drug expenditure for hospitals increasing post budget implementation 
(Lee et al., 2006). Lee et al. recommended that incentives for keeping 
expenditure within budget should be directly tailored to individual 
physicians to be able to achieve cost savings. 
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4.6.5 Generic substitution 
Similarly to the implementation of a budget system, only a single 
study was included in the review that evaluated generic substitution as a 
cost containment policy. Andersson et al. (2007) concluded that the generic 
substitution policy shifted the drug expenditure trend from an increase into 
a decrease. However, patients remain as one of the main obstacles in 
generic substitution. Patients tend to refuse substitution if the saving from 
substitution was low, thus drug utilisation behaviour appears to be 
influenced by price differences between brand and generic products 
(Andersson et al., 2005). 
 
4.6.6 Price cuts 
Price cut measures resulted in a reduction in total drug expenditure 
by reducing the cost of drugs particularly drugs that were subjected to price 
cuts with no significant changes to drug utilisation. However, price cut 
measures were not found to be consistently effective. Of the four price cut 
measures implemented in Spain between 1999 and 2006, the November 
1999 price cut was effective in reducing drug cost and total expenditure 
(Moreno-Torres et al., 2011). In the Lee et al. (2012) study, price cuts after 
patent expiry resulted in an increase of antihyperlipidemics utilisation. This 
was mainly attributed to patients seeking treatment that persisted before 
the price cuts and consuming more expensive drugs that were previously 
unaffordable, thus causing the increase in drug utilisation. 
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4.6.7 Reference pricing 
In general, the reference pricing implemented in Canada for various 
types of drugs resulted in significantly lower drug cost and total drug 
expenditure. However, no significant reduction in drug utilisation trends was 
observed except in one study (Schneeweiss et al., 2003). Although 
Schneeweiss’s study demonstrated a reduction in the doses of 
dihydropyridine calcium channel blockers, the use of antihypertensive did 
not decline. This result is consistent with the aim of reference pricing, which 
is to encourage patients to switch to cheaper drugs, thus reducing the 
demand for expensive drugs, rather than to reduce demand.  
The results of studies evaluating reference pricing in other countries 
including Spain (Moreno-Torres et al., 2011) and Taiwan (Hsiao et al., 2010; 
Huang et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2006) demonstrated an inconclusive impact of 
reference pricing. Of the five reference pricing policies implemented in 
Spain, only the January 2004 one was effective in reducing total 
expenditure. In Taiwan, 10 reference pricing policies were implemented 
between November 1996 and September 2007. Only four of these policies 
(April 2001, January 2002, March 2003 and November 2004) were found to 
be effective in reducing overall drug expenditure. These findings support the 
view of Giuliani et al. (1998) that reference pricing policies are only partially 
effective in containing cost. Giuliani et al. suggested two main weaknesses 
of reference pricing. Firstly, reference pricing cannot be applied to branded 
drugs for the fear of negatively affecting pharmaceutical innovation. 
Secondly, the criteria for grouping drugs may not be categorised 
appropriately and some of the drugs may not be perfectly ‘interchangeable’.  
Findings in this study concur with systematic review studies on 
reference pricing policy. Galizzi et al. (2011) concluded that reference pricing 
policies were associated with a reduction in expenditure but this was 
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generally limited to the first year of implementation. Aaserud et al. (2006) 
found similar findings but with a shorter duration of impact, estimated to 
last for six months only. Another systematic review by Morgan et al. (2009) 
found a reduction in overall drug utilisation as well as a reduction in total 
drug expenditure. In addition, all systematic review studies found no 
significant link between the implementation of reference pricing policies 
and adverse health impacts. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Due to differences in the types and intensity of cost containment measures 
that have been implemented in different countries, together with cross-country 
differences in health systems and populations, it is difficult to make direct 
comparisons across studies. However, this systematic review, which covers all cost 
containment measures in a single review, provides policy makers with an important 
public health tool that presents the current evidence base about the impact of the 
various cost containment on pharmaceuticals volumes and expenditure. 
The results of this review suggest that price cuts and reference pricing 
measures have been effective in reducing total drug expenditure mainly by 
reducing drugs cost. However, limited changes in drug volume were observed for 
both measures. Three cost containment measures, namely cost sharing, positive 
and negative lists and prescription controls and duration limits, were found to have 
reduced drug volume or drug cost but their impact on total drug expenditure was 
inconclusive. Due to the limited number of studies evaluating the impact of budget 
systems and generic substitution measures, the impact of these measures cannot 
be ascertained until more comprehensive evidences becomes available. 
The current systematic review was limited by the types of study designs 
included, with all studies being interrupted time series analyses or before-after 
studies. Randomized controlled trials provide better insights into the impact of 
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interventions but are difficult to conduct in health and many other areas of public 
policy.  
A possible area of future research in this field would be to apply the 
Economic, Clinical, and Humanistic Outcomes (ECHO) methodology in evaluation of 
cost containment measures (Kozma et al., 1993). This methodology includes clinical 
and humanistic outcomes included as outcome measures in addition to economic 
outcomes. Pharmaceutical cost containment measures have uncertain effects and 
may cause harm such as a decline in quality of life or increase in hospitalisation 
rate. By applying the ECHO model in future research, a more holistic approach in 
evaluating the impact of cost containment measures can be achieved.  
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Chapter 5.0 Methods and Statistical Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis examining the 
impact of cost containment reforms to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme on 
prescribing volumes and expenditure. The results are arranged according to three 
drugs classifications, which are referred to as Category 1 (all ATC main drug groups), 
Category 2 (all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups) and Category 3 (all 
Atorvastatin drug groups). The first section of Chapter 5 provides an overview of 
the data source and the time-series properties of the analysis. It describes the 
Medicare database of government expenditure (benefit) and volume (service) for 
PBS medicines. The next section elaborates on the statistical analysis. This section 
discusses the classification of drugs, types of interventions investigated, outcome 
variables analysed, data organisation and layout and how the analysis was 
conducted. Finally, the last part of this chapter describes the results of the analysis.  
 
5.2 Data Source and Time-Series Properties 
The PBS statistics are publicly available on Medicare Australia’s website 
(https://www.medicareaustralia.gov.au/statistics/pbs_item.shtml). The database 
provides time-series data of the monthly government’s expenditure (benefit) or 
volume (service) of PBS medicines that has been processed by Medicare Australia. 
Monthly, quarterly, or financial year reports can be retrieved for either individual 
medicines or groups of medicines based on the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
(ATC) code (Table 5.1) and arranged according to the patient category (general 
beneficiary category and concessional beneficiary category) or by the state.  
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Table 5.1 Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification System 
ATC Main Group 
A   Alimentary tract and metabolism 
B   Blood and blood forming organs 
C   Cardiovascular system 
D   Dermatologicals 
G   Genito urinary system and sex hormones 
H   Systemic hormonal preparations, excluding sex hormones and insulins 
J   Antiinfectives for systemic use 
L   Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents 
M   Musculo-skeletal system 
N   Nervous system 
P   Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents 
R   Respiratory system 
S   Sensory organs 
V   Various 
  
 Source: Department of Health and Ageing 
 
 In this study, the data retrieved from the Medicare database were limited to 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) with the Repatriation Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme (RPBS) data being excluded. The RPBS, governed by the 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs is a special scheme created for military veterans, 
war widows or widowers and their dependants (Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 
2014). Beneficiaries under the RPBS pay the same co-payment amount and have 
the equivalent Safety Net threshold as concessional beneficiaries under the PBS 
(Department of Health and Ageing, 2013). Over the years, the expenditure and 
volume by RPBS have been relatively small, representing around 4.5% of the total 
benefits paid and 5.9% of the total services processed by the PBS in 2012-13 
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(Department of Human Services, 2013b). Due to the uniqueness of the RPBS, which 
is restricted to a small portion of the population and a small percentage of the 
overall expenditure and volume, the RPBS was not included as part of this study. 
 The monthly time-series data does not necessarily represent the actual month 
the medicine was supplied to patients by the pharmacy but rather the month the 
service was processed by Medicare Australia (Medicare Australia, 2013). This may 
result in significant fluctuations in the trend data, which may therefore not 
consistently be a true reflection of actual dispensing activity. In June 2012, the 
numbers of PBS prescriptions were 75% higher than the corresponding month in 
the previous year and 30% higher relative to any other month before it. A study has 
shown that Medicare slowed down the average processing time for the nine 
months prior to April 2012 but sped up the processing in May and June before the 
end of the financial year in June 2012 (Medicines Partnership of Australia, 2012). 
This artificially inflates the June 2012 data thus giving an incorrect representation of 
the true scenario. Therefore, those periods were excluded from this study and only 
the time periods from 1 January 1992 to 31 March 2012 were included in this study. 
 
5.3 Statistical Analysis 
5.3.1 Regression model 
 Aggregate monthly time series data provides data to conduct a ‘natural 
experiment’ to study the impact of cost containment policies implemented over the 
years. Time series is simply defined as a sequence of observations, measured at 
uniformly spaced intervals over a period of time (Brockwell, 1987; Kirchgässner et 
al., 2012). The design of this research is an interrupted time-series study, a quasi-
experimental approach using quantitative data. An interrupted time-series design is 
the strongest, quasi-experimental approach for evaluating longitudinal effects of 
interventions (Lagarde, 2012; Wagner et al., 2002).  
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 To evaluate the impact of PBS policy changes on prescription expenditure 
(benefit) and volumes (service), segmented linear regression models were used to 
analyse the time series data starting from 1 January 1992 to 31 March 2012. The 
identified cost containment measures provide the specific point in the series and 
are a practical choice for interrupted time-series studies (Matowe et al., 2003). The 
segmented regression interrupted time series analysis is preferred over the auto-
regressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis as segmented regression is 
statistically better in examining group trends compared to ARIMA which is best 
used for examining individual subjects (Martin et al., 2013). Segmented regression 
analysis was also adopted because of its ability to control for non-stationarity, auto-
correlation and seasonality characteristics in the time series data (Lagarde, 2012; 
Wagner et al., 2002). Non-stationarity is the systematic trend (either upward or 
downward) of the time series that consistently changes over time (e.g. population 
increase) while seasonality refers to the repetitive cycles which are predictable in 
one year or less due to seasonal effects. Auto-correlation occurs when a value at 
one point is being correlated in part to the previous value (Brockwell, 1987; 
Kitagawa, 2010).  
 In each segment, two parameters, the level and trend are used to estimate 
the impact of the intervention. The level parameter estimates the differences in 
absolute value between pre-intervention and post-intervention immediately 
following the intervention. The trend parameter estimates the differences in 
growth rate or slope over the segment (Ansari et al., 2003; Gillings et al., 1981; 
Institute of Medicine, 2007). Figure 5.1 presents a hypothetical example to illustrate 
the level and trend parameters before and after an intervention using segmented 
regression analysis.  
 In the biomedical field, segmented linear regression models have been used in 
several studies to estimate the impact of health policies and educational 
interventions. Hynd et al. (2008, 2009) used segmented regression analysis and the 
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Australian Medicare data to determine the impact of co-payment changes for 
selected drug groups while Andersson et al. (2006) used this approach to evaluate 
the impact of several pharmaceutical sector policies including the introduction of 
reference pricing, a new pharmaceutical benefits scheme and co-payment changes 
on cost, volume and cost per volume trends in Sweden. In Ireland, Usher et al. 
(2012) studied the impact of price cuts and margin reduction on the Community 
Drugs Schemes expenditure using this segmented regression analysis.  
 
Figure 5.1  Hypothetical example illustrating the general elements of a 
segmented time series regression analysis before and after an intervention 
 
5.3.2 Drugs classification 
 The Medicare data were classified into three categories. Category 1 consisted 
of all ATC main drug groups listed in the PBS schedule (Table 5.1). It included both 
the general beneficiary and concession beneficiary patient’s data. In Category 2, all 
five statins (Simvastatin, Pravastatin, Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin, and Rosuvastatin) 
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that were available on the PBS under the HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors group were 
chosen. For Category 3, Atorvastatin of all strengths were included. In the Category 
1 analysis, the inclusion of all drug groups listed in the PBS schedule provides a 
general perspective of the PBS cost containment reforms. In the Category 2 
analysis, the statins group was selected because this group is most widely 
dispensed and incurs the highest total expenditure in the PBS. Atorvastatin was 
singled out for further analysis due to the fact that Atorvastatin was the most 
prescribed drugs and incurred the highest expenditure in PBS for the year ending 
June 2012 (Department of Health and Ageing, 2012).  
 
5.3.3 Interventions investigated 
 Seven cost containment policies that are considered as major policies were 
investigated. These interventions were expected to have an impact on prescription 
expenditures and volumes of the PBS. In addition to these policies, four new listing 
dates of statins (Pravastatin, Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin, and Rosuvastatin) in the PBS 
were included as breakpoints, applicable to Category 2 and 3 analyses (Table 5.2). 
The listing of Simvastatin on 1st January 1992 was excluded as one of the 
breakpoints since it was the first month of the study period as well as the first 
available statins data. The listing of new statins are not cost containment policies 
but were expected to impact on both the prescription expenditure and volume in 
Category 2 and 3 analyses. New statins give prescribers more alternatives in 
treating hyperlipidaemia especially patients who previously did not tolerate older 
generation statins. Prescribers may also switch from older generation statins (e.g. 
Atorvastatin) to newer generation statins (e.g. Rosuvastatin) which are more 
effective in reaching the recommended lipid target (Binbrek et al., 2006; Jones et 
al., 2003; Shepherd et al., 2003; Strandberg et al., 2004). However, newer statins 
are more expensive relative to the older ones, thus possibly increasing PBS 
expenditure.  
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 For a better understanding of the analysis and to facilitate the discussion in 
the later part, the expected impact of each policy on the level and trend of both 
expenditure and volume are summarised in Table 5.3. The level and trend 
parameters can either indicate increases, decreases or no changes. The two co-
payment increases (Intervention C and E) would be expected to decrease the level 
and trend of PBS expenditure and volume across the three categories. Co-payment 
increases would be expected to reduce patients’ demand by making them more 
cost-conscious in selecting drugs and reduce unnecessary drugs use. The re-supply 
limits (Intervention B) and Safety Net 20 day rule (Intervention F) would also be 
expected to decrease the level and trend of PBS expenditure and volume. Both 
policies would be expected to reduce drug stockpiling by patients, thus reducing the 
total cost subsidised by the government. The policy requiring an economic 
evaluation (Intervention A) might have the effect of delaying the listing of new and 
more expensive drugs on the PBS. Due to the long period to get listing approval 
(Australian National Audit Office, 1997), the immediate effect of this policy on 
expenditure levels and volume levels would not be expected to be significant. 
However, PBS expenditure and volumes might be expected to trend downwards as 
more cost-effective drugs are listed.  
 For the Therapeutic Group Premium policy (Intervention D), the level and 
trend of PBS expenditure would be expected to decrease due to the drugs grouping, 
where government subsidise the lowest price drug in that group. The level of 
service and its trend would be likely to remain unchanged as the number of drugs 
listed on the PBS will remain the same. With the introduction of the F2 Formulary 
and the 2%, 12.5% or 25% price reductions, the level and trend of PBS expenditure 
and volumes would be expected to decrease. The amount of drugs subsidised by 
the government will be reduced in addition to the decreased in the number of 
subsidised drugs, where drugs that cost below co-payment level were not captured 
by PBS database. 
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 For the listing of new statins (Intervention H – K), there are likely to be no 
changes to the volume for Category 1 and Category 2 due to drug switching. 
However, drug switching may decrease the expenditure and volume of Atorvastatin 
(Category 3) when Rosuvastatin (Intervention K) is listed. The listings of new, more 
expensive statins would be expected to increase the level and trend of expenditure 
for Category 1 and Category 2. 
 
Table 5.2 Interventions investigated and included as breakpoints 
Intervention Date 
Cost Containment Policy  
A Economic Evaluation Requirement 1/01/1993 
B Re-Supply Limits  1/11/1994 
C Co-payment Increase Between 15.0-18.5% 1/01/1997 
D Therapeutic Group Premium Policy 1/02/1998 
E Co-payment Increase 24%  1/01/2005 
F Safety Net 20 Day Rule 1/01/2006 
G F2—2%, 12.5%, 25% price reductions  1/08/2008 
   
New Listing of Statins  
H Pravastatin Listed 1/06/1993 
I Fluvastatin Listed 1/02/1996 
J Atorvastatin Listed 1/02/1998 
K Rosuvastatin Listed 1/12/2006 
 
 
  
 
1
3
4
 
 
Table 5.3 Expected impact of the interventions 
Intervention 
Category 1  
(All PBS Medicines) 
Category 2  
 (All Statins) 
Category 3  
(All Atorvastatin) 
Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits 
Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend 
Cost Containment Policy  
           
A 
Economic Evaluation 
Requirement 
<->  <->  <->  <->  N.A N.A N.A N.A 
B Re-Supply Limits          N.A N.A N.A N.A 
C 
Co-payment Increase 
Between 15.0-18.5% 
        N.A N.A N.A N.A 
D 
Therapeutic Group 
Premium Policy 
<-> <->   <-> <->   N.A N.A N.A N.A 
E 
Co-payment Increase 
24%  
            
F Safety Net 20 Day Rule             
G 
F2—2%, 12.5%, 25% 
price reductions  
            
  
 
1
3
5
 
 
              
New Listing of Statins             
H Pravastatin Listed <-> <->   <-> <->   N.A N.A N.A N.A 
I Fluvastatin Listed <-> <->   <-> <->   N.A N.A N.A N.A 
J Atorvastatin Listed <-> <->   <-> <->   N.A N.A N.A N.A 
K Rosuvastatin Listed <-> <->   <-> <->       
              
 N.A – Not applicable             
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5.3.4 Outcome variables analysed 
 Nine dependent variables, Total Service (General + Concessional), Total 
Benefits (General + Concessional), Total Service (General), Total Benefit (General), 
Total Service (Concessional), Total Benefits (Concessional), Total Service per 
thousand of the population (Total Service/1000), Total Benefits per thousand of the 
population (Total Benefits/1000) and the Defined Daily Doses (DDDs) per thousand 
of the population per day (DDDs/1000/day) were included in the analysis. In order 
to determine the effect of an intervention on general beneficiary patients and 
concessional beneficiary patients, the service and benefit data were analysed as a 
combination of both categories and also as individual categories. To calculate the 
rate of services and benefits, the monthly estimated population was used as a 
denominator. The monthly population data were obtained by linear extrapolation 
from the quarterly estimated resident population produced by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). The DDDs/1000/day 
variable is an international unit to represent the level of drug utilization in the 
studied population (World Health Organization et al., 2003). The World Health 
Organization defines DDD as ‘the assumed average maintenance dose per day for a 
drug used for its main indication in adults’ (WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug 
Statistics Methodology, 2009). For this study, the DDDs/1000/day variable was only 
applicable to Category 2 and Category 3 data, namely the HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitors drugs group. Monthly DDDs/1000/day variable were calculated using 
Equation 1 by taking into account the number of scripts in that particular month. 
Details of each drug used to calculate the DDDs/1000/day are given in Table 5.4. 
 
Equation 1.0 Calculation of DDD/1000 population/day 
DDD/1000 population/day 
=
Number of benefits per month X Strength (mg) X Packaging size X 1000
DDD (mg) X Population X days in that particular month 
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Table 5.4 HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors drugs with the strength available, 
packaging size and DDDs 
Drug Strength available (mg) Packaging size (n) DDD (mg) 
Pravastatin 10, 20, 40, 80 30 30 
Fluvastatin 20, 40, 80 28 60 
Atorvastatin 10, 20, 40, 80 30 20 
Rosuvastatin 5, 10, 20, 40 30 10 
    
Source: Department of Health and World Health Organisation, 2014 
 
5.3.5 Data organization for analysis 
 Using data of total services (general + concessional) as an example, Table 5.5 
illustrates how the data were organised for analysis. The months before the 
implementation of an intervention are indicated by 0 and months after the 
intervention are indicated by 1. The month and month after the implementation of 
an intervention are given sequential integer variables. 
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Table 5.5 Structure of data for analysis of the impact of two policy changes on the total 
service (General + Concessional) 
Time 
Total Service 
(Gen. + Conc.) 
Observation 
Intervention 
A1 
Time after 
Intervention 
A 
Intervention 
B2 
Time after 
Intervention 
B 
01-01-1992 9616464 1 0 0 0 0 
01-02-1992 6291465 2 0 0 0 0 
01-03-1992 6806613 3 0 0 0 0 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
01-10-1992 8912714 10 0 0 0 0 
01-11-1992 8870800 11 0 0 0 0 
01-12-1992 10991649 12 0 0 0 0 
01-01-1993 10472069 13 1 1 0 0 
01-02-1993 6862123 14 1 2 0 0 
01-03-1993 7853524 15 1 3 0 0 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
01-08-1994 10535352 32 1 20 0 0 
01-09-1994 10122927 33 1 21 0 0 
01-10-1994 9960653 34 1 22 0 0 
01-11-1994 10261066 35 1 23 1 1 
01-12-1994 10648698 36 1 24 1 2 
01-01-1995 10690134 37 1 25 1 3 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ 
       
1 Intervention A introduced on 1st January 1993 
2 Intervention B introduced on 1st November 1994 
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5.3.6 Analysis 
 The time series data were initially plotted graphically and visual inspections 
performed to detect breakpoints, abnormal patterns and seasonality. Breakpoints 
are intervention points that divide the time series into segments. Next, using the 
STATA/MP version 10 statistical package, segmented linear regression was applied 
to the time series data to determine statistically the significance of the level and 
trend. To control for auto-correlation in the data series, Newey-West estimators 
were used to estimate the coefficients (Newey et al., 1986; StataCorp, 2013). In 
addition, a lag of 12 months was applied to adjust for seasonal noise (Sims, 1974). 
Visually, the data were found to spike in December every year before falling in the 
first month of the year, thus having lags 12. Donnelly et al. (2000) demonstrated 
that due to the arrangement of the PBS, patients tend to increase drugs usage 
toward the end of the year to take advantage of the safety net by accumulating 
drugs for the following year consumption, thus creating an annual seasonal noise. 
 In order to obtain a parsimonious model, forward stepwise eliminations were 
applied in the analysis. Variables parameters at breakpoints that produced both 
insignificant coefficients (level and trend) were eliminated. P-values of 0.05 and 
higher were considered insignificant. However, if either one of the parameters was 
significant, the variables at that breakpoint were included in the analysis. The 
stepwise eliminations were done systematically in chronological order. 
 Generally, time series with 50 to 100 observations is preferred in order to 
produce a reliable estimate (Helfenstein, 1986). However, the available literature 
shows no consensus on the numbers of observations needed. Wagner et al. (2002) 
recommended a minimum of 12 observations before and 12 observations after the 
intervention for the nature of the pattern to be established. Systematic review on 
reference pricing by Aaserud et al. (2006) accepted interrupted time series studies 
with a at least 12 observations before and after the intervention into their review. 
This recommendation concurred with Marshall et al. (2002) by using 12 data points 
before and after intervention in their study. On the other hand, the EPOC Cochrane 
 140 
 
Group defines time series with at least 3 observations before and 3 observations 
after the intervention, as qualifying as interrupted time series studies, not 
accounting for seasonal variation.  However, if seasonality is observed in the model, 
a minimum of 10 pre- and 10 post-data points are required (Cochrane Effective 
Practice and Organisation of Care Group, 2013; Ramsay et al., 2003). Several studies 
used less than 10 observations before the intervention in their analysis model, 
Soumerai et al (1992) applied 6 observations before and 8 after the intervention 
while Mol et al. (2005) used between 10 and 18 observations. In this study, a 
minimum of 12 observations before and 12 observations after the intervention was 
adopted. Several interventions were omitted from the analysis due to the proximity 
of those interventions with each other. For the Category 1 analysis, in cases where 
the interventions were implemented 12 months apart or less, the earlier policy was 
prioritised and included in the analysis while the latter policy was removed from the 
analysis. As a result, the brand substitution policy introduced in December 1994 
was dropped from the analysis due to the proximity to the introduction of the re-
supply limits policy introduced a month earlier in November.  
 For the Category 2 and 3 analyses, the data available contained primarily the 
expenditure and volume of statins prescriptions. Therefore, key incidents such as 
the listing of new statins were expected to significantly impact the prescription 
expenditure and volume and were given priority over the cost containment 
measures if both interventions occurred less than 12 months apart. For instance, 
the economic evaluation requirement policy was introduced in January 1993 and 
Pravastatin was listed in the PBS six months later on June 1993. The listing of 
Pravastatin was taken as a breakpoint in the analysis whereas the economic 
evaluation requirement policy was dropped from the analysis. In summary, 
Category 1 statistical analysis was performed by including breakpoints from 
intervention A to G while Category 2 and 3 statistical analyses included breakpoints 
from intervention B to K (Figure 5.2). 
  
 
1
4
1
 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Cost containment measures and statin’s key incidents in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, January 1992 to 
March 2012 
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5.3.7 Interpretation of results 
 Results of the analysis must be interpreted taken into consideration limitations in 
the PBS data, in particular that for the duration of the study the PBS database did not 
include non-subsidised medicines falling below the co-payment level. This will not have 
impacted on the Category 3 analysis as the price of Atorvastatin was above the co-payment 
level throughout the duration of the study. The price of Rosuvastatin was also above the 
co-payment level throughout the period. However, the price of lower strengths of 
Simvastatin, Pravastatin and Fluvastatin did fall below the co-payment level for general 
beneficiaries progressively from 2006 onwards, with higher strengths (40mg plus for 
Simvastatin and Pravastatin and 80mg plus for Fluvastatin) remaining above the co-
payment level throughout the period. In the Category 1 analysis, which included all ATC 
main drug groups, new drugs priced above the co-payment level will have been added to 
the PBS while the price of others will have fallen below the co-payment level during the 
period. This latter analysis sought to capture broad trends overall. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Category 1 – all ATC main drug groups 
 Out of seven interventions (A – G) analysed, all interventions were found to 
have significant impact on at least one of the outcome variables except intervention 
B, the re-supply limits policy. Changes in level and trend of services and benefits for 
the concessional beneficiary, the general beneficiary, all beneficiaries and per 1000 
population are shown in Table 5.6 to Table 5.11. The results are presented 
graphically in Appendices (Figure A3 to Figure A10). 
 The introduction of intervention A (economic evaluation requirement policy) 
was found to have no effect on all levels and trends of PBS services and benefits 
except services for concessional beneficiaries. The intervention resulted in an 
immediate drop of 599,500 prescriptions [95% CI 119,600; 1,079,000] (p=0.015) and 
a trend reduction of 106,870 prescriptions in each month [95% CI 50,750; 162,990] 
(p<0.001). 
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 Following the implementation of intervention C (co-payment increase 
between 15.0-18.5%), there were immediate drops in the level of services and 
benefits but the impact was temporary with the trend of services and benefits 
increasing in the following months post intervention. The level of service and 
benefits for all beneficiaries were reduced by 1,708,776 prescriptions [95% CI 
1,064,560; 2,352,990] (p<0.001) and A$37,300,000 [95% CI 21,400,000; 53,300,000] 
(p<0.001) respectively, with the average reduction rate per 1000 population of 
93.90 prescriptions [95% CI 58.37; 129.42] (p<0.001) and A$2,086 [95% CI 1,202.81; 
2,971.13] (p<0.001). Post intervention, the estimated trend for all beneficiaries 
added an additional 128,314 prescriptions [95% CI 69,640; 186,990] (p<0.001) and 
A$3,643,142 [95% CI 1,820,000; 5,460,000] (p<0.001) each month to the PBS, 
averaging 6.93 prescriptions per 1000 population [95% CI 3.76; 10.11] (p<0.001) 
and A$191.63 per 1000 population [95% CI 94.04; 289.21] (p<0.001). 
 All estimated level and trend of services and benefits post intervention D 
(Therapeutic Group Premium policy) were decreased except the service trend in the 
general beneficiary, where no statistically significant impact was found. Significant 
decreases were found in the level for all beneficiaries, with the number of services 
decreasing by 1,273,978 prescriptions [95% CI 768,870; 1,779,090] (p<0.001) and 
the total benefits decreasing by A$42,700,000 [95% CI 28,700,000; 56,800,000] 
(p<0.001) while the trend in the service reduced by 117,206 prescriptions each 
month [95% CI 58,350; 176,070] (p<0.001) and total benefits reduced by 
A$2,327,346 each month [95% CI 541,200; 4,110,000] (p=0.011). The bulk of the 
decreases were attributed to concessional beneficiaries with the levels of service 
decreased by 866,796 prescriptions [95% CI 490,590; 1,243,010] (p<0.001) and total 
benefits decreased by A$31,600,000 [95% CI 22,800,000; 40,300,000] (p<0.001). 
The concessional beneficiary trends were estimated to decrease by 83,161 
prescriptions [95% CI 33,070; 133,250] (p=0.001) and A$1,518,304 each month 
[95% CI 427,000; 2,610,000] (p=0.007). 
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 The implementation of a second co-payment increment in intervention E (co-
payment increase by 24%) resulted in a slightly different impacts compared to 
intervention C. There were immediate drops in the number of services and total 
benefits across all outcome variables, with changes in level similar to the first co-
payment increment. However, for concessional beneficiaries, the monthly 
estimated trend of service and benefits increased by 66,319 prescriptions [95% CI 
23,460; 109,180] (p=0.003) and A$2,485,974 [95% CI 369,500; 4,600,000] (p=0.022) 
respectively while for general beneficiaries, the trend of service decreased by 
20,193 prescription [95% CI 14,930; 25,460] (p<0.001) and no significant effect was 
found on the trend of benefits. 
 The impact of intervention F (Safety Net 20 day rule) was largely on the 
services and benefits for concessional beneficiaries. The intervention resulted in an 
immediate reduction of 774,746 prescriptions [95% CI 332,750; 1,216,740] 
(p=0.001) and A$35,300,000 [95% CI 20,700,000; 49,800,000] (p<0.001) while the 
monthly trend reduction were estimated at 84,010 prescriptions [95% CI 37,190; 
130,840] (p<0.001) and A$3,360,000 [95% CI 1,170,000; 5,550,000] (p=0.003). For 
general beneficiaries, there were no significant effect on the services and benefits 
except an increase in the level of total benefits by A$12,400,000 [95% CI 3,800,000; 
21,000,000] (p=0.005) immediately after the intervention being implemented. 
 The increase in services post intervention G (2%, 12.5% or 25% price 
reductions in F2) was limited to the level only while the trend remained unchanged. 
The level of service for all beneficiaries was increased by 1,034,020 prescriptions 
[95% CI 435,830; 1,632,210] (p=0.001) with the majority of the increase attributed 
to concessional beneficiaries with 786,730 prescriptions [95% CI 280,970; 
1,292,490] (p=0.002) while the general beneficiary service increased by 232,378 
prescriptions [95% CI 42,620; 422,130] (p=0.017). There were also increases in the 
estimated level of benefits for all beneficiaries by A$47,300,000 [95% CI 17,800,000; 
76,700,000] (p=0.002), for general beneficiaries by A$12,600,000 [95% CI 
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5,400,000; 19,700,000] (p=0.001) and for concessional beneficiaries by 
A$34,700,000 [95% CI 11,500,000; 57,900,000] (p=0.003). However, there were no 
significant changes in the trend of both services and benefits save for the total 
benefits of general beneficiaries with a decrease of A$361,689 [95% CI 16,000; 
707,300] (p=0.040).  
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Table 5.6 Estimated number of services and benefits before and after intervention A 
  A  
Intervention  Economic Evaluation 1/01/1993  
 All ATC main 
drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  6,944.88  217.68 9,557.09  -174.81 -792.28  
95% CI  6,023.44 to 7,866.32  90.26 to 345.11 -  -299.02 to -50.61 -1,699.15 to 114.59  
P>t  0.000  0.001 -  0.006 0.087  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  92.40  1.86 -  NS  NS  
95% CI  87.00 to 97.80  1.706 to 2.01 -  - -  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  - -  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1,261.52  7.28 -  NS NS  
95% CI  1,038.49 to 1,484.56  1.83 to 12.74 -  - -  
P>t  0.000  0.009 -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  20.50  0.3560 -  NS NS  
95% CI  17.80 to 23.20  0.2884, 0.4235 -  - -  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  - -  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  6,164.94  145.90 7,915.68  -106.87 -599.50  
95% CI  5,734.77 to 6,595.11  87.95 to 203.84 -  -162.99 to -50.75 -1,079.40 to -119.60  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.000 0.015  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  71.90  1.50 -  NS NS  
95% CI  68.90 to 74.90  1.40 to 1.60 -  - -  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  - -  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  399.57  11.99 543.50  -10.15 -43.46  
95% CI  346.81 to 452.33  4.70 to 19.28 -  -17.24 to -3.06 -95.84 to 8.93  
P>t  0.000  0.001 -  0.005 0.104  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  5,379.90  95.87 -  NS NS  
95% CI  5,052.86 to 5,706.94  87.02 to 104.73 -  - -  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  - -  
NS – Non Significant 
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Table 5.7 Estimated number of services and benefits before and after intervention C 
  C  
Intervention  Co-payment increase 1/01/1997  
 
All ATC main 
drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  8,764.82  42.87 10,822.63  128.31 -1,708.78  
95% CI  -  - -  69.64 to 186.99 -2,352.99 to -1,064.56  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  92.40  1.86 203.67  3.64 -37.30  
95% CI  87.00 to 97.80  1.706 to 2.01 -  1.82 to 5.46 -53.30 to -21.40  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.000 0.000  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1,261.52  7.28 1,698.43  40.23 -531.30  
95% CI  1,038.49 to 1,484.56  1.83 to 12.74 -  5.79 to 74.68 -880.24 to -182.37  
P>t  0.000  0.009 -  0.022 0.003  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  20.50  0.3560 41.86  1.11 -10.70  
95% CI  17.80 to 23.20  0.2884, 0.4235 -  0.3087 to 1.92 -17.80 to -3.71  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.007 0.003  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  7,316.18 
 
 39.03 9,189.35  84.65 -1,242.63  
95% CI  -  - -  36.83 to 132.46 -1,737.09 to -748.18  
P>t  -  - -  0.001 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  71.90  1.50 162.01  2.53 -26.60  
95% CI  68.90 to 74.90  1.40 to 1.60 -  1.42 to 3.64 -36.60 to -16.60  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.000 0.000  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  500.05 
 
 1.85 588.70  6.93 -93.90  
95% CI  -  - -  3.76 to 10.11 -129.42 to -58.37  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  5,379.90  95.87 11,132.12  191.63 -2,086.97  
95% CI  5,052.86 to 5,706.94  87.02 to 104.73 -  94.04 to 289.21 -2,971.13 to -1,202.81  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.000 0.000  
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Table 5.8 Estimated number of services and benefits before and after intervention D 
  D  
Intervention  TGP 1/02/1998  
 
All ATC main 
drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  9,113.85 
 
 171.19 11,339.26  -117.21 -1,273.98  
95% CI  -  - -  -176.07 to -58.35 -1,779.09 to -768.87  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  166.57 
 
 5.50 238.08  -2.33 -42.70  
95% CI  -  - -  -4.11 to -0.5412 -56.80 to -28.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.011 0.000  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1,167.13 
 
 47.52 1,784.83  -34.05 -407.18  
95% CI  -  - -  -68.76 to 0.670 -651.08 to -163.28  
P>t  -  - -  0.055 0.001  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  31.16 
 
 1.47 50.25  -0.8090 -11.20  
95% CI  -  - -  -1.61 to -0.0097 -17.00 to -5.28  
P>t  -  - -  0.047 0.000  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  7,946.72 
 
 123.67 9,554.43  -83.16 -866.80  
95% CI  -  - -  -133.25 to -33.07 -1,243.01 to -490.59  
P>t  -  - -  0.001 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  135.41 
 
 4.03 187.83  -1.52 -31.60  
95% CI  -  - -  -2.61 to -0.4270 -40.30 to -22.80  
P>t  -  - -  0.007 0.000  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  494.80 
 
 8.78 609  -6.64 -65.24  
95% CI  -  - -  -9.83 to -3.46 -93.29 to -37.20  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  9,045.15 
 
 287.50 12,782.61  -141.31 -2,100.07  
95% CI  -  - -  -237.11 to -45.51 -2,898.91 to -1,301.22  
P>t  -  - -  0.004 0.000  
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Table 5.9 Estimated number of services and benefits before and after intervention E 
  E  
Intervention  Co-payment increase 1/01/2005  
 
All ATC main 
drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  10,065.28 
 
 53.98 14,545.55  85.43 -1,494.06  
95% CI  -  - -  3.89 to 166.98 -2,253.77 to -734.35  
P>t  -  - -  0.040 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  195.38 
 
 3.17 458.79  3.29 -59.00  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.3619 to 6.94 -89.30 to -28.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.077 0.000  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1,377.65 
 
 13.47 2,495.72  -20.19 -207.71  
95% CI  -  - -  -25.46 to -14.93 -394.20 to -21.21  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 0.029  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  39.05 
 
 0.6600 93.81  0.8027 -15.50  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.7928 to 2.40 -27.30 to -3.71  
P>t  -  - -  0.323 0.010  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  8,687.63 
 
 40.51 12,049.84  66.32 -1,047.12  
95% CI  -  - -  23.46 to 109.18 -1,528.25 to -565.99  
P>t  -  - -  0.003 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  156.23 
 
 2.51 364.88  2.49 -43.50  
95% CI  -  - -  0.3695 to 4.60 -62.50 to -24.50  
P>t  -  - -  0.022 0.000  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  543.68 
 
 2.14 721  3.90 -76.41  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0969 to 7.89 -114.94 to -37.88  
P>t  -  - -  0.056 0.000  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  10,682.54 
 
 146.19 22,816  144.92 -3,072.33  
95% CI  -  - -  -33.20 to 323.03 -4,615.96 to -1,528.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.110 0.000  
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Table 5.10 Estimated number of services and benefits before and after intervention F 
  F  
Intervention  Safety Net 20 days 1/01/2006  
 
All ATC main 
drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  13,051.49 
 
 139.41 14,724.45  -123.89 -1,004.31  
95% CI  -  - -  -206.18 to -41.61 -1,698.94 to -309.68  
P>t  -  - -  0.003 0.005  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  399.79 
 
 6.46 477.33  -4.04 -47.60  
95% CI  -  - -  -7.81 to -0.2713 -70.00, -25.30  
P>t  -  - -  0.036 0.000  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  2,288.01 
 
 -6.72 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  78.31 
 
 1.46 95.86  -0.6848 -12.40  
95% CI  -  - -  -2.35 to 0.9769 -21.00 to -3.80  
P>t  -  - -  0.418 0.005  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  11,002.72 
 
 106.83 12,284.65  -84.01 -774.75  
95% CI  -  - -  -130.84 to -37.19 -1,216.74 to -332.75  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 0.001  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  321.38 
 
 5.00 381.38  -3.36 -35.30  
95% CI  -  - -  -5.55 to -1.17 -49.80 to -20.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.003 0.000  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  644.48 
 
 6.03 717  -6.17 -48.77  
95% CI  -  - -  -10.20 to -2.13 -82.84 to -14.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.003 0.005  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  19,743.57 
 
 291.10 23,237  -205.32 -2,289.18  
95% CI  -  - -  -389.48 to -21.16 -3,391.62 to -1,186.75  
P>t  -  - -  0.029 0.000  
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Table 5.11 Estimated number of services and benefits before and after intervention G 
  G  
Intervention  F2 price cut 1/08/2008  
 
All ATC main 
drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  13,720.14 
 
 15.52 14,201.23  -14.46 1,034.02  
95% CI  -  - -  -55.68 to 26.76 435.83 to 1,632.21  
P>t  -  - -  0.490 0.001  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  429.73 
 
 2.42 504.74  -0.9307 47.30  
95% CI  -  - -  -2.44, 0.5768 17.80 to 76.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.225 0.002  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  2,288.01 
 
 -6.72 1,998.95  3.89 232.38  
95% CI  -  - -  -1.64 to 9.43 42.62 to 422.13  
P>t  -  - -  0.167 0.017  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  83.46 
 
 0.7776 107.56  -0.3617 12.60  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.7073 to -0.0160 5.40 to 19.70  
P>t  -  - -  0.040 0.001  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  11,509.90 
 
 22.82 12,217.19  -18.93 786.73  
95% CI  -  - -  -55.11 to 17.26 280.97 to 1,292.49  
P>t  -  - -  0.304 0.002  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  346.08 
 
 1.64 396.98  -0.5690 34.70  
95% CI  -  - -  -1.77 to 0.6352 11.50 to 57.90  
P>t  -  - -  0.353 0.003  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  668.12 
 
 -0.13 664  -0.58 44.38  
95% CI  -  - -  -2.50 to 1.35 16.71 to 72.06  
P>t  -  - -  0.555 0.002  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  20,947.62 
 
 85.79 23,607  -47.02 2,073.38  
95% CI  -  - -  -116.88 to 22.83 747.57 to 3,399.20  
P>t  -  - -  0.186 0.002  
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5.4.2 Category 2 – all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups 
 For the category 2 analysis, nine45 interventions (intervention B – G and H – K) 
were analysed and one intervention, the listing of Pravastatin (intervention H) was 
found to have no statistically significant effect on the level and trend of services and 
benefits across any of the outcome variables. Changes in the level and trend of 
services and benefits for concessional beneficiaries, general beneficiaries, all 
beneficiaries, the rate per 1000 population and DDDs/1000/day are shown in Table 
5.12 to Table 5.19. These results are presented graphically in Appendix (Figure A11 
to Figure A19). 
 The implementation of intervention B (Re-supply limits) did not statistically 
change the level of services and benefits for all variables. However, the intervention 
resulted in an increase in trend for all variables with an additional 659,000 
prescriptions per month [95% CI 4,330; 8,840] (p<0.001) and A$270,000 per month 
[95% CI 97,700; 442,300] (p=0.002) added to the all beneficiaries trends. The 
increments in services and benefits trends were largely attributed to concessional 
beneficiaries with an increase of 4,030 prescriptions per month [95% CI 2,730; 
5,340] (p<0.001) and A$171,900 per month [95% CI 76,800; 266,900] (p<0.001) 
while the general beneficiary services and benefits were increased by 2,550 
prescriptions per month [95% CI 1,610; 3,500] (p<0.001) and A$98,100 per month 
[95% CI 20,400; 175,800] (p=0.014) respectively. The trend of DDD per 1000 
population was estimated to have increased by 0.1695 per day [95% CI 0.1142; 
0.2248] (p<0.001). 
  
                                                          
45
 Both intervention D (Therapeutic Group Premium policy) and J (Atorvastatin listing) were 
implemented in the same date, 1
st
 February 1998 and were counted as one intervention. 
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 Following the implementation of intervention C (co-payment increase 
between 15.0–18.5%), there was an immediate drop in the levels of services and 
benefits across every outcome variable. The number of services dropped by 66,990 
prescriptions [95% CI 48,500; 85,480] (p<0.001) for all beneficiaries, 45,260 
prescriptions [95% CI 32,820; 57,690] (p<0.001) for concessional beneficiaries and 
21,730 prescriptions [95% CI 15,370; 28,100] (p<0.001) for general beneficiaries 
while the levels of benefits dropped by A$3,810,000 [95% CI 2,590,000; 5,020,000] 
(p<0.001) for all beneficiaries, A$2,450,000 [95% CI 1,750,000; 3,140,000] (p<0.001) 
for the concessional beneficiary benefits and A$ 958,700 [95% CI 581,600; 
1,340,000] (p<0.001) for general beneficiaries. The effects of the intervention in 
decreasing the levels of both services and benefits were momentary. There were no 
statistically significant changes estimated for the trends of services and benefits in 
any of the outcome variables apart from a reduction in benefits of A$39,300 per 
month [95% CI 17,400; 61,200] (p<0.001) for general beneficiaries and an increase 
of 0.0923 DDD per 1,000 population [95% CI 0.0175; 0.1671] (p=0.016).  
 The second co-payment increases (intervention E), implemented in January 
2005 reduced the level of both services and benefits for all outcome variables with 
the exception of general beneficiary’s services and DDDs/1000/day. The level of 
services for all beneficiaries was decreased by 82,050 prescriptions [95% CI 33,920; 
130,170] (p=0.001), which was primarily attributable to the decrease of 72,410 
prescriptions [95% CI 38,030; 106,800] (p<0.001) for concessional beneficiaries. The 
levels of benefits was also estimated to have decreased by A$6,670,000 [95% CI 
2,940,000; 10,400,000] (p=0.001) for all beneficiaries with decreases of 
A$1,260,000 [95% CI 252,700; 2,280,000] (p=0.015) and A$4,540,000 [95% CI 
2,400,000; 6,680,000] (p<0.001) respectively for general and concessional 
beneficiaries. The effect of this intervention on trends was similar to the previous 
co-payment increment intervention (intervention C). The trend in benefits for 
general beneficiaries was reduced by A$113,500 per month [95% CI 87,200; 
139,700] (p<0.001) while the trend of DDDs/1000/day went in the opposite 
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direction, increasing by 0.3279 DDDs [95% CI 0.0729; 0.5829] (p=0.012). There were 
no statistically significant changes estimated for other outcome variables.  
 The concurrent impact of intervention D (Therapeutic Group Premium policy) 
and intervention J (Atorvastatin Listed) had mixed results. No statistically significant 
changes were identified in the level or trend of benefits for general beneficiaries 
and benefits per 1,000 population. However, the trend of services was estimated to 
have decreased by 3,900 prescriptions per month [95% CI 1,830; 5,980] (p<0.001) 
for all beneficiaries and 0.2629 prescriptions per month for per 1,000 population 
[95% CI 0.1498; 0.3761] (p<0.001). The level of benefits for all beneficiaries 
decreased by A$1,830,000 [95% CI 90,400; 3,580,000] (p=0.039) following the 
implementation of these interventions, attributable primarily to the decrease of 
A$1,290,000 [95% CI 146,400; 2,430,000] (p=0.027) for concessional beneficiaries. 
For the DDDs/1000/day variable, the level was decreased by 1.60 DDDs per 1,000 
population [95% CI 0.4397; 2.75] (p=0.007) while the trend increased by 0.3102 
DDDs per 1,000 population [95% CI 0.2303; 0.3900] (p<0.001). 
 On January 2006, intervention F (Safety Net 20 day rule) was implemented 
and was found to have no statistically significant effect on the general beneficiary’s 
services or benefits. For concessional beneficiaries, the level and trend in services 
were estimated to have decreased by 42,510 prescriptions [95% CI 14,520; 70,490] 
(p=0.003) and 5,660 prescriptions per month [95% CI 2,440; 8,880] (p=0.001) 
respectively. Over all, the level of services for all beneficiaries was reduced by 
52,450 prescriptions [95% CI 12,640; 92,290] (p=0.01) with the trend of services 
reduced by 6,750 prescriptions per month [95% CI 1,930; 11,570] (p=0.006). 
However, while the intervention resulted in a decrease in the level of benefits of 
A$4,770,000 [95% CI 1,370,000; 8,170,000] (p=0.006), no statistically significant 
change was found in the corresponding for concessional beneficiaries. The average 
rate of change for benefits per 1000 population demonstrated an opposite 
response by decreasing the trend by A$25.86 per month [95% CI 4.17; 47.56] 
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(p=0.02) without any statistically significant changes to the level. Statistically, there 
was no significant change to the level of DDDs/1000/day but the trend was 
decreased by 0.4482 DDDs [95% CI 0.1826; 0.7138] (p=0.001).  
 Following the implementation of intervention G (2%, 12.5% or 25% price 
reductions in F2), the levels of services and benefit for all beneficiaries increased by 
92,720 prescriptions [95% CI 11,400; 1,740,300] (p=0.026) and A$5,700,000 [95% CI 
1,090,000; 10,300,000] (p=0.016). On closer examination, all levels of services and 
benefits were higher post intervention except for the services of general beneficiary 
where no statistically significant changes were identified. The increase in the level 
of services were temporary with the trend of services for all beneficiaries reducing 
by 5,810 prescriptions per month [95% CI 920; 10,710] (p=0.02) except for 
concessional beneficiary where no statistically significant changes were identified. 
The trends of benefits for all variables were also found to be statistically not 
significant. The level of DDDs/1000/day increased by 7.12 DDDs [95% CI 1.16; 
13.09] (p=0.019) while the trend decreased by 0.5026 DDDs per month [95% CI 
0.1375; 0.8677] (p=0.007).  
 In February 2006, Fluvastatin was listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme and resulted in an immediate decrease in the levels of services, benefits 
and DDDs across all variables. On the other hand, the trends of these variables were 
increased except for the non-significant changes in benefits for general 
beneficiaries. The levels of services and benefits for all beneficiaries were reduced 
by 55,690 prescriptions [95% CI 38,400; 72,980] (p<0.001) and A$2,900,000 [95% CI 
1,710,000; 4,080,000] (p<0.001) while the trends were increased by 4,980 
prescriptions per month [95% CI 2,480; 7,480] (p<0.001) and A$270,900 per month 
[95% CI 79,100; 462,700] (p=0.006) respectively. For DDDs/1000/day, the level was 
decreased by 1.24 DDDs [95% CI 0.8541; 1.63] (p<0.001) while the trend increased 
by 0.1303 [95% CI 0.0648; 0.1959] (p<0.001).  
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 The latest listing of the HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug group, 
Rosuvastatin, on December 2006 resulted in no statistically significant changes in 
the levels and trends in any of outcome variables except for a decrease in the trend 
by A$544,200 per month [95% CI 69,400; 1,020,000] (p=0.025) for concessional 
beneficiaries.  
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Table 5.12 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention B 
  B  
Intervention  Re-supply limit 1/11/1994  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups  
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  128.79  1.72 187.23 
 
 6.59 -10.91  
95% CI  122.19 to 135.37  1.37 to 2.07 -  4.33 to 8.84 -30.91 to 9.08  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.000 0.283  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  5.75  0.0894 8.79 
 
 0.2700 -1.08  
95% CI  5.42 to 6.09  0.0704 to 0.1083 -  0.0977 to 0.4423 -2.67 to 0.5210  
P>t  0.000  0.000 -  0.002 
 
0.186 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  55.95  0.2379 64.04 
 
 2.55 -3.65  
95% CI  53.11 to 58.80  0.0795 to 0.3964  -  1.61 to 3.50 -12.66 to 5.35  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.003 -  0.000 
 
0.425  
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  2.21  0.0116 2.60 
 
 0.0981 -0.4135  
95% CI  2.01 to 2.40  0.0004 to 0.0229 -  0.0204 to 0.1758 -1.21 to 0.3819  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.043 -  0.014 0.307  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  72.82  1.48 123.19 
 
 4.03 -7.26  
95% CI  68.70 to 76.94  1.27 to 1.69 -  2.73 to 5.34 -18.30 to 3.78  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.196  
        
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  3.54  0.0777 6.19 
 
 0.1719 -0.6624  
95% CI  3.34 to 3.75  0.0670 to 0.0884 -  0.0768 to 0.2669 -1.48 to 0.1543  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.111  
            
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  7.42  0.0895 10.46 
 
 0.3544 -0.5896  
95% CI  7.05 to 7.79  0.0698 to 0.1091 -  0.2316 to 0.4773 -1.69 to 0.5124  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.293  
        
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  331.47  4.70 491.22 
 
 14.48 -59.18  
95% CI  312.43 to 350.51  3.63 to 5.77 -  5.06 to 23.90 -147.16 to 28.80  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.003 0.186  
           
DDD 
Coef.  3.15  0.0413 4.55 
 
 0.1695 -0.2633  
95% CI  3.01 to 3.30  0.0332 to 0.0492 -  0.1142 to 0.2248 -0.7627 to 0.2362  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.300  
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Table 5.13 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention I 
  I  
Intervention  Fluvastatin listed 1/02/1996  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  176.32 
 
 8.30 
 
300.89 
 
 4.98 
 
-55.69  
95% CI  -  - -  2.48 to 7.48 -72.98 to -38.40  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  7.71 
 
 0.3593 
 
13.10  0.2709 
 
-2.90 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.07909 to 0.4627 -4.08 to -1.71  
P>t  -  - -  0.006 
 
0.000 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  60.39  2.79 
 
102.24 
 
 1.57 
 
-21.18  
95% CI  -  - -  0.6023 to 2.53 -29.07 to -13.29  
P>t  -  - -  0.002 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  2.19  0.1098 
 
3.84  0.0733 -1.21  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0117 to 0.1584 -1.76 to -0.6589  
P>t  -  - -  0.091 
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  115.92  5.51 198.64  3.41 -34.51  
95% CI  -  - -  1.85 to 4.98 -44.06 to -24.96  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  5.52  0.2496 9.27  0.1976 -1.69 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.0898 to 0.3053 -2.33 to -1.05  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  9.87 
 
 0.4439 
 
16.53 
 
 0.2629 
 
-3.05 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.1270 to 0.3988 -4.00 to -2.11  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  432.04 
 
 19.18 
 
719.75 
 
 14.43 
 
-158.60 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  3.99 to 24.87 -223.46 to -93.74  
P>t  -  - -  0.007 
 
0.000 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  4.29 
 
 0.2107 
 
7.45 
 
 0.1303 
 
-1.24 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.0648 to 0.1959 -1.63 to -0.8541  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.000 
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Table 5.14 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention C 
  C  
Intervention  Co-payment increase 1/01/1997  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  245.20 
 
 13.28 
 
391.29 
 
 0.3542 
 
-66.99 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -1.86 to 2.57 -85.48 to -48.50  
P>t  -  - -  0.753 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  10.21 
 
 0.6303 17.14  0.0875 
 
-3.81 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0694 to 0.2444 -5.02 to -2.59  
P>t  -  - -  0.273 
 
0.000 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  81.06  4.36 
 
128.97  -0.0153 
 
-21.73 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.7891 to 0.7585 -28.10 to -15.37  
P>t  -  - -  0.969 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  2.63 
 
 0.1831 4.64  -0.0393 
 
-0.9587 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0612 to -0.0174 -1.34 to -0.5816  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  164.13 
 
 8.93 262.32  0.3695 
 
-45.26 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -1.11 to 1.85 -57.69 to -32.82  
P>t  -  - -  0.623 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  7.58  0.4472 12.50  0.0575 -2.45  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0282 to 0.1432 -3.14 to -1.75  
P>t  -  - -  0.188 
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  13.48 
 
 0.7068 
 
21.25 
 
 0.0103 
 
-3.63 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.1095 to 0.1300 -4.63 to -2.63  
P>t  -  - -  0.866 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  561.15 
 
 33.61 
 
930.89 
 
 -1.89 
 
-175.22 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -5.57 to 1.78 -229.28 to -121.16  
P>t  -  - -  0.312 
 
0.000 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  6.21 
 
 0.3410 
 
9.96 
 
 0.0923 
0.0923 
 
-1.75 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.0175 to .1671 -2.30 to -1.19  
P>t  -  - -  0.016 
 
0.000 
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Table 5.15 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention D and J 
  D & J  
Intervention  TGP and Atorvastatin listed 1/02/1998  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  324.30  13.64 
 
501.56 
 
 -3.90 
 
-5.19 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -5.98 to -1.83 -43.28 to 32.89  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.788 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  13.33  0.7178 
 
22.66  -0.0491 -1.83  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.1901 to 0.0920 -3.58 to -0.0904  
P>t  -  - -  0.494 
 
0.039 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  107.24  4.34 163.65  -1.86 -2.10  
95% CI  -  - -  -2.54 to -1.19 -10.60 to 6.40  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.627 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  3.68  0.1438 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  217.06  9.30 337.90  -2.01 -4.24  
95% CI  -  - -  -3.46 to -0.56 -34.92 to 26.44  
P>t  -  - -  0.007 
 
0.786 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  10.05  0.5047 
 
16.61  0.0194 -1.29  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0585 to 0.0973 -2.43 to -0.1464  
P>t  -  - -  0.624 
 
0.027 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  17.62 
 
 0.7170 
 
26.94  -0.2629 
 
0.2969 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.3761 to -0.1498 -2.04 to 2.64  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.803 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  755.67 
 
 31.72 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
DDD 
Coef.  8.22 
 
 0.4333 
 
13.85  0.3102 
 
-1.60 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.2303 to 0.3900 -2.75 to -0.4397  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.007 
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Table 5.16 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention E 
  E  
Intervention  Co-payment increase 1/01/2005  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  496.37  9.73 1304.17  4.17 -82.05  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.34 to 8.67 -130.17 to -33.92  
P>t  -  - -  0.070 
 
0.001 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  20.83  0.67 
 
76.33  -0.0297 -6.67  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.4751 to 0.4157 -10.40 to -2.94  
P>t  -  - -  0.896 
 
0.001 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  161.55  2.48 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  3.68  0.1438 17.48  -0.1135 -1.26  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.1397 to -0.0872 -2.28 to -0.2527  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.015 
 
 
          
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  333.67  7.28 938.04  2.76 
 
-72.41  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2145 to 5.73 -106.80 to -38.03  
P>t  -  - -  0.069 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  15.33  0.5241 
 
58.83  -0.0583 -4.54  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2848 to 0.1682 -6.68 to -2.40  
P>t  -  - -  0.613 
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  27.24 
 
 0.4541 
 
64.93  0.1530 
 
-4.59  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0689 to 0.3749 -7.14 to -2.03  
P>t  -  - -  0.176 
 
0.000 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  755.67 
 
 31.72 3800.85  -4.62 -360.88  
95% CI  -  - -  -26.24 to 16.99 -545.47 to -176.29  
P>t  -  - -  0.674 
 
0.000 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  12.25 
 
 0.7434 
 
73.96  0.3279 
 
-0.8222 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  0.0729 to 0.5829 -3.31 to 1.66  
P>t  -  - -  0.012 
 
0.515 
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Table 5.17 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention F 
  F  
Intervention  Safety Net 20 days 1/01/2006  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1222.12 
 
 13.90 
 
1388.92 
 
 -6.75 -52.45  
95% CI  -  - -  -11.57 to -1.93 -92.29 to -12.64  
P>t  -  - -  0.006 
 
0.010 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  69.67 
 
 0.6390 77.34 
 
 -0.5132 -2.96  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.9568 to -0.0696 -6.99 to 1.07  
P>t  -  - -  0.024 
 
0.149 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  161.55  2.48 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  16.22  0.0303 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  865.63  10.04 
 
986.09  -5.66 -42.51  
95% CI  -  - -  -8.88 to -2.44 -70.49 to -14.52  
P>t  -  - -  0.001 
 
0.003 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  54.29  0.4658 59.88  0.0450 -4.77 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.4681 to 0.5582 -8.17 to -1.37  
P>t  -  - -  0.863 
 
0.006 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  60.34 
 
 0.6071 
 
67.63  -0.3571 
 
-2.48  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.5950 to -0.1191 -4.47 to -0.4915  
P>t  -  - -  0.003 
 
0.015 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  3439.97 
 
 27.10 3765.16  -25.86 
 
-143.04 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -47.56 to -4.17 -340.05 to 53.98  
P>t  -  - -  0.020 
 
0.154 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  73.14 
 
 1.07 85.99  -0.4482 
 
-1.46  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.7138 to -0.1826 -4.18 to 1.27  
P>t  -  - -  0.001 
 
0.294 
 
 
NS – Non Significant 
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Table 5.18 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention K 
  K  
Intervention  Rosuvastatin listed 1/12/2006  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1336.46  7.15 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  74.38  0.1258 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  161.55  2.48 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  16.22  0.0303 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  943.59  4.38 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  55.11  0.5108 60.73 
 
 -0.5442 
 
-0.3802  
95% CI  -  - -  -1.02 to -0.0694 -2.63 to 1.87  
P>t  -  - -  0.025 
 
0.739 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  65.15 
 
 0.2500 
 
-  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  3622.12 
 
 1.23 -  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
DDD 
Coef.  84.54 
 
 0.6231 
 
-  NS NS  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
NS – Non Significant 
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Table 5.19 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention G 
  G  
Intervention  F2 price cut 1/08/2008  
 
All HMG-CoA reductase 
inhibitor drug groups 
Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  1336.46  7.15 1558.21  -5.81 92.72 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -10.71 to -0.92 11.40 to 174.03  
P>t  -  - -  0.020 
 
0.026 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  74.38  0.1258 78.27  0.0027 5.70  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2788 to 0.2843 1.09 to 10.30  
P>t  -  - -  0.985 
 
0.016 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  161.55  2.48 473.77  -2.15 22.39  
95% CI  -  - -  -3.27 to -1.04 -0.43 to 45.21  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.054 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  16.22  0.0303 17.52  -0.0291 1.81  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0777 to 0.0195 0.8111 to 2.81  
P>t  -  - -  0.240 
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  943.59  4.38 1079.40  -3.37 75.36  
95% CI  -  - -  -6.90 to 0.17 13.88 to 136.85  
P>t  -  - -  0.062 
 
0.017 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  55.11  -0.0333 59.68  0.1606 4.96  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0431 to 0.3642 0.5474 to 9.38  
P>t  -  - -  0.122 
 
0.028 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  65.15 
 
 0.2500 
 
72.90 
 
 -0.2718 
 
3.8617 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.4968 to -0.0468 0.2807 to 7.44  
P>t  -  - -  0.018 
 
0.035 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  3622.12 
 
 1.23 3660.37  0.3415 
 
245.08  
95% CI  -  - -  -12.69 to 13.37 40.11 to 450.04  
P>t  -  - -  0.959 
 
0.019 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  84.54 
 
 0.6231 
 
103.85  -0.5026 
 
7.12  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.8677 to -0.1375 1.16 to 13.09  
P>t  -  - -  0.007 
 
0.019 
 
 
 165 
 
5.4.3 Category 3 – all Atorvastatin drug groups 
 For the category 3 analysis, four interventions (intervention E-G and K) were 
analysed and the result are shown in Table 5.20 to Table 5.23. These results are 
presented graphically in Appendix (Figure A20 to Figure A28). Following the 
implementation of intervention E (co-payment increase of 24%), the levels of 
services and benefits across all variables was estimated to decrease except for the 
general beneficiary and DDDs/1000/day variables. For all beneficiaries, the level of 
services was reduced by 33,900 prescriptions [95% CI 6,710; 61,090] (p=0.015) 
while the level of benefits was reduced by A$2,940,000 [95% CI 616,300; 5,270,000] 
(p=0.014). These reductions were primarily due to concessional beneficiaries, 
where the number of services was reduced by 28,430 prescriptions [95% CI 11,720; 
45,140] (p=0.001) and the benefits paid was reduced by A$ 1,820,000 [95% CI 
567,000; 3,070,000] (p=0.005). However, the decrease in levels was followed by an 
increase in the trends of services and benefits across all outcome variables except 
for benefits for general beneficiaries. The trends of services and benefits for all 
beneficiaries increased by 4,660 prescriptions per month [95% CI 2,340,000; 
6,990,000] (p<0.001) and A$470,900 per month [95% CI 164,400; 777,300] 
(p=0.003). Services and benefits for concessional beneficiaries increased by 3,030 
prescriptions per month [95% CI 1,610; 4,440] (p<0.001) and A$320,000 per month 
[95% CI 186,400; 453,600] (p<0.001) respectively. 
 In January 2006, following the introduction of intervention F (Safety Net 20 
days), there were significant reductions in the level of services and benefits for 
across all variables except for general beneficiaries and DDDs/1000/day. Services 
and benefits for all beneficiaries decreased immediately by 42,200 prescriptions 
[95% CI 5,880; 78,520] (p=0.023) and A$3,410,000 [95% CI 287,600; 6,540,000] 
(p=0.033). On average, the rate of decrease for the level of services was 2.07 
prescriptions per 1000 population [95% CI 0.3076; 3.84] (p=0.022) while benefits 
 166 
 
were reduced by A$166.97 per 1000 population [95% CI 15.22; 318.72] (p=0.031). 
There were no statistically significant changes in the underlying trend of services or 
benefits. 
 When Rosuvastatin was listed on December 2006, changes were limited to the 
trend of services and benefits, and no significant changes were estimated for the 
level of services and benefits. Trends of services and benefits reduced by 7,820 
prescriptions per month [95% CI 2,850; 12,790] (p=0.002) and A$516,600 per 
month [95% CI 53,500; 979,600] (p=0.029). The number of prescriptions dispensed 
to general beneficiaries fell by additional 2,010 prescriptions per month [95% CI 
1,340; 2,680] (p<0.001) and the equivalent fall for concessional beneficiary services 
was 5,290 prescriptions per month [95% CI 2,040; 8,530] (p=0.002). The cost of 
prescriptions subsidised for general beneficiaries decreased by A$112,300 per 
month [95% CI 44,100; 180,600] (p=0.001) and for concessional beneficiaries by 
A$360,700 per month [95% CI 104,800; 616,600] (p=0.006).  
 Immediately after the implementation of intervention G (2%, 12.5% or 25% 
price reductions in F2), there were immediate increases in the level of all outcome 
variables. Services to all beneficiaries increased by 58,340 prescriptions [95% CI 
16,520; 100,150] (p=0.007), with 16,130 prescriptions [95% CI 4,380; 27,890] 
(p=0.007) dispensed to general beneficiaries and 42,210 prescriptions [95% CI 
11,880; 72,540] (p=0.007) dispensed to concessional beneficiaries. Benefits to all 
beneficiaries were also significantly increased by A$4,940,000 [95% CI 2,510,000; 
7,360,000] (p<0.001), with increases for general and concessional beneficiaries of 
A$1,250,000 [95% CI 477,600; 2,030,000] (p=0.002) and A$3,690,000 [95% CI 
1,650,000; 5,720,000] (p<0.001) respectively. In the months following the 
implementation of intervention G, the trend of services was reduced significantly 
but benefits remained unchanged. The number of Atorvastatin prescriptions 
dispensed to all beneficiaries was 3,880 prescriptions [95% CI 1,140; 6,610] 
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(p=0.006) less, with reduction for general beneficiaries of 1,830 prescriptions per 
month [95% CI 922; 2,730] (p<0.001) and for concessional beneficiaries of 2,050 
prescriptions per month [95% CI 215; 3,880] (p=0.029). The DDDs/1000/day saw an 
immediate increase in the level by 4.83 DDDs [95% CI 1.51; 8.14] (p=0.005), but 
0.3062 DDDs less per month [95% CI 0.0945; 0.5179] (p=0.005) following the 
intervention implementation.  
 
5.5 Strengths and Weaknesses 
5.5.1 PBS data 
 The Medicare database provides accurate data on the volume of prescriptions 
dispensed and prescription expenditure for the PBS. The PBS data are collected by 
the Department of Human Services when pharmacists lodge claims for 
pharmaceutical benefits that are accepted for reimbursement processing. 
Pharmacists are required to lodge claims once a month to cover pharmaceutical 
benefits supplied during one month within 30 days from when the benefits were 
supplied (Department of Health, 2014a). The claims processing are mainly 
automated and therefore the chance for errors is relatively small. Accurate 
information on volume, benefits, patient category (general and concessional 
beneficiaries) and location (state) of dispensing are the strength of the database 
(Medicare Australia, 2013). 
 The longitudinal nature of the PBS data enables it to provide retrospective 
data since January 1992, thus providing a longer time period for statistical analysis. 
Furthermore, the retrospective nature of the data provides an additional strength 
to the analysis as the outcomes is not affected by contact with researchers. 
 Although the PBS data provides insight into the trend of medicine usage and 
the government’s pharmaceutical expenditure, it does not necessarily give a true 
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representation of overall medicine utilisation. The PBS is a dynamic scheme where 
the PBS schedule is reviewed every few months with medicines being removed and 
new medicines being added to the schedule. The utilisation of medicines that have 
being removed from the schedule are no longer captured by the Medicare database 
while new listing of medicines adds additional patients that were previously not 
captured, thus distorting the real utilisation rate. Furthermore, the Australian 
population and the number of concessional cardholders are constantly changing 
over time. These scenarios created ‘noise’ to the data. 
 There are a number of limitations to the PBS data. Firstly, medicines listed on 
the PBS and supplied to outpatients that cost less than the co-payment (A$36.90 for 
general beneficiary patients and A$6.00 for concession beneficiary patients in 2014) 
do not receive a PBS benefit and are not included in the database. Furthermore, 
some drugs price may fall between the co-payment value of the general beneficiary 
patients and the concessional beneficiary patients. For these drugs, the PBS 
database will include transactions by concessional beneficiary patients but not 
general beneficiary patients unless the general beneficiary patients have reached 
the safety net threshold. Therefore, the data for general beneficiary patients may 
be underreported (Research Economics Support Team, 2011). In addition, prices of 
some drugs may drop for a variety of reasons such as a price cut after a patent has 
expired and these drugs would be captured in a previous year but excluded in the 
following year when drug prices drop below co-payment level.  
 A second limitation of PBS data is the failure to capture the utilisation of 
medicines not listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule such as private 
prescriptions, over the counter drugs, in-patient drugs usage in public hospital and 
new drugs (available to the Australian market but not yet listed on the PBS). Only 
approximately 75% of all prescriptions dispensed in community pharmacies are 
subsidized under the PBS (Lofgren, 2009; Sansom, 2004). 
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 The Medicare database is unable to provide the actual month the medicine is 
dispensed to the patients by the pharmacy. There may be a significant gap between 
the service date and the claim date, as the latter represents the time the service 
was processed by Medicare Australia (Medicare Australia, 2013). 
 A seasonal effect was present in the PBS data due to the safety net 
arrangement. A high level of prescriptions was being filled towards the end of the 
year to accumulate medicines for the consumption in the following year (Donnelly 
et al., 2000). To account for this data seasonality, a lag of 12 months was 
incorporated into the statistical analysis. 
 Taking into consideration the above limitations, the findings presented in this 
study may not reflect the actual effect of the interventions. Medicines supplied 
through community pharmacy that cost less than the general co-payment may be 
an underestimate of prescription volumes particularly for the general beneficiaries. 
In addition, the degree of the changes in level and trend may not necessarily be 
fully attributed to the interventions but other external factors that have not been 
taken into consideration. 
 
5.5.2 Statistical analysis 
 The segmented interrupted time series design used in this study cannot 
determine a strong cause-effect relationship and hence the changes in utilisation 
and expenditure patterns cannot be definitively attributed to the interventions 
studied (Hanbury et al., 2013). Due to the quasi-experimental nature of this study 
where no control group is available, it is only possible to imply that the 
interventions studied were associated with statistically valid changes in outcomes. 
The shortfall of no comparison group in the analysis is partially overcome by taking 
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the pre intervention period as a comparison group for the post intervention period 
(Ferrand et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012). 
 In addition to the above limitation, one intervention, the brand substitution 
policy was found to be implemented a month later after the implementation of the 
re-supply limits policy. Due to the proximity of both interventions, the brand 
substitution break point was dropped from the analysis while the re-supply limits 
break point was included. The brand substitution policy allows pharmacists to 
supply interchangeable brand name medicines with bioequivalent generic 
medicines without seeking advice from prescribers, unless otherwise indicated on 
the prescription. The implication of excluding the brand substitution break point is 
limited as this policy does not influence the selection of medicines by prescribers 
and the amount of subsidies bear by the PBS. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 Comparing the results of category 1 with category 2 and 3, the interventions 
analysed in this study resulted in impacts that were either similar throughout all 
three categories or had different impacts between these categories. Intervention B, 
the re-supply limits policy was not statistically significant in category 1 but was 
shown to increase the trend of services and benefits in category 2 and decrease the 
level of services and benefits, particularly for concessional beneficiaries in category 
3. Both co-payment increment policies, interventions C and E, decreased the level 
of services and benefit across all categories. However, both interventions impacts 
on the trend of services and benefits were limited to category 1 while no significant 
impacts on the trend were estimated for category 2. Category 3 analysis was 
performed only on intervention E and showed similar impacts as for category 1. 
Intervention D (Therapeutic group premium policy) and J (Atorvastatin listed) were 
implemented concurrently and resulted in mixed results. The impacts on category 1 
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were generally in a deceasing direction for both level and trend but the level of 
benefits and the trend of services were the only variables significantly decreased in 
category 2. The next policy to be introduced, intervention F (Safety Net 20 days 
rule), was found to decrease the level and trend of services and benefits in all three 
categories, limited only to the concessional beneficiary. General beneficiaries were 
not significantly affected by this policy. For intervention G, the drug price reduction 
in F2 resulted in various types of impacts. Generally, the levels of both services and 
benefits were increased in all categories and the trends of benefits were not 
significantly changed. However, the trends of services were decreased in category 2 
and 3 while no changes were estimated in category 1. 
 The listing of new statins resulted in a mixed responses. Fluvastatin listing was 
found to have an immediate effect in reducing the number of statin prescriptions 
and expenditure but the effect was short-lived with an increase of the trend in the 
months following the listing. In the case of the listing of Atorvastatin, the impact 
was primarily confined to the number of services with a decrease in trend while the 
levels and trends of benefits were mainly unchanged. The latest addition to the 
statins group, Rosuvastatin, did not make a statistically significant difference to the 
level or trend for the combined statins drug group. However, its listing decreased 
the trends of services and benefits of the all Atorvastatin drug group.  
 The following chapter provides further discussion of the results of the 
statistical analysis of the impact of cost containment reforms to the PBS on 
prescribing volumes and expenditure policies and compares these results to the 
evidence found in the systematic review (Chapter 4.0). 
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Table 5.20 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention E 
  E  
Intervention  Co-payment increase 1/01/2005  
 
All Atorvastatin group Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  216.37  5.77 
 
626.26 
 
 4.66 
 
-33.90 
 
 
95% CI  191.66 to 241.07 
 
 5.23 to 6.31
 
-  2.34 to 6.99
 
-61.09 to -6.71
 
 
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.015 
 
 
       
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  10.20  0.3556 
 
35.45 
 
 0.4709 
 
-2.94  
95% CI  9.26 to 11.10 
 
 0.3225 to 0.3887
 
-  0.1644 to 0.7773
 
-5.27 to -0.6163 
 
 
P>t  0.000
 
 0.000
 
-  0.003
 
0.014
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  83.80 
 
 1.71 
 
205.14 
 
 1.06 
 
-2.70 
 
 
95% CI  73.96 to 93.65 
 
 1.49 to 1.93 
 
-  0.64 to 1.47 
 
-12.87 to 7.46 
 
 
P>t  0.000
 
 0.000
 
-  0.000
 
0.600
 
 
       
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  -  - -  - -  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  132.56 
 
 4.06 
 
421.12 
 
 3.03 
 
-28.43 
 
 
95% CI  117.59 to 147.53 
 
 3.74 to 4.39 -  1.61 to 4.44 -45.14 to -11.72 
 
 
P>t  0.000
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.001
 
 
       
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  6.93  0.2687 
 
26.01  0.3200 
 
-1.82  
95% CI  6.39 to 7.47  0.2492 to 0.2883 -  0.1864 to 0.4536 -3.07 to -0.5670  
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.000 
 
0.005 
 
 
        
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  11.74 
 
 0.2734 
 
31.15 
 
 0.2007 
 
-1.89 
 
 
95% CI  10.31 to 13.17  0.2434 to 0.3035 -  0.0862 to 0.3152 
 
-3.29 to -0.5015 
 
 
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.001 
 
0.008 
 
 
       
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  556.68 
 
 16.97 
 
1,761.71 
 
 21.34 
 
-157.03 
 
 
95% CI  512.36 to 601.00
 
 15.43 to 18.51
 
-  6.43 to 36.24
 
-271.21 to -42.86
 
 
P>t  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
-  0.005 
 
0.007 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  8.09 
 
 0.4571 
 
40.54 
 
 0.2367 
 
1.30 
 
 
95% CI  6.91 to 9.27
 
 0.4163 to 0.4978
 
-  0.1533 to 0.3201
 
-0.9942 to 3.59  
P>t  0.000
 
 0.000
 
-  0.000
 
0.265 
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Table 5.21 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention F 
  F  
Intervention  Safety Net 20 days 1/01/2006  
 
All Atorvastatin group Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  592.36 
 
 10.44 
 
717.60 
 
 -0.3440 -42.20 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -5.82 to 5.13 
 
-78.52 to -5.88
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.901 
 
0.023 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  32.51 
 
 0.8265 
 
42.42 
 
 -0.2584 
 
-3.41 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.8259 to 0.3090 -6.54 to -0.2876
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.370 
 
0.033
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  -  - -  - -  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
           
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  -  - -  - -  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
            
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  392.69 
 
 7.09 
 
477.75  -0.2856 -33.71 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.3777 to 0.3206 
 
-57.21 to -10.20  
P>t  -  - -  0.872
 
0.005 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  24.19  0.5888 31.26  -0.1508 -2.46  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.4326 to 0.1309 -4.23 to -0.6930  
P>t  -  - -  0.292 
 
0.007 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  29.25 
 
 0.4741 
 
34.94 
 
 -0.0285 
 
-2.07 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2949 to 0.2379 
 
-3.84 to -0.3076  
P>t  -  - -  0.833 
 
0.022 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  1604.68 
 
 38.31 
 
2064.40 
 
 -13.32 
 
-166.97 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -40.91 to 14.26 -318.72 to -15.22
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.341 
 
0.031 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  -  - -  - -  
95% CI  -  - -  - -  
P>t  -  - -  - -  
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Table 5.22  Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention K 
  K  
Intervention  Rosuvastatin listed 1/12/2006  
 
All Atorvastatin group Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  675.40 
 
 10.09 
 
786.42 
 
 -7.82 
 
-5.16 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -12.79 to -2.85 -34.07 to 23.75
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.002 
 
0.725 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  39.01 
 
 0.5680 
 
45.26  -0.5166 
 
-0.74  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.9796 to -0.0535
 
-3.25 to 1.77 
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.029
 
0.560
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  202.44 
 
 2.77 
 
266.03 
 
 -2.01 
 
0.7220 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -2.68 to -1.34 
 
-8.42 to 9.87 
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.000
 
0.876
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  3.24  0.0865 
 
11.37 
 
 -0.1123 
 
0.1533 
 
 
95% CI  2.99 to 3.49 
 
 0.0821 to 0.09099
 
  -0.1806 to -0.0441
 
-0.7624 to 1.07
 
 
P>t  0.0000
 
 0.0000
 
  0.001
 
0.741
 
 
        
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  444.05 
 
 6.80 
 
518.88 
 
 -5.29 
 
-4.37 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -8.53 to -2.04 
 
-22.72 to 13.97  
P>t  -  - -  0.002
 
0.638 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  28.79 
 
 0.4380 
 
33.61  -0.3607 
 
-0.6461  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.6166 to -0.1048 -1.99 to 0.6966  
P>t  -  - -  0.006 
 
0.343 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  32.87 
 
 0.4456 
 
37.77 
 
 -0.3914 
 
-0.2323 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.6319 to -0.1508 -1.63 to 1.17  
P>t  -  - -  0.002 
 
0.744 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  1,897.42 
 
 24.99 
 
2,172.29 
 
 -25.54 
 
-34.82 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -47.93 to -3.16
 
-155.86 to 86.23  
P>t  -  - -  0.026 
 
0.571 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  41.84 
 
 0.6938 
 
57.80 
 
 -0.5070 
 
0.4655 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.6413 to -0.3727 -1.39 to 2.32  
P>t  -  - -  0.000 
 
0.621 
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Table 5.23 Estimated number of services, benefits and DDDs/1000/day before and after intervention G 
  G  
Intervention  F2 price cut 1/08/2008  
 
All Atorvastatin group Term  Intercept  Pre-intervention  Changes  
  Trend Level  Trend Level  
All 
Beneficiaries 
(General + 
Concessional) 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  781.26  2.27 
 
826.69 
 
 -3.88 
 
58.34 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -6.61 to -1.14
 
16.52 to 100.15  
P>t  -  - -  0.006 
 
0.007 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  44.52 
 
 0.0515 
 
45.55  -0.1085 4.94  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2931 to 0.0761 2.51 to 7.36  
P>t  -  - -  0.247 
 
0.000 
 
 
            
General 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  266.75 
 
 0.7550 
 
281.85 
 
 -1.83 
 
16.13 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -2.73 to -0.9218 
 
4.38 to 27.89  
P>t  -  - -  0.000
 
0.007 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  3.39  -0.0258 
 
11.01  -0.0239 1.25  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.0938 to 0.0461 0.4776 to 2.03  
P>t  -  - -  0.501 
 
0.002 
 
 
          
Concessional 
Service 
(n, ‘000) 
Coef.  514.51  1.52 544.84  -2.05 42.21  
95% CI  -  - -  -3.88 to -0.2148 11.88 to 72.54 
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.029 
 
0.007
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$, million) 
Coef.  32.96  0.0772 
 
34.51 
 
 -0.0846 
 
3.69  
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2083 to 0.0391
 
1.65 to 5.72  
P>t  -  - -  0.179
 
0.000 
 
 
          
Per 1000 
Population 
Service 
(n) 
Coef.  37.54 
 
 0.0543 
 
38.63 
 
 -0.1688 
 
2.49 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.2946 to -0.0431 0.6500 to 4.33 
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.009 
 
0.008 
 
 
         
Benefits 
(A$) 
Coef.  2,137.47 
 
 -0.5562 
 
2,126.34 
 
 -4.46 
 
218.37 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -13.08 to 4.16
 
109.50 to 327.24
 
 
P>t  -  - -  0.308 
 
0.000 
 
 
           
DDD 
Coef.  58.26 
 
 0.1867 
 
62.00 
 
 -0.3062 
 
4.83 
 
 
95% CI  -  - -  -0.5179 to -0.0945
 
1.51 to 8.14  
P>t  -  - -  0.005
 
0.005 
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Chapter 6.0 Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The global pharmaceutical industry has been growing rapidly along with the 
increase in demand for pharmaceuticals. Global pharmaceutical expenditure for 
2014 is expected to reach US$1 trillion for the first time and is expected to continue 
to rise further (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2013a). The Increase in 
demand for pharmaceuticals is mainly attributed to the ageing population, 
advances in health technology and rising patient expectations. Globally, there were 
approximately 810 million persons aged 60 years or over in 2012, representing one 
out of every nine persons. This age group is projected to increase to one out of 
every five persons by 2050 (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012). Aged 
people are generally more susceptible to chronic diseases and utilize more drugs for 
treatment. Over the last decade, the discovery of newer drugs had improved the 
population’s health status but new drugs usually cost more than their predecessors. 
Drugs such as AstraZeneca’s Crestor (rosuvastatin calcium) and Nexium 
(esomeprazole magnesium), Pfizer’s Lipitor (atorvastatin calcium), 
GlaxoSmithKline’s Seretide (fluticasone/salmeterol), AbbVie’s Humira (adalimumab) 
and Bristol-Myers Squibb and Sanofi-Aventis’s Plavix (clopidogrel) are labelled 
‘blockbuster’ drugs and have achieved sales of over US$1 billion a year (IMS 
Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012b, 2013b, 2014). A study by de Wolf et al. 
(2005) found that the introduction of new drugs contributed approximately two per 
cent of the annual growth of pharmaceutical expenditure in the Netherlands while 
the growth and ageing of the population increased pharmaceutical expenditure by 
1.3 per cent. Other studies have also found that the introduction of new drugs 
increases pharmaceutical expenditure not only in outpatient setting but in inpatient 
settings as well (Liu et al., 2012). As medical technologies advances, patients have 
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higher health care expectations, particularly seeking better quality drugs. Drugs are 
expected to produce more efficient and effective results, in addition to being safer. 
In tandem with the increase in demand for pharmaceuticals, in many 
countries government expenditure on pharmaceutical has been increasing. 
Statistics from the OECD showed government expenditure on pharmaceuticals 
increasing by an average of 76.2% between 2001 and 2011. Countries such as 
Ireland, United States, Korea, Greece and Netherlands all reported strong growth in 
expenditure, with expenditure in 2001 doubling by 2011 (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2013).  
Over the past 20 years, the world had experienced several economic 
downturns, notably the Asian economic crisis in 1997, the global financial crisis of 
2008 and the Euro crisis in 2010-2011. These crises have served as a trigger for 
governments in affected countries to implement austerity measures to improve 
their budget positions and keep spending under control, with pharmaceuticals 
expenditure one of the main areas to be cut. Pharmaceuticals expenditure is more 
often a target for cost reduction policies compared to spending in other health care 
sectors due to it being relatively easy to identify and measure (Towse, 2003).  
In recent years, the European Union (EU) zone has seen many cost 
containment measures related to the pharmaceutical sector being implemented. 
Measures such as price cuts, co-payment changes, reduction of distribution margins 
and increased of value-added tax (VAT) rates on medicines, all of which can be 
introduced rather quickly, have often been used as the first option (Vogler et al., 
2011). Greece, one of the most severely affected countries by the Euro crisis, 
introduced a new reference pricing policy with the average prices set based on the 
three lowest EU prices and reintroduced a positive list with strict pricing criteria for 
drugs eligible for reimbursement between 2010 and 2012 (Bouvy et al., 2013; 
Leopold, 2013). In Ireland, reference pricing was implemented in 2013 with drug 
prices being cut by up to 70 per cent of the original price (Department of Health, 
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2013e). In 2010, Portugal and Spain introduced mandatory price cuts of both 
generic and branded drugs. Generic drug prices were reduced by 30 per cent and 
branded drug prices by 6 per cent in Portugal while price reductions of 25 per cent 
for generic drugs and 10 to 16 per cent for branded drugs were implemented in 
Spain (Deloitte, 2013). Cost containment measures were not limited to the EU but 
Asian-Pacific and other countries followed this trend. For example, pharmaceutical 
price cuts were implemented in countries such as China (2011), Australia (2008), 
Philippines (2009 and 2010) and South Korea (2011) (IMS Consulting Group, 2012). 
In Australia, several cost containment measures have been implemented 
including the requirement of economic evaluation (1993), re-supply limits (1994), a 
brand substitution policy (1994), co-payment increases (1997 and 2005), a 
therapeutic group premium policy (1998), the safety net 20 days rule (2006), the 
creation of F1 and F2 formularies (2007), premium-free dispensing (2008) and price 
cuts (2008 onwards). Although, numerous cost containment measures have been 
implemented over the past two decades, the Australian government is still 
concerned about the growth and sustainability of the expenditure on the PBS. Since 
1991, PBS expenditure has been growing at an average rate of 10% annually 
although slower growth rates were observed in the last decade between 2002 and 
2011 (Department of Health and Ageing, 2012). Recently, the National Commission 
of Audit highlighted PBS expenditure as one of the fastest growing areas of 
government expenditure and this is expected to continue in the medium to longer 
term. The Commission suggested that co-payments should be increased as well as 
the safety net and that a predetermined funding envelope should be established to 
freeze expenditure for seven years. The proposal made was to increase the co-
payment for general beneficiaries by A$5.00 and the safety net from A$1,421.20 
currently to A$1,613.77. For concessional beneficiaries, the suggested co-payment 
was A$2.00 as compared to no charges currently when the safety net threshold is 
reached (National Commission of Audit, 2014).  
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However, not all cost containment measures have been found to be 
successful in controlling expenditure on pharmaceuticals. Some countries have 
succeeded in containing these costs while others have seen expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals continue to increase. Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) studied 16 cost 
containment measures in Spain and found that only four measures were effective in 
containing pharmaceutical expenditure. In Norway, a study by Håkonsen et al. 
(2009) yielded similar result with certain measures for instance, the international 
reference pricing successfully in containing pharmaceutical expenditure, while in-
market reference pricing along with index pricing and generic substitution showed 
limited effect. In contrast to Håkonsen et al’s study, Lee et al. (2006) investigated six 
reference pricing measures in Taiwan and found that international reference pricing 
and in-market reference pricing were not effective in containing pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Instead, reference pricing based on generic grouping significantly 
reduced pharmaceutical expenditure. These examples illustrate that not all cost 
containment measures work well for all countries. Policy makers tend to implement 
cost containment measures from other countries without considering differences in 
cultures or healthcare systems. This so-called ‘penguin effect’ has been mainly 
caused by a lack of research on the effectiveness of cost containment measures 
(Guillén et al., 2003). The poor understanding of cost containment measures was 
pointed out by de Bont et al. (2007) who suggested that policy makers in 
Netherlands rarely used evidence from healthcare databases in their decision 
making, especially in regard to cost control measures and quality assurance.  
Most policy makers also often overlook the fact that the demand for 
pharmaceuticals is different from other commodities. For example, the demand for 
pharmaceuticals is relatively inelastic, which implies measures to change their price 
and influence patients have little effect on the demand for pharmaceuticals. Also, 
while patients might be financially responsible for at least a portion of the cost of 
their purchases of pharmaceuticals, they are usually not the decision makers in 
determining the choice of medicines and are not aware of the availability and 
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characteristics of competing medicines. The choice of medicines is determined by 
the prescribers based on a patient’s conditions, with prescribers not financially 
accountable for the decisions they make (Fisher, 1991; Parvis, 2002; Samuelson et 
al., 2010). 
The implementation of pharmaceutical cost containment measures is an 
extremely complex process. Insurers (in most cases, governments and their 
agencies), introduce cost containment measures with the objective to efficiently 
use the limited resources available and maximize outcomes. This, however, conflicts 
with the objectives of other stakeholders, especially patients and taxpayers, who 
generally want to have equality of access to healthcare and medicines (Drummond 
et al., 2003). Therefore, it is important for policy makers to take into consideration 
the following factors during the conception and implementation of cost 
containment measures (Almarsdóttir et al., 2005; Ess et al., 2003; Garrison et al., 
2003).  
1. Interests of the various stakeholder including insurers, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, prescribers and pharmacies, and residents with a role both 
as patients and taxpayers need to be considered to avoid any one group 
being unduly disadvantaged. This requires policy makers having to balance 
the interest of stakeholders, for instance ensuring the profitability of 
pharmaceutical industry in order to boost the development of new drugs at 
the same time as containing pharmaceutical expenditure.  
2. Measures should be comprehensive and include a broad perspective, rather 
than being limited only to conventional measures such as utilisation and 
pricing constraints, and should include measures such as altering patient’s 
and prescriber’s behaviour to ensure effective pharmaceutical outcomes in 
the long run. 
3. All measures suggested should be evidence-based and supported with 
research on their nature and impact.  
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4. The measures should be proactive rather than reactive. Cost containment 
should be an ongoing process at all times instead of a ‘quick fix’ every time a 
crisis occurs. Very often, the introduction of spontaneous measures lack 
consultation and input from interest groups and produce knee-jerk reactions 
that fall short of their aims. 
5. The evaluation of cost containment measures should be made through using 
both quantitative and qualitative research methodology. This broad 
evaluation is more likely to be able to draw better conclusions on the full 
impact of measures and avoid situations where, for example, reducing 
expenditure on one area (pharmaceuticals) may lead to higher expenditure 
on other areas such as hospital care. 
 
6.2 Cost Containment Measures 
This section presents an overview of the statistical analysis of the PBS cost 
containment reforms and discusses these in the context of the finding of the 
systematic review presented in Chapter 4.0. To facilitate discussion in this section, a 
summary of the results obtained from the Chapter 5.0 are presented in Table 6.1 to 
Table 6.3. 
 
6.2.1 Patient cost-sharing 
The two increases in patient co-payment implemented in January 1997 
(intervention C) and January 2005 (intervention E) resulted in an immediate drop in 
the level of services and benefits but the intervention’s effects were reversed in the 
months post intervention where the trend continued to increase. The immediate 
decrease in the level in January 1997 and 2005 concurred with the expected impact 
suggested in Chapter 5. Patients tend to accumulate medications once the safety 
net threshold is achieved to take advantage of low co-payments (general 
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beneficiaries) and no charges (concessional beneficiaries) for medicines before the 
new co-payment rates imposed in January the following year. The news of co-
payment increases was announced months before its implementation and 
therefore hoarding of medications by patients in anticipation of co-payment 
increased may occur. However, once the reserve of their medications was used up, 
patients gradually returned to their prescriber and pharmacist to refill their 
medications. In Australia, McManus et al. (1996) studied the increase in the general 
beneficiary co-payment and found similar results. The numbers of prescriptions 
dispensed were decreased immediately following the implementation of the 
intervention but later reverted to the pre intervention trend in the following 
months. 
Comparing between both co-payment increases, intervention E (co-payment 
increase by 24%) was found to be more effective in containing services and benefits 
than intervention C (co-payment increase between 15.0 to 18.5%). The rate of 
services and benefits per 1000 population continued to increase at a higher rate 
after the implementation of intervention C but no significant changes in trend were 
observed after the implementation of intervention E. This may be due to the 
greater magnitude of the patient’s co-payment increase in intervention E (25.0%) 
compared to intervention C (15.0 to 18.5%). Given the relatively low price elasticity 
of demand for pharmaceuticals (Landsman et al., 2005), the increase in co-
payments in intervention C may have been too low to significantly decrease 
utilisation and expenditure. Some studies have suggested that a 10% increase in 
price will lead to a decrease in drug use of 1% to 4% (Leibowitz et al., 1985; Smith et 
al., 1992). However, the price elasticity may vary among difference drugs (Goldman 
et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 1997).  
In this study, both general beneficiaries and concessional beneficiaries 
reacted to intervention C in a similar way with trends of services and benefits 
increasing at a higher rate compared to the pre-intervention period. However, the 
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implementation of intervention E resulted in a difference reaction between general 
and concessional beneficiaries. The trend of services and benefits for concessional 
beneficiaries continued to increase at a higher rate while the increase in the trend 
of services for general beneficiaries was reduced to a slower pace while the trend in 
benefits remain unchanged. This finding was reinforced in the category 2 and 3 
analyses where the increasing trend of services and benefits were either slowed 
down or remain unchanged for general beneficiaries. It is often assumed that 
concessional beneficiaries (the elderly and/or the poor) are likely to be most 
sensitive to cost-sharing changes and negatively impacted by these changes. This 
assumption was supported by the studies by Hynd et al. (2008, 2009) that found co-
payment increases had more profound effects in decreasing the medicine utilisation 
of concessional beneficiaries compared to general beneficiaries. Studies from 
Canada (Blais et al., 2001; Blais et al., 2003) had similar findings to the studies by 
Hynd et al. with individuals receiving welfare and paying a lower co-payment 
decreasing their usage of inhaled corticosteroids while older individuals (paying a 
higher co-payment compared to the welfare group) not significantly affected by the 
co-payment increases. Contrary to these studies, Johnson et al. (1978) found no 
differences in drugs utilisations after a co-payment increase between low-income 
and poor patients compared with the rest of the population. A systematic review by 
Goldman (2007) concluded that an increase in cost-sharing reduced the use of 
prescription drugs but the impact was not necessarily greater on low-income 
patients.  
Besides changes to services and benefits, an interesting change was found in 
the category 2 analysis of overall statins DDDs per 1000 population. The trend in 
services and benefits was unaffected by the implementation of both interventions 
but the DDDs per 1000 population trends were increased at a higher rate post 
intervention. This finding suggested that patients taking statins may have resorted 
to pill spitting to alleviate the increased cost of the co-payment. Many statins are 
available at increased dosage at a fractional cost of the lower dosage. By splitting 
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higher doses medicines, patients can save as much as half of the drugs cost 
(Alexander et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2000; Stafford et al., 2002). For example, in 
January 2005, Simvastatin tablets of 5mg and 10mg strength cost A$30.11 and 
A$39.82 respectively. Both strengths were priced above the co-payment of A$28.60 
for general beneficiaries and A$4.60 for concessional beneficiaries. By splitting the 
10 mg tablet into half, patients taking 5mg were able to reduce the cost by 50%, 
paying only A$14.60 (general beneficiaries) and A$4.30 (concessional beneficiaries).  
In conclusion, cost-sharing increases were ineffective in reducing drugs 
utilisation and expenditure. This finding is consistent with the finding from Chapter 
4.0 systematic review, where the impact of cost-sharing were limited to reducing 
drug cost but did not necessarily reduce drug utilisation and drug expenditure. In 
addition, the implementation of cost-sharing may have changed patient drug 
consumption behaviour by encouraging pill splitting that might cause unintended 
effect in health. Most cost-sharing studies reviewed in Chapter 4.0 reported an 
increase in the use of other healthcare services such as hospital care and nursing 
home admissions which offset any or some savings from the cost-sharing measures. 
Therefore, the overall saving to the health care system from cost-sharing policy 
remains uncertain. 
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Table 6.1 Estimated impact of cost containment measures for all PBS medicines 
Intervention 
Category 1 (All PBS Medicines) 
All Beneficiaries 
(General + Concessional) 
General Concessional Per 1000 Population 
Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits 
Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend 
                 
A Economic Evaluation <->  <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <->   <-> <-> <->  <-> <-> 
C 
Co-payment Increase 
Between 15.0-18.5%                 
D 
Therapeutic Group 
Premium Policy      <->           
E 
Co-payment Increase 
24%     <->    <->      <->  <-> 
F Safety Net 20 Day Rule 
    <-> <->  <->         
G F2—2%, 12.5%, 25% 
price reductions 
 <->  <->  <->    <->  <->  <->  <-> 
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Table 6.2 Estimated impact of cost containment measures for all statins 
Intervention 
Category 2 (All Statins) 
All Beneficiaries 
(General + Concessional) 
General Concessional Per 1000 Population 
Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits DDD 
Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend 
                   
B 
Re-Supply 
Limits 
<->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  
C 
Co-payment 
Increase 
Between 
15.0-18.5% 
 <->  <->  <->    <->  <->  <->  <->   
D 
Therapeutic 
Group 
Premium 
Policy 
<->   <-> <->  <-> <-> <->   <-> <->  <-> <->   
E 
Co-payment 
Increase 
24%  
 <->  <-> <-> <->    <->  <->  <->  <-> <->  
F 
Safety Net 
20 Day Rule 
  <->  <-> <-> <-> <->    <->   <->  <->  
G 
F2—2%, 
12.5%, 25% 
price 
reductions  
   <-> <->   <->  <->  <->    <->   
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Table 6.3 Estimated impact of cost containment measures for all Atorvastatin 
Intervention 
Category 3 (All Atorvastatin) 
All Beneficiaries 
(General + Concessional) 
General Concessional Per 1000 Population 
Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits DDD 
Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend 
                   
E 
Co-payment 
Increase 
24%  
    <->  <-> <->         <->  
F 
Safety Net 
20 Day Rule 
 <->  <-> <-> <-> <-> <->  <->  <->  <->  <-> <-> <-> 
G 
F2—2%, 
12.5%, 25% 
price 
reductions  
   <->    <->    <->    <->   
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6.2.2 Re-supply limits and safety net 20 days rule 
This study results showed no significant impact of the re-supply limits 
(intervention B) measure on services and benefits of the all ATC main drug groups. 
The ineffectiveness of this measure was to be expected as the Australian 
government had to introduce an additional measure, the safety net 20 days rule in 
January 2006, to improve the effectiveness of the re-supply limit policy 
(Department of Health and Ageing, 2005). Increasing the duration of the next 
allowable resupply and allowing the cost to continue to contribute to the safety net 
caused the re-supply limits policy to be misused and fail to contain services and 
benefits. Patients took advantage of the safety net to get multiple prescriptions at a 
reduced rate once the safety net threshold was reached, particularly towards the 
end of the year. The abuse of the safety net by patients to hoard medication was 
pointed out by the Australian Treasurer during the budget speech for 2005-06 
(Costello, 2005). The accumulated medicines were for use in the following year 
when the safety net thresholds were reset at the beginning of the year and higher 
co-payments were required to purchase medicines. Donnelly et al. (2000) also 
found no significant changes to the monthly trend in the number of prescriptions 
dispensed in subsequent months following the implementation of the re-supply 
limits measure. No comparisons can be made internationally as similar measures 
have not been introduced.  
Generally, the safety net 20 days rule was the only measure that displayed 
outcomes that matched with the expected impact, where reductions in both the 
level and trend for all beneficiaries were observed. However, when both 
beneficiaries were analysed independently, the reductions were only noticeable for 
the concessional beneficiaries while no significant trend changes were observed for 
general beneficiaries. This finding suggests that concessional beneficiaries were 
affected by this policy change and more likely to have taken advantage of the safety 
net to accumulate medicines. Concessional beneficiaries, mainly comprised 
pensioners and elderly are likely to be more susceptible to diseases, especially 
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chronic diseases, which generally lead to greater use of medicines and require 
longer duration of treatment (Department of Health and Ageing et al., 2013). This 
may explain the success of the safety net 20 days rule in reducing both the level and 
trend of services and benefits.  
 
6.2.3 Therapeutic group premium policy 
The therapeutic group premium is a type of reference pricing. Introduced in 
February 1998, the initial implementation involved four therapeutic groups, ACE 
inhibitors, the calcium channel blockers, the HMG CoA Reductase inhibitors and the 
H2 receptor antagonists. By grouping those drugs into therapeutic sub-groups, the 
government subsidises drugs to the level of the lowest priced drug in the subgroup. 
This measure was expected to reduce the benefits paid by the government, but 
services were not expected to be significantly affected as the number of drugs listed 
in the PBS remains unchanged and patients would not have any reasons to reduce 
drugs usage. The results from the category 1 analysis showed a deceasing direction 
for both level and trend of services and benefits. The unexpected reduction of 
services raises a question about the impact of the policy on patient’s medication 
compliance. To mitigate the additional cost, patients may opt to switch to cheaper 
medicines that do not attract a premium or discontinue the medicines altogether. 
Patients forced to switch to medicines may be exposed to a higher risk of health 
detriment due to different drug response to genetic and environmental variability. 
However, the observed reduction in services may be due to limitation of the data 
that failed to capture prescriptions costing below the co-payment level. By grouping 
drugs into sub-groups, some drugs prices may fall below the co-payment levels and 
have not been captured in the PBS data, thereby artificially reducing the utilization. 
The implementation of this measure also coincided with the listing of Atorvastatin 
in the PBS. Therefore, the impact of this intervention cannot be solely attributed to 
the therapeutic group premium due to other confounding factors. 
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The impacts of reference pricing have been subjected to considerable 
debate. Several studies on reference pricing such as Schneeweiss et al. (2002) and 
Schneeweiss et al. (2003) reported the switching of drugs from medicines requiring 
a co-payment to medicines that were fully subsidised. Schneeweiss et al. (2003) 
found reduction in overall utilisation of drugs that were subjected to reference 
pricing measure as well as reducing drugs cost. In contrast, Hazlet et al. (2002), 
Huang et al. (2012) and Hsiao et al. (2010) concluded that referencing pricing had 
no significant effect on drugs utilisation while the study by Moreno-Torres et al. 
(2011) indicated an increase in the number of prescriptions filled along with a 
reduction in drugs cost and expenditure. 
The findings of this study seem to be consistent with three systematic 
reviews included in Chapter 4 which found a reduction in expenditure following the 
implementation of reference pricing. Aaserud et al. (2006) and Morgan et al. (2009) 
concluded reference pricing induced patients to shift to less expensive drugs and 
reduced overall drug expenditures. However, Galizzi et al. (2011) and Aaserud et al. 
(2006) suggested that savings in drug expenditures were more significant and 
consistent during the first six to 12 months following implementation of reference 
pricing.  
In the category 2 analysis, no significant changes were observed in the trend 
in benefits. Due to the new listing of Atorvastatin, it is likely that prescribers may 
have switched their patients to Atorvastatin, offsetting any saving from the 
implementation of the therapeutic group premium. Before the listing of 
Atorvastatin on the PBS, much publicity had been given to prescribers 
demonstrating that Atorvastatin was better in controlling patient’s lipid profile 
compared to other available statins (Dart et al., 1997; Insull et al., 2001; Marais et 
al., 1997; Wolffenbuttel et al., 1998; Yee et al., 1998). Atorvastatin was widely 
prescribed when it was made available on the PBS in February 1998. Medicare data 
showed 150,000 prescriptions were filled in the first month costing A$8 million. A 
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year later, the number of prescriptions doubled to 310,000 prescriptions costing 
A$16.7 million. By June 1999, the total cost of Atorvastatin has become the third 
highest cost for government, behind Omeprazole and Simvastatin (Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Pricing Authority, 1999). 
In summary, the introduction of the therapeutic group premium appears to 
have led to a reduction in services and benefits. However, an unanswered question 
remains as to the impact of the policy on the health of patients. By bringing 
together a therapeutically similar but chemically different drugs in a group and 
attaching a single reference price to the group, some patients are likely to be 
treated with a drug that may not perfectly suited to them but were selected 
because of their lower price. 
 
6.2.4 Price cuts 
The results of this study showed an increase in the levels of services and 
benefits across all categories immediately after the implementation of the price 
cuts. However, the increases were short lived with the trends of services and 
benefits returning to the pre-intervention trend in the following months. The initial 
increase in the level can be interpreted as a temporary ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to the 
price cuts that may due to patients seeking treatment that persisted before the 
price cuts and prescribers prescribing more costly medication that were previously 
unaffordable (Lee et al., 2012). This phenomenon will offset any long-term saving 
from price cuts as the increase in utilisation will directly increase costs to 
government. Therefore, in order for price control mechanisms to be effective, they 
need to be supplemented with volume controls to constrain overall spending such 
as the safety net 20 days rule (Maynard et al., 2003).  
However, a closer examination of the trend in benefits in different 
beneficiaries showed a reduction in the trend for general beneficiaries while no 
significant changes were observed for concessional beneficiaries. This suggests that 
 192 
 
general beneficiaries may have switched from more expensive medicines usually 
priced above the co-payment to cheaper medicines priced below the co-payment. 
However, concessional beneficiaries were less likely to switch medicines as the co-
payment paid by them were minimal and the price differences were unlikely to 
have any impact on their medicines choices. In a previous study, Lee et al. (2012) 
reported that price cut measures in Korea did not have any impacts on drugs 
utilisation or expenditure while Moreno-Torres et al. (2011) found limited success 
of price cut measures in containing drug cost and pharmaceutical expenditure. 
However, Usher et al. (2012) study concluded that price cuts were effective in 
reducing the cost of drugs and overall expenditures. The study, however, did not 
investigate drug utilisation as one of the outcome variables and therefore the 
impacts on drug utilisation were unknown. 
Of interest was the decrease in trend observed in services of the all statins 
drugs and Atorvastatin following the implementation of price cuts in the category 2 
and category 3 analyses. Compared to the no changes in the trend for benefits in 
both categories, this finding suggests that the implementation of price cuts 
encouraged statins switching by patients who used statins that were priced above 
co-payment, particularly Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin, with the switching to 
cheaper statin drugs. During the August 2008 price cuts, only the prices of two 
statin groups, namely Pravastatin and Simvastatin were cut, with Fluvastatin, 
Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin not subjected to price cuts. Pravastatin used to cost 
between A$25.24 (10mg) and A$79.52 (80mg) while Simvastatin cost between 
A$23.03 (5mg) and A$76.54 (80mg), depending on the strength of the medicine. 
After the implementation of the price cuts, Pravastatin prices were reduced to 
between A$21.23 (10mg) and A$61.28 (80mg) while the price of Simvastatin now 
was between A$19.49 (5mg) and A$59.04 (80mg) (Department of Health and 
Ageing, 2008a, 2008b). The patient’s co-payment for the year 2008 was A$31.30 for 
general beneficiaries while concessional beneficiaries paid A$5.00. Statins that were 
priced below the patient’s co-payment now required less payment while co-
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payment for statins priced above the co-payment remained unchanged. Patients 
taking statins priced above the co-payment may have switched to those priced 
below the co-payment to reduce their cost of medicines.  
In conclusion, price cuts were ineffective in containing the volume of and 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals. The saving to government was offset by the short 
term increase in utilisation and expenditure. The ineffectiveness of price cuts may 
also be due to the limited coverage of this measure that only involved medicines 
listed on F2 which comprises generic medicines.  
 
6.2.5 Economic evaluation requirement 
The implementation of the economic evaluation requirement in January 
1993 resulted in a reduction in the trend in services while other outcomes remained 
unchanged. The economic evaluation requirement policy was introduced as part of 
the requirement for drugs to be listed on the PBS. With the additional requirement, 
the listing of new and more expensive drugs in the PBS may have been delayed and 
therefore reduced the trend of services in the long-term (Harris, 1994). No 
immediate impacts were predicted for this measure as the number of medicines 
and prices remained unchanged. In addition to the reduction of the trend in 
services, the trend in benefits was expected to decrease as more cost-effective 
medicines were listed. However, no changes to benefits were observed in this 
study. The economic evaluation requirement policy does not focus solely on drugs 
being listed in the PBS based on cost-minimisation analysis but also allows new 
drugs to be listed if they are therapeutically superior to the main comparator and of 
acceptable cost-effectiveness. Thus, drugs approved for listing are not necessarily 
cheaper than the comparator already listed. The main purpose of requiring an 
economic evaluation prior to listing was to achieve efficiency or value for money 
rather than being a cost containment measure. Birkett et al. (2001) concluded that 
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in countries that required economic evaluation as part of the listing process, the 
government drug budget has been increasing by 10 percent annually.  
 
6.3 New Listing of HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitor Drug 
This section presents an overview of the statistical analysis of the new listing 
of HMG-CoA Reductase Inhibitor Drug. To facilitate discussion in this section, a 
summary of the results obtained from the Chapter 4.0 are presented in Table 6.4 to 
Table 6.5. 
Generally, the listing of new statins (Pravastatin, Fluvastatin, Atorvastatin 
and Rosuvastatin) on the PBS resulted in non-significant changes in the services and 
benefits in the category 2 analysis with the exception of Fluvastatin. Listed on 
February 1996, the number of prescriptions of statins and expenditures were 
reduced before the effect was reversed with an increase in trend in the months 
following the listing. The unexpected increase of statins utilisation and expenditure 
following the listing of Fluvastatin may be attributable to the increase in prescribing 
by prescribers who were initially reluctant to prescribe statins due to the lack of 
sufficient evidence in improving the survival rate in patients with high blood 
cholesterol levels (Gopinath, 1996). As more epidemiological studies became 
available that showed the benefits of statins in reducing the risk of heart attack in 
patients with coronary disease who have average cholesterol levels (Sacks et al., 
1996; Shepherd et al., 1995), prescribers were more convinced of the effectiveness 
of statins and thus increased the utilisation of statins.  
Collectively as a group, the findings showed that the expenditure on statins 
was not significantly affected by the new listing of Atorvastatin and Rosuvastatin. 
However, it was predicted before the analysis that total benefits paid for statins 
would increase following the listing due to the switching of newer and more 
expensive statins. As discussed in section 6.2.3, the listing of Atorvastatin coincided 
with the introduction of the therapeutic group premium policy. The therapeutic 
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group premium policy was found to decrease the volume of statins dispensed in the 
months following the policy implementation but no impact was observed in 
expenditure on statins. This finding can be explained in part by the switching of 
statins by prescriber and patients. Similarly, the listing of Rosuvastatin resulted in 
patients switching to the new statin and this observation is consistent with the 
reduction in the trends of services and benefits that were observed in the category 
3 analysis. The switch from Atorvastatin to Rosuvastatin decreased the trend of 
Atorvastatin but did not change overall utilisation and expenditure on statins. 
Numerous studies had reported better control of lipid and cholesterol with 
Rosuvastatin as compared to Atorvastatin and others statins, which encouraged 
prescribers to switch to Rosuvastatin (Ballantyne et al., 2006; Clearfield et al., 2006; 
Fonseca et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2007; Schuster et al., 2004; Strandberg et al., 2004) 
In summary, the listing of new statins encouraged prescribers and patients 
to switch to newer and more expensive drug.  
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Table 6.4 Estimated impact of statins listing for all statins 
Intervention 
Category 2 (All Statins) 
All Beneficiaries 
(General + Concessional) 
General Concessional Per 1000 Population 
Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits DDD 
Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend 
                   
I 
Fluvastatin 
Listed 
       <->           
J 
Atorvastatin 
Listed 
<->   <-> <->  <-> <-> <->   <-> <->  <-> <->   
K 
Rosuvastatin 
Listed 
<-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <->  <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> <-> 
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Table 6.5 Estimated impact of statins listing for all Atorvastatin 
Intervention 
Category 3 (All Atorvastatin) 
All Beneficiaries 
(General + Concessional) 
General Concessional Per 1000 Population 
Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits Service Benefits DDD 
Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend Level Trend 
                   
K 
Rosuvastatin 
Listed 
<->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  <->  
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6.4 Limitation and Future Research  
There are a number of limitations in this study. Firstly, there were limited 
numbers of Australian studies investigating the impact of cost containment 
measures. Only four studies (Donnelly et al., 2000; Hynd et al., 2008, 2009; 
McManus et al., 1996) were found and therefore a comprehensive comparison with 
other studies conducted in Australia was not possible. However, comparison with 
cost containment measures in other countries may not provide conclusive findings 
due to the differences in health systems and populations.  
Secondly, findings in this study were based on the changes in post-
intervention levels and trends relative to pre-intervention levels and trends. The 
magnitude of these changes in services and benefits cannot necessarily be 
attributed to the cost containment policies as other external factors might have 
impacted on the results. 
It is recommended that further research be undertaken using a more 
comprehensive database such as the Drug Utilization Sub-Committee (DUSC) 
database to better reflect the true drugs utilisation. In addition to the PBS 
prescription counts and expenditures, the DUSC database provides estimated 
prescription counts of drugs in the non-subsidised categories, mainly prescriptions 
that were under the co-payment and private prescriptions from the Pharmacy Guild 
Survey (Edmonds et al., 1993). The Pharmacy Guild of Australia conducts monthly 
random survey of approximately 300 pharmacies to collect dispensing information. 
However, it is important to note that the Pharmacy Guild Survey was terminated 
beginning 1 April 2012 and this responsibility was taken over by the Department of 
Human Services (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014).  
It would be also interesting to assess the impacts of cost containment 
measures using different types of drug groups such as the proton pump inhibitors, 
antipsychotics and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs). Patients taking 
different groups of medication react differently to cost containment measures. 
 199 
 
Essential drugs such as lipid modifying agents and antipsychotics might be more 
resistant to cost containment measures while discretionary drugs such as proton 
pump inhibitors and NSAIDs might be more sensitive to cost containment 
measures. By knowing how cost containment measures impact on services and cost 
for individual drug groups, policy makers will be able to customise cost containment 
measure to effectively contain volume and expenditure.  
Finally, the focus of this study has been on the impact of cost containment 
policies on prescription volumes and expenditure on pharmaceuticals. The study 
has not covered the impact of cost containment policies on adherence with 
medications, health outcomes, health related quality of life or the economic impact. 
While outside the scope of this study, these are important issues that can be 
addressed in future research. By considering these impacts also, a more complete 
understanding will be obtained of the full impact of cost containment measures 
that have been imposed on the PBS (Kozma et al., 1993). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This aim of the study was to determine the impact of cost containment 
policies on prescription volumes and expenditure on pharmaceuticals listed in the 
PBS. The impact of seven cost containment policies and four new listing dates of 
statins were investigated. Generally, the study found that not all cost containment 
measures were effective in containing costs. Among those measures, the safety net 
20 days rule was found to be the most effective in reducing drugs utilisation and 
expenditure with the overall trend in services and benefits reduced after its 
implementation in addition to initial decrease in level. The therapeutic group 
premium policy was effective in containing utilisation and cost but its effectiveness 
may be limited to only a short time of period. Furthermore, during the initial 
implementation, the therapeutic group premium policy was only imposed on four 
therapeutic groups, namely the ACE inhibitors, the calcium channel blockers, the 
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HMG CoA Reductase inhibitors and the H2RAs. Due to the limited number of drugs 
covered by the therapeutic group premium policy, the impact of this policy on 
prescription volumes and expenditure may not be long lasting. The number of drugs 
covered by this policy was apparently reduced to only three drugs (telmisartan, 
olmesartan medoxomil and eprosartan) in the PBS as of May 2014. 
This study has found that different types of cost containment measures 
impacted differently on different groups of patients. Cost sharing measures such as 
co-payment increases were found to impact general beneficiaries more than 
concessional beneficiaries. General beneficiaries were more sensitive to changes in 
cost as they were subjected to higher co-payment compared to concessional 
beneficiaries and may be negatively impacted by these changes. On the other hand, 
the safety net 20 days rule impacted more on concessional beneficiaries compared 
to general beneficiaries.  
This study also found that patient’s behaviour in regards to drugs utilisations 
was influenced by the cost containment measures and listing of new drugs. The cost 
borne by patients played a major role in shaping patient’s behaviour. Patients 
tended to prefer medicines that required lower payment when co-payments 
increased or medicines price cuts occurred. However, when a new medicine was 
listed, patients were more likely to switch to the new drug. For example, in the case 
of switching from Atorvastatin to Rosuvastatin, switching was more likely to occur 
as both drugs were priced above the co-payment for general and concessional 
beneficiaries and attracted the same co-payment.  
This study also found that patients, especially the concessional beneficiaries 
tend to misuse the safety net by hoarding medication particularly towards the end 
of the year. However, with the implementation of the safety net 20 days rule, 
following the failure of the re-supply limits measure, the likelihood of patients 
misusing the safety net were reduced and resulted in saving in pharmaceutical 
expenditure. 
 201 
 
In summary, the findings of this study have a number of important 
implications for policy makers. The effectiveness of cost containment measures 
varies among countries due to differences in healthcare system and culture. There 
is no one measure that fits all countries. Therefore, policy makers must be able to 
modify cost containment measures to suit one country. Besides containing volume 
and expenditure, cost containment measures were found to alter the drugs 
utilisations behaviour of patients such as drugs switching and hoarding. Changes in 
drug consumption behaviour may result in adverse health and pose additional 
burden to healthcare system. Therefore, the impact of cost containment policies on 
patient health must be taken into consideration in addition to their effectiveness to 
contain volume and cost. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1 Data extraction form for systematic review 
 S I G N 
Data extraction form 
Study identification (Include author, title, year of publication, journal title, pages) 
Guideline topic: Key Question No: Completed by: 
Study design 
This form is intended for use with studies where no comparison group has been used. 
These will normally constitute level 3 evidence and do not require completion of a 
methodology checklist. Please indicate which of the following most closely matches the 
design of the study covered by this form (tick one box): 
 Before and after study:  (Patients are assessed once before, and once after an 
intervention has been applied and allowed time to work).   
 Case series:  (A report on a series of patients with a condition and/or outcome of 
interest).   
 Interrupted time series:  (A study where patients are assessed at regular intervals 
before, during, and after an intervention has been applied. Assessment must be 
made more than once post-intervention).   
 Retrospective cohort: (Study where data is gathered retrospectively on a defined 
group of patients).   
 Single case design:  (Patients are given a treatment and their condition monitored. 
Treatment is then withdrawn and their condition monitored for a further period. This 
sequence may be repeated. Despite the name, the study may cover a number of 
patients but each individual patient will be assessed and reported separately).   
 Single cohort:  (A defined group of patients is observed over a period of time during 
which they receive an exposure or treatment, and the results recorded. There is no 
comparison group. These studies are often retrospective cohorts).   
 Other design: (Please describe briefly) 
Non-systematic reviews and consensus reports (including consensus guidelines) 
constitute level 4 evidence, and do not require data extraction of this kind. 
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The following information is required to complete evidence tables facilitating cross-study 
comparisons.  Please complete all sections for which information is available.  PLEASE 
PRINT CLEARLY 
1 Where is this study carried out? 
Country or state involved 
 
2 What types of data source used? 
Name the data source – e.g. PBS Medicare 
Australia (if appropriate) 
 
3 
 
How many patients are included in this study? 
Please indicate number, at the time the study 
began, and the number of dropouts (if 
appropriate). 
 
4 What are the main characteristics of the 
patient population? 
Include all relevant characteristics –  
 age,  
 sex,  
 ethnic origin,  
 co-morbidity,  
 disease status 
 
5 What kind of drugs included in this study? 
 
 
6 What intervention (treatment, procedure) is 
being investigated in this study? 
List all cost containment policies covered by 
the study. 
 
7 How long are patients followed-up in the 
study? 
The length of time patients is followed from 
beginning participation in the study.  Note 
specified end points used to decide end of 
follow-up (e.g. death, complete cure).  Note if 
follow-up period is shorter than originally 
planned. 
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8 What outcome measure(s) are used in the 
study? 
List all outcomes that are used to assess 
effectiveness of the interventions. 
 
9 What size of effect is identified in the study? 
List all measures of effect in the units used in 
the study – e.g. absolute or relative risk, NNT, 
etc.  Include p values and any confidence 
intervals that are provided. 
 
 
10 How was this study funded? 
List all sources of funding quoted in the article, 
whether Government, voluntary sector, or 
industry. 
 
 
11 What is the limitation of this study? 
List all the limitation. 
 
12 Does this study help to answer your key 
question? 
Summarise the main conclusions of the study 
and indicate how it relates to the key question. 
Include any comment on the choice of study 
design, likely validity of the conclusions, etc. 
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Figure A3 Number of services for general beneficiaries and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 
1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A4 Total benefits for general beneficiaries and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 
1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A5  Number of services for general beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A6 Total benefits for general beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A7 Number of services for concessional beneficiaries before and 
after interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
 
0
2000000
4000000
6000000
8000000
10000000
12000000
14000000
16000000
18000000
20000000
Total Service (Concessional) Line of Best Fit
Intervention 
A C D E F G
 254 
 
 
Figure A8 Total benefits for concessional beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A9 Number of services per 1000 general and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 
1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A10 Total benefits per 1000 general and concessional beneficiaries 
before and after interventions for all ATC main drug groups, January 1992 to 
March 2012 
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Figure A11 Number of services for general beneficiaries and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor 
drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A12 Number of benefits for general beneficiaries and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor 
drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A13 Number of services for general beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, January 1992 to 
March 2012 
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Figure A14 Number of benefits for general beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, January 1992 to 
March 2012 
 
 261 
 
 
Figure A15 Number of services for concessional beneficiaries before and 
after interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, January 1992 
to March 2012 
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Figure A16 Number of benefits for concessional beneficiaries before and 
after interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, January 1992 
to March 2012 
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Figure A17 Total services per 1000 general and concessional beneficiaries 
before and after interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, 
January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A18 Total benefits per 1000 general and concessional beneficiaries 
before and after interventions for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, 
January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A19 Total DDD per 1000 inhabitants before and after interventions 
for all HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor drug groups, January 1992 to March 2012 
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Figure A20 Number of services for general beneficiaries and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, 
February 1999 to March 2012 
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Figure A21 Number of benefits for general beneficiaries and concessional 
beneficiaries before and after interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, 
February 1999 to March 2012 
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Figure A22 Number of services for general beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to March 2012 
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Figure A23 Number of benefits for general beneficiaries before and after 
interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to March 2012 
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Figure A24 Number of services for concessional beneficiaries before and 
after interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to March 2012 
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Figure A25 Number of benefits for concessional beneficiaries before and 
after interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to March 2012 
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Figure A26 Total services per 1000 general and concessional beneficiaries 
before and after interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to 
March 2012 
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Figure A27 Total benefits per 1000 general and concessional beneficiaries 
before and after interventions for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to 
March 2012 
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Figure A28 Total DDD per 1000 inhabitants before and after interventions 
for all Atorvastatin drug groups, February 1999 to March 2012 
 
 
